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RARE EVENTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
MODELING HETEROGENEITY AND INTERDEPENDENCE WITH
SPARSE DATA
Scott J. Cook, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2014
The interdependence of international events is obvious to even casual observers of
global politics. History is replete with examples of events repeating within states and/or
being influenced by outcomes in other states. Despite this, much of the current literature
in International Relations either mishandles or outright neglects this dependence, thereby
threatening the credibility of our inferences. In large part, this stems from the difficulty of
modeling such dependence when one’s data are binary and rare, as they often are for many of
the most widely-studied phenomena in IR (e.g., violent conflict, economic crises, etc. . . ). For
data of this type, commonly-used strategies to capture dependence are frequently ill-suited
and, as such, new approaches are required. Therefore, this thesis aims to clarify the empirical
challenges which arise from these data, detail the problems with existing approaches, and
offer alternatives which should be preferred.
The focus is principally on two potential (and related) sources of bias which may arise
within binary time-series cross-sectional (b-TSCS) data: true (inter-)dependence and unit
heterogeneity. In the first, the outcomes, actions, and/or choices of some unit-times depend
directly on those of other unit-times. To model both spatial and serial dependence in such
data, a spatiotemporal-lag probit model estimated using maximum-simulated-likelihood us-
ing recursive-importance-sampling (MSL-by-RIS) is presented. This allows us to directly
model the dependence of the lagged-latent outcomes, which is shown to have several advan-
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tages over models using the observed indicator (e.g., model consistency, effects estimation,
predictive accuracy). The second main focus is on the threat of unobserved unit heterogene-
ity, that is, when time-invariant unit-characteristics influence the outcome, action, choice,
but go unmodeled. While fixed-effects estimators are traditionally the solution to this issue,
such models have received heavy criticism in political science applications with b-TSCS data.
In light of these criticisms, a penalized-maximum-likelihood fixed effects (PML-FE) model
is proposed which suffers from few of these drawbacks and permits the estimation of novel
unit-specific substantive effects. In addition, original analyses into intrastate conflict and
financial crises are offered to highlight the value of these approaches for testing existing, and
motivating new, theories of international behavior.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
I don’t particularly care about the usual...Can you assess the danger a criminal
poses by examining only what he does on an ordinary day? Can we understand
health without considering wild diseases and epidemics? Indeed the normal is often
irrelevant.
— Nassim Taleb
...the opportunity to be wrong is considerably enhanced when the design is
two-dimensional.
— James A. Stimson
Many of the most interesting phenomena in International Relations, and political sci-
ence more generally, are either by nature or design binary. Which is to say that the choices,
actions, and outcomes of states can only be observed as having occurred or not, as being
present or absent. Binary outcomes inherently complicate our ability to understand what
gives rise to these phenomena, as they reveal less information about the process by which
they were produced than do continuous outcomes.1 By analogy, it is easier to estimate the
utility a state places on military preparedness (e.g., military consumption over GDP), than
it is to estimate the utility it places on avoiding war (i.e., war/no war). While this con-
cern is common to any analysis with binary outcomes, it is more salient in International
Relations where our binary outcomes are almost invariably rare as well. When events oc-
cur infrequently, we have even less information from which to derive our understanding of
their causes. Despite these unique challenges, surprisingly little attention has been paid to
1Train (2009) discusses this in terms of deriving the choice probabilities for individuals when making a
selection.
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the consequences of estimating models with binary rare-event data. In part, this is because
other fields do not as often confront these data in their analyses.2 However, rare and binary
outcomes are central in International Relations, with models of such events representing
amongst its most significant and substantial contributions.
Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in the study of the causes of interstate war.
Despite the (thankful) rarity of such wars, little work in political science has had the impact
of the democractic-peace theory (Doyle 1986, Maoz & Russett 1993, Russett 1994).3 That
democracies rarely go to war with each other is taken as one of the law-like empirical regular-
ities of political science (Levy 1988). In its wake, a substantial amount of research has sought
to better understand (e.g., De Mesquita et al. 1999) or explain away this finding, arguing
that it is a consequence of other related factors (e.g., alliances (Gowa 1994; 1995), capitalism
(Gartzke 2007), American hegemony (Rosato 2003)) or model mispecification (Green et al.
2001), though evidence continues to offer support for the peace between democracies (Dafoe
et al. 2013). In addition to motivating this line of research, the democratic-peace theory is
unique among political-science research in that it seems to have carried meaningful weight in
foreign policy decision-making. Presidents Clinton and Bush both expressed a belief that the
spread of democracy was an essential component for the promotion of peace, under the logic
that democracies don’t attack one another. As a result, it has been used as a motivation for
the promotion of democracy and, it is argued, as a potential justification for war itself (e.g.,
2003 Iraq War).
Other forms of conflict are also quite rare, including the study of intrastate war. While
civil war is now the most frequent and prominent form of armed conflict, it remains a rare
event. As Gates (2002) notes an “inherent problem characterizing civil war data is the
relative rareness of this event,” (22). This is particularly true if we confine our attention to
new wars, of which there are rarely any in a given year. However, when we do see civil war
2Of course there are notable exceptions to this. In biostatistics and medicine low rates of occurrence in
randomized trials often requiring cross-trial clustering procedures, in behavorial economics the importance of
rarity in shaping expectations (and responses) has been widely discussed, in machine learning and language
processing algorithms for divining patterns from extremely sparse data are increasingly common. The
more fundamental point is that these events are not so central in other fields so as to have motivated the
construction of a range of general techniques and strategies when dealing with models of rare events.
3Beck (2008) notes that Maoz & Russett (1993) is the second most widely cited article from the American
Political Science Review in the last twenty five years.
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it is often in states within the context of recurring or enduring conflicts. Consequently, a
small fraction of states account for the majority of civil wars that are observed, motivating
researchers to attempt to understand why conflict is so frequent in these countries but so
rare everywhere else (Collier et al. 2003). The dominant explanation given in the literature
is that underdevelopment in these states gives rise to conflict, creating conditions conducive
to rebellion (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, Fearon & Laitin 2003). As with the democratic peace
for interstate war, the ‘developmental peace’ is one of the most robust empirical regularities
in the discipline, with some arguing that it has resolved the debate on the causes of civil
war (Rice et al. 2006). As a result, scholars consistently advocate and policy-makers have
increasingly begun to pursue development as a strategy for reducing the risk of civil war.
Given the severe consequences of civil war – casualties in the millions, destabilizing refugee
outflows, domestic and regional economic costs in the millions, disease, pollution, etc... –
it is clearly important to understand why they occur and, in turn, what might be done to
make them even rarer.
Rare-event outcomes are not unique to peace studies, however, research into the emer-
gence of economic regionalism is among the more important work in international cooper-
ation. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 377 regional trade agreements
(RTAs) were in force as of 2014. While this is less rare than interstate wars, as a proportion
of the total number of dyads which could have agreements it is still quite rare. Researchers
have sought to understand the domestic and international political conditions affecting the
decision to enter into RTAs, arguing for the impact of waning American hegemony (Mansfield
& Milner 1999), stalled multilaterism (Mansfield & Reinhardt 2003), joint democracy (Mans-
field et al. 2002), and domestic veto-players (Mansfield et al. 2007). Given the purported
benefits or costs of these agreements suggested by the literature for trade (Magee 2008),
investement (Bu¨the & Milner 2008), repression (Hafner-Burton 2005), and war (Mansfield
& Pevehouse 2000), it is important to understand the conditions which cause states to enter
them with the states they do.
International Political Economy scholars also frequently analyze rare events, with the
study of economic crises being the most recent and prominent example. As noted by (Leblang
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& Satyanath 2006, 245) “currency crises are are costly phenomena that have been excep-
tionally difficult to explain and predict.” These rare events result in severe economic decline
(Bordo et al. 2001), often crippling economies for years after, and social and political un-
rest (Frankel 2005), including shorter leader tenure and regime turnover. Banking crises are
equally debilitating, imposing considerable fiscal costs (Laeven & Valencia 2012). Further-
more, banking crises often precipitate currency and/or sovereign debt crises in their wake
(Reinhart & Rogoff 2011). While our understanding of the causes of the events remains
limited, IPE scholars have increasingly offered political explanations for these events. No-
tably, scholars have argued that political institutions (e.g., veto players, divided government,
government turnover) determine both the ability of states to respond to crises and the expec-
tations of investors about these responses Leblang & Satyanath (2006), MacIntyre (2001).
Given the recent global recession it is likely that analysis into these events will only increase
in the future Helleiner (2011), Mosley & Singer (2009).
As can be seen, rare and binary events are routinely found in the study of International
Relations. Therefore, it is important to know what, if any, unique challenges are raised in
their analysis. We have already mentioned that they provide less information, but how
exactly does that matter? Returning to the democratic-peace literature helps illustrate
the possible problem(s). Critics have suggested that one of the impediments to gaining an
accurate understanding of the relationship between democracy and conflict is the rarity of
war itself.4 Spiro (1994) was among the first to voice these concerns, arguing that the failure
to observe democracies at war is not theoretically meaningful, but instead a function of the
rarity of war and the paucity of jointly democratic dyads. In particular, he expressed, if
somewhat imprecisely, two concerns about Maoz & Russett (1993)’s analysis which continue
to cloud the democratic peace debate today: i) estimating a model of war which pooled all
dyad-years and ii) treating each dyad-year as if it were independent. While much progress
has been made on these issues since, these concerns remain fundamentally the same problems
faced by researchers today.5 In general, as the number of occurrences of an event decreases, it
4This is in addition to a range of other measurement issues – primarily centered on ones understanding
and coding of democracy – which will not be addressed here.
5These advances include the efforts to better account for temporal dependence in binary data (Beck et al.
1998, Carter & Signorino 2010), and a thorough discussion on the appropriateness of various panel models
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becomes increasingly difficult to determine whether our empirical findings are a consequence
of substantive theoretical explanations, (un-modeled) heterogeneity among the units, or
dependence within the outcome. Given these constraints, researchers are often forced to
choose between several second-best choices, often with little guidance or justification. As a
consequence, even those relationships widely regarded as “empirical law” rest on potentially
specious modeling assumptions.
Consider again the work on civil war onset, with its focus on explaining the uneven
distribution of conflict among states. It could be, as is argued by the developmental peace
literature, that the states which experience conflict regularly are simply abundant in the
factors that produce conflict (e.g., low GDP per capita).6 However, there are alternative
explanations which would place these conflicts in the same countries. First, these states
are also likely to possess unobserveable factors which make civil war more likely (e.g., weak
social institutions, historical antipathy among ethnic groups, etc...). Moreover, these same
unobservable factors may also be a cause of the low levels of development in these countries,
complicating efforts to understand the direct impact of development on civil war (Djankov
& Reynal-Querol 2010). Second, given that these countries experience repeated episodes of
conflict it would seem to indicate dependence between these events. This is exactly the point
raised by the ‘Conflict Trap’ literature, which suggests that experiencing a civil war makes
subsequent civil wars more likely due to economic destruction, heightened antipathy, and the
introduction of guns, troops, and ideologies of conflict into the state (Collier et al. 2003). As
such, it is argued that the dynamics of conflict itself produces additional conflict. Further-
more, civil war also generates lower levels of development, which again calls into question
the meaningfulness of the observed relationship between GDP and conflict. While conflict
scholars appreciate these alternative explanations, their ability to discriminate between them
has been constrained by limitations in the available techniques for modeling binary and rare
event data.
(Beck & Katz 2001, Green et al. 2001, King 2001, Oneal & Russett 2001). Both advances will be discussed
in greater detail in subsequent chapters.
6Here and throughout the remaining chapters I use the ‘developmental peace’ to succinctly refer to the
various works linking low GDP to civil war. I simply note this as it is not a phrase which is common to the
literature (or at least not that I am aware).
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In sum, the rate at which we have produced theories pertaining to rare phenomena has
seemed to outpace our ability to accurately estimate models of rare data. In the broadest
sense, binary data confront many of the same threats to accurate inference found with
interval data, but researchers possess fewer solutions for dealing with and overcoming these
concerns. Moreover, the rareness of these data itself complicates the efficacy of even existing
strategies explicitly suited for binary outcomes. These methodological shortcomings and my
belief in the importance of the substantive areas affected by them serve as the motivation for
the remaining chapters. In short, I will discuss the nature of some of the empirical challenges
presented in models of binary data, provide possible solutions to these issues, and indicate
how these strategies enable us not only to test our existing theories more accurately, but
actually motivate (and demand) new theories of international behavior. Moreover, I present
original analyses into the study of war and financial crises which challenge conventional
understandings of these events. To help frame these issues, I open here with a brief discussion
of the conventional design and estimation of binary-outcome models. This also allows me to
introduce some of the notation which will be used throughout.
While most of the empirical work on binary and rare events in International Relations
increasingly utilizes time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) data – which is defined loosely by
Beck (2008) as “a relatively small number of units observed for some reasonable length” –
some questions remain ill-suited for, or lack the data demanded by, TSCS analysis.7,8 There-
fore, for both generality and ease of exposition, I begin the discussion focusing exclusively
on cross-sectional analysis before expanding the analysis to include a time dimension.9 A
simple model for cross-sectional data with a binary outcome is presented in Equation 1.1.
While there are several analogous ways to motivate the generating process for binary data,
7Beck (2008) partly credits the success of the “Democratic Peace” literature for the proliferation of time
series cross-sectional data.
8For example, the use of child soldiers in civil war is predominantly modeled with “conflict” as the unit
of analysis.
9I do not discuss time-series analysis uniquely as it is rare for empirical IR to exhibit no cross-sectional
variation. An exception would be theories on changes at the systemic level which examine only variation
across time. For these contexts the later discussion on modeling temporal dependence in TSCS data should
suffice.
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the latent-variable representation is particularly intuitive and will be used in the remaining
chapters.10,11 Under this formulation the regression function is given by:
y∗i = αi + Xiβ + i (1.1)
where α is the constant, Xi is k matrix of included regressors, β is a vector of their associated
coefficient-parameter estimates, i is an i.i.d error disturbance, and identifying subscript






0, if y∗i ≤ 0
(1.2)
If instead latent-variable y∗ were observed, estimation would be straight-forward, as
it is a linear function of the regressors, with i giving the prediction errors. Instead, we
only observe y∗ in terms of its sign (1.1) and therefore must specify a link function to relate
the distribution of the observed responses to the linear predictors. The two common link
functions used to estimate binary outcomes are logit and probit.12,13 Both will provide the
response probability (conditional on Xi that we are interested in:
10The latent variable formulation will also be useful later in discussing the correlations among observations.
11Alternatives include the index model, the utility model, etc...
12In applied empirical International Relations work logit is clearly the preferred choice. While some may be
making this choice purposefully – the fatter tails of the logistic CDF are argued to make it less susceptible to
outliers which may be more present in rare-event data – in practice there is often little justification provided.
13Another approach to binary data which is widely discussed in the econometric literature but is not
commonly used in International Relations is the linear probability model Angrist & Pischke (2008). While
the LPM is easy to estimate – simply regressing y on X using OLS – the predicted errors are necessarily
heteroskedastic and frequently fall outside the unit interval, therefore such approaches are typically cautioned
against in most introductory econometrics texts (Wooldridge 2012). More seriously, as Dave Giles has noted,
LPM cannot produce consistent estimates of the true marginal effects as it does not produce consistent
estimates of the parameters. Furthermore, any measurement error – mis-classification of zeroes and ones –
has been shown to be a much more serious problem for LPM models than logit or probit (Hausman et al.
1998). Mis-classification is not limited to an incorrect coding of the data, but rather is also present in
situations where units are modeled as being at risk of failure when they are not truly. As researchers have
argued in a different context – as motivation for split-population models (Xiang 2010) – this is likely the case
for a number of the more prominent applications in international relations (e.g., interstate war initiation).
Given these limitations and the ease with which one can estimate probit and logit models using conventional
statistical packages, I do not discuss the use of the LPM model of binary data any further.
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Pr(i < Xiβ) = Pr(yi = 1|Xiβ) = pii ≡ F (X′iβ) (1.3)
With differences arising from the specification of Cumulative Distribution Function (i.e.,
F (·)), with probit specifying the errors as distributed standard-normally and logit distributed
logistically:
Logit: pii ≡ Λ(Xiβ) ≡ exp(Xiβ)
1 + exp(Xiβ)





With the joint density of yi for all i given Xi for each logit and probit being the product of
the individual observation’s density:
f(y|Xiβ) =
∏
F yii (1− Fi)1−yi (1.5)
and the log-likelihood the sum of the individual log-likelihoods:
logL(β) =
∑
{yilog(pii) + (1− yi)log(1− pii)} (1.6)
which is then maximized to provide parameter estimates βˆ which best fit the data. Assuming
the observations are independent and normally distributed βˆ is a consistent, asymptotically
normal, and efficient estimate of β, and is produced via the standard pooled logit or probit
estimator. Unfortunately, these assumptions are rarely valid even in cross-sections of data,
as our observations (and therefore marginal probabilities) are often correlated across units.
More informally, such (inter)dependence may be present whenever we have cause to
suspect that the actions, outcomes, and choices of states (dyads, etc...) are influenced by the
choices of some other actors. Which is to say, always and everywhere. Indeed coming up with
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examples where the actions of states are completely independent is far more difficult than
thinking of situations where they are affected by one another. Even more to the point, what
is the field of International Relations if not a collection of theories on how the interactions
between states produce outcomes which would otherwise be different? Historically (and
colloquially), interdependence has been used to describe those situations in which members
opt-in to some system which results in a form of intended mutual dependence (e.g., trade,
alliances, agreements). These connections, however, also create a structure through which
the actions taken in one member-state i have consequences for another member-state j.
More accurately, given the ubiquity and density of these ties in the current global landscape,
the actions of i affect all other states j 6= i, either directly or indirectly. Furthermore,
and somewhat obviously, the likelihood with which some event influences others increases
as a function of the significance of the event.14 This means that the very issues which are
presumably the most interesting to scholars (i.e., the important ones) are also those which
are the most likely to be affected by spatial interdependence.15
As Franzese & Hays (2007; 2008) have shown analytically and numerically, failing to
account for this spatial dependence results in inefficient and inaccurate standard errors at
best, and generally bias as well. To avoid this, we will typically want to include a spatial-lag
– analogous to the more familiar temporal lag except that it relates the outcomes of different
units weighted by some measure of relation (canonically distance) between the two (Chapter
2 provides a more formal treatment) – to capture the interdependence among the units as
follows:
14Drawing upon the Epidemiologic Triad for disease transmission, we might consider the risk of spatial
spillovers to be a function of three factors: the virulence of an external agent, the susceptibility of host, and
the conditions of the environment, each of which interact to determine whether a disease develops. There
are obvious parallels to this in our understanding of the spread of political phenomena and it is a model I
develop more fully later.
15I should note that the likely presence of and theoretical consequences which result from such interdepen-
dence are increasingly being explored by International Relations scholars in most all issue areas. Simmons
et al. (2006)’s work identifying four distinct theoretical mechanisms for the diffusion of liberalism – i) coer-
cion, ii) competition, iii) learning, and iv) emulation – has been widely cited and spurred work on diffusion
in a range of additional issue areas. Furthermore, studies exploring the spread of social movements, the
diffusion of regimes, and the contagion of conflict are increasingly common.
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y∗i = αi + ρWy
∗ + Xiβ + i (1.7)
With continuous outcomes, we then simply estimate this model using one of two consis-
tent and relatively easy to implement estimators (Spatial-ML and Spatial-2SLS).16 However,
as briefly introduced in Franzese & Hays (2008) and elaborated (& extended) in Franzese
et al. (2014), estimating spatial models with qualitative dependent variables is not as straight-
forward. In short, spatial interdependence renders standard probit inappropriate as the
marginal probabilities are no longer independent, meaning that the joint probability is not
simply the sum of the log of marginal probabilities (as in Equation 1.6).17 As such, estima-
tors which either estimate non-spatial or ‘na¨ıve’ spatial models – the only models currently
employed for models of binary and rare events in International Relations – will produce
potentially wildly biased estimates.
The likelihood of dependence in our data only increase if we introduce over-time data
to our cross-section. While the myriad benefits that come from time-series-cross-sectional
data have rightly made it the dominant “large-N” data structure in International Relations,
it becomes even less likely that our observations are independent. That is, to estimate a
conventional logit or probit – one with no correction for (latent) auto-correlated residuals –
we would have to be willing to assume that the likelihood with which a state experiences
an event in one period is unrelated to the likelihood that a states experiences that event in
other periods, which is rarely, if ever, the case. To see these issues, I now expand our model
from Equation 1.1 to include variation in the outcome across time:
y∗it = αi + Xitβ + it (1.8)
with t indexing time t = {1, . . . , T} and it now indexing (unit-time) observations it =
{1, . . . , NT}. As with spatial auto-dependence, any dependence within a single unit i across
16Franzese & Hays (2007) even indicate that Spatial-OLS performs reasonably with low levels of interde-
pendence.
17As discussed later, we must instead maximize the log of one n-dimensional non-separable probability.
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time t will complicate estimation. Namely, it would mean that, once again, our marginal
probabilities are not independent. While this is unlikely to result in bias, as in the case of
spatial interdependence, serial dependence in the data still results in inefficient and incorrect
standard errors, thereby risking overconfident inferences (Beck 2008, Poirier & Ruud 1988).
This dependence manifests frequently in many of the rare events we have discussed thus
far, with many exhibiting substantial persistence in the outcome. As an example, Gates
(2002) notes that ‘conflict data tend to be characterized by complex dependence struc-
tures...any econometric analysis of civil conflict must account for this lack of independence
across cases,”(22). The same is true for almost anything of interest.
It is, therefore, important to account for both a state’s previous actions and its ‘neigh-
bors’ current ones, as these outcomes condition the future behavior of a state.18. These
‘prior’ events (in time or space) alter the factors which determine future occurrences. We see
evidence for the logic of this framing every time we make a decision: my choice today is a
consequence of my prior experiences. However, another explanation could be also be linking
these decisions, perhaps I am just the type of person who is inclined to make a particular
choice (regardless of previous experiences). As noted by Heckman (1978), the prior expla-
nation assumes an implicit counter-factual wherein the same actor would have a different
probability of experiencing an event (making a choice, etc. . . ) today if the past had been
different, that is, if that event, choice, action had not occurred. This is true dependence. An-
other explanation is that we see persistence in the actions taken by individual actors because
they have heterogeneous propensities to experience the event which are themselves correlated
across time. In this respect, the prior and current events do not meaningfully depend upon
one another, but are only related to the extent that it is the same actors experiencing them.
As any treatment on panel data informs us, this unobserved unit-level heterogeneity may
pose the same threat to inference on the substantive parameters as dependence did in our
prior discussion. As such, it is important to account for it in our analysis.
In short, we need to establish baseline expectations for the behavior of all units in
the sample (i.e., constants). Different assumptions about the heterogeneity of the time-
18Neighbors used literally here, but only as a convenient term to denote spatial proximity.
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invariant latent propensities (and ultimately their relation to the included regressors) give
rise to different models. If one assumes that αi = α – that is, no unit level heterogeneity
– one simply estimates pooled probit or logit models. To the extent that the αi = α these
models are unbiased and provide the most efficient estimates of the parameters. But notice
how restrictive this assumption is, it requires that there are no unobserved factors which
distinguish between the units in the model. This is rarely the case. Furthermore, when
significant differences between αi and α exists – i.e., when there is unit-level heterogeiety –
this model is misspecified and the estimates will be biased. Often it will be more realistic to
assume that αi varies across units and specify a model which accounts for this unobserved
unit-specific variation. 19 This gives rise to two broad estimation strategies – distinguished by
the assumption about the relationship between αi and X – random and fixed effects. In short
and saving the technical details for later discussion, if one believes that the individual level
effects αi are unrelated to X, we can regard them as a problem only of the stochastic term
and estimate the random-effects model. Generally, however, it is unlikely the unobserved
factors which affect the outcome will be orthogonal to the observed factors. If they are
correlated then we need to account for the unobserved effects in the structural term and
estimate a fixed effects model.
The permissiveness of these approaches for rare-event binary-outcome models in Inter-
national Relations has been subject to much debate (Beck & Katz 2001, Green et al. 2001,
King 2001, Oneal & Russett 2001). While all agree that there are likely unobserved unit
effects which correlate with the regressors, many still feel fixed effects is almost never a good
idea with these data. First, given that it eliminates between variation from the analysis,
fixed effects models cannot provide estimates for time-invariant regressors and may provide
incorrect estimates for those that are nearly time-invariant. This latter point is particu-
larly important, as many of the explanators International Relations scholars are interested
in change ‘slowly’ – that is, exhibit greater variation between units on average than within
units over time – such as institutions, population, development. The other major prob-
lem with available fixed-effects models of binary outcomes is that those units which do not
19I pause to remind readers that this was the second major issue raised by Spiro (1994) regarding the
empirical work on the Democratic Peace, that is, whether or not it is valid to estimate pooled models which
treat all dyad-years as having a common baseline propensity for war.
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change state – e.g. Σtyit = 0 or T – contribute nothing to the likelihood (returning esti-
mates of ±∞) and are consequently dropped from the analysis. As such, researchers have
argued that estimating these models induces sample-selection bias by removing all the cases
which never experience the outcome. Given that there are many such units in rare event
data this problem is concerning. Thus, researchers with rare-event binary-outcome data face
a Morton’s fork: either assume the presence of no or orthogonal individual unit effects in
situations where such assumptions are likely invalid or estimate models which account for
this heterogeneity but induce other forms of bias into the analysis (e.g., sample selection,
incidental parameters, rarely-changing regressors).
In sum, I have presented two ways in which unit heterogeneity impedes our ability
to make sound inferences with rare events BTSCS data. First, units have distinct histories
upon which the propensity for a current event depends. This includes both prior realizations
of the event within that unit itself and the experiences of other units with which that state
is uniquely related. As such, our individual observations are not independent, but instead
conditional upon one another. Second, units have distinct unobservable characteristics which
determine their propensity to take an action. That is, even after accounting for all the theo-
retically relevant observed factors, units still have different probabilities of experiencing the
event. As a result, events will occur in some units consistently more (less) than would be ex-
pected by the observed factors alone. Both of these issues impair out ability to draw credible
inferences about the relationship between the substantive parameters and the outcome. Yet,
strategies to address these issues for models of rare events binary outcomes remain limited,
threatening the validity of our research into topics such as interstate conflict, civil war, and
economic crises. While we will likely never find a perfect solution for handling rare-event
BTSCS data, the importance and centrality of these phenomena to International Relations
should compel us to improve upon those current strategies which are clearly imperfect.
Therefore, I take up the issue of dependence in rare event binary data in chapter 2.
Drawing on Franzese et al. (2014), I discuss the econometric challenges of these models more
formally, introduce a simulation-based strategy for their estimation, and provide a novel
simulation-based strategy for estimating conditional counter-factual substantive effects. This
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approach greatly improves on standard approaches for estimating spatial models employed
within the IR literature. Furthermore, I discuss how the same estimator can be used to
model temporal dependence as well. While other strategies exist to remove the nuisance
of temporal dependence, no current approach directly capture the auto-dependence in the
outcome. Doing so gives a natural interpretation to the effect of the substantive parameters
(e.g., short-run, long-run), in a manner that is familiar to researchers from dynamic interval-
level models.20 Furthermore, it offers the first fully integrated and consistent estimator of
the total dependence for binary outcomes presented in political science. I conclude this
chapter with a discussion on the applicability of these, and the more standard methods,
for rare events explicitly. Additionally, I note the additional complications raised when
extending this model to account for conditional and interdependent responses (in addition
to conditional outcomes) as well. Given that we will frequently want to model these kinds
of dynamics as well, I suggest it as fruitful area for future research.
In chapter 3, I bring these strategies to bear on the question of civil war incidence. As
noted above, civil wars tend to concentrate heavily in a particular set of states. Considerable
research has sought to explain this empirical reality, with many scholars arguing that such
clustering arises from auto-dependence in conflict itself. In particular, there are two ways in
which civil war is likely to cause additional conflict: persistence and contagion. The literature
on conflict persistence argues that fighting creates conditions favorable to additional conflicts
in that state, whereas the literature on conflict contagion argues that civil war increases the
risk of additional conflicts in neighboring states. Reviewing these literatures, I argue that
they are part of the same systemic process of conflict dynamics and, therefore, need to
be jointly analyzed. Specifically, I argue that contagion is a mechanism that increases the
persistence of conflict, as each state’s risk of conflict is augmented by those of their neighbors,
and more persistent conflicts, in turn, increase the likelihood of contagion. These mutually-
reinforcing positive-feedback loops help explain why we observe conflict-prone regions and
20Throughout I use ‘substantive’ to refer to the included regressors (assumed to be) exogenously introduced
into the equation of y∗. Elsewhere, Franzese & Hays (2007) have referred to these as “domestic, exogenous-
external, or context-conditional” effects. The use of the term substantive is primarily used in relation to the
‘nuisance’ parameters introduced in later chapters for fixed-effects estimation, I retain the term throughout
for consistency, but note that it is not meant to suggest anything about the substantive importance, or lack
there of, of the dependence parameters.
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offer a more complete understanding of the ‘conflict trap’ which ensnares states. Using the
method developed in chapter 2 I test for the presence of these conflict dynamics in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The results suggest that there does appear to be regional conflict dynamics
which arise from both the persistence and contagion of conflict.
While civil wars spread almost exclusively to geographically proximate countries, states
can be ‘connected’ in a variety of ways. These relationships are inherently complex, as states
find themselves bound together by a series of overlapping, direct (e.g., alliances, trade, etc...)
and indirect ties (e.g., shared history, common language, similar polity, etc...). As such,
chapter 4 briefly discusses how models which employ a single measure of spatial proximity
– classic SAR and STAR models – in International Relations will often be under-specified,
thereby underestimating the strength of spatial interdependence. Instead, researchers should
estimate multiparameteric spatial models (as previously discussed by Hays et al. (2010)),
which allow for the inclusion of several measures of spatial (i.e. cross-unit) proximity and,
therefore, better capture the interdependence in the data. Furthermore, it enables us to
discriminate between possible sources of interdependence and, therefore, gain greater leverage
over competing theoretical mechanisms. Utilizing this approach, I analyze how even perceived
ties between states can cause their fates to be wed during times of crisis.
Specifically, I argue that contemporary explanations for the spread of financial crises –
which primarily focus on trade and financial ties – have underestimated the role that investor
beliefs, and subsequent behavior, play in spreading crises above and beyond what would be
anticipated from direct ties. I contend that following a crisis, investors update their beliefs
as to the (possibly spurious) causes of the crisis and subsequently withdraw investment from
other states they believe to be at similar risk (i.e., signal-extraction failure). Building on
theories of investor ‘lumping,’ I argue that states with common political fundamentals suffer
from contagion even in the absence of direct economic ties. Specifically, the initial crisis
induces updating over the ability of its political institutions to prevent a crisis, precipitating
withdraws from states with similar political environments and resulting in additional crises.
Ultimately, I find evidence that states with similar political institutions are more likely to
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experience simultaneous financial crises, suggesting that IPE scholars may need to expand
their understanding of how these institutions matter.
In chapter 5, I turn to the issue of unit-level heterogeneity and the challenges it presents
for models with binary-outcome data in International Relations. Many of these issues emerge
principally because our data are rare as well. Therefore, I begin with a more general discussion
of what we mean by rare events and how rarity might potentially impact our analyses. King
& Zeng (2001a;b), amongst others, have noted that because rare events provide so little
information our estimates are frequently biased. While this is true for any model, the impact
of rare events becomes even more pernicious when we attempt to estimate traditional panel
models. With rare events it is increasingly likely that some units do not experience the
outcome, meaning they are dropped from fixed-effects models and our results are potentially
biased (Beck & Katz 2001). After discussing these issues, I show how they are actually a
result of the same underlying problem: small-sample bias. In the former case we have too
few realizations in the total sample to generate accurate estimates, while in the latter we
have too few realizations in the unit sample to produce finite estimates.
As such, I propose a general ‘small sample’ solution, penalized maximum likelihood
(PML), which can be applied to either of these cases. PML not only corrects the bias from
small samples, as do current rare-event approaches, but it can also provide finite estimates
for parameters even in instances of perfect separation. I show how this allows us to estimate
a fixed-effects model where all units are retained, minimizing the risk of bias and improving
efficiency. As such, PML provides a flexible solution to several types of challenges raised
with rare-events data and, I argue, should be the preferred approach for modeling these data.
Moreover, I detail how this strategy could be combined with group-selection techniques
to estimate models of group, rather than unit, fixed effects. Group fixed-effects affords
researchers greater flexibility than current methods which require them to assume either
complete homogeneity (pooled) or heterogeneity (uni -fixed-effects).21 In so doing, it can also
minimize the biases confronted when employing either of these ‘pure’ strategies by selecting a
minimal set of groups (reducing the incidental-parameter bias of unit fixed-effects) necessary
21I focus exclusively on heterogeneity with respect to the intercept, omitting any discussion of unit variation
in the estimation of model parameters as discussed in Beck & Katz (2007) and elsewhere.
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to accurately model unit heterogeneity in the sample (avoiding the omitted-variable bias of
pooled models).
In light of the theoretical importance of properly modeling unit heterogeneity, I (re-
)analyze the relationship between GDP and civil war in chapter 6. In current research, the
pacific effect of development is largely unquestioned. It is widely regarded as the most robust
finding in civil war research, with some concluding that the debate on this issue has been
settled: poverty matters. These studies seem to confirm what we already know, after all,
one need only “read the newspapers” to ”see that the countries where there is conflict are far
more likely to be poor” (Collier 2008). However, as in all things, correlation is not causation.
There are many reasons why a state may be abundant in both poverty and civil war (e.g.,
weak institutions, inter-ethnic tensions, etc . . . ), calling into question the direct relationship
between the two. In such situations, a fixed-effects estimator is called for, allowing us to
control these unobservables and examine the direct relationship between GDP and conflict.22
However, researchers in development and civil war have been hesitant to embrace and even
advocate against the use of such methods, in part, it seems, because when utilized the
relationship between GDP and civil war is no longer present. I argue that many of these
concerns are unfounded (e.g., sample selection, nearly time-invariant regressors) and that
fixed effects should be the preferred approach. As such, we need to take meaningfully the
result that GDP and civil war do not appear to have a direct relationship. While this may
be surprising to some, it actually confirms formal analysis of conflict which has found no
basis for a casual explanation linking development to conflict (Chassang & Padro-i Miquel
2009, Fearon 2008). As such, I argue it is time to reopen the debate linking development
and poverty and consider alternative explanations for what remains an interesting empirical
regularity.
Finally, in chapter 7, I conclude by summarizing the main issues presented in the thesis.
In particular, I discuss the need for future work unifying the two main issues addressed in
the thesis: auto-dependence and unit-level heterogeneity. Being able to distinguish between
these processes has significant theoretical consequences. For example, it is important to
22See Acemoglu et al. (2008) for a celebrated example of this approach examining income and democracy.
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understand whether civil conflict occurrence increases the risk of conflict or whether it is
simply more prevalent amongst a certain subset of states (independent of any initial conflict).
As I note, however, achieving this sort of unified model is no easy task. Furthermore, I recall
what Beck has call “Stimson’s Law”: You can only solve one hard problem at a time, and
solving requires ignoring lots of other problems.
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2.0 (INTER)DEPENDENCE ACROSS TIME AND SPACE
After choosing the area we usually have no guidance beyond the widely verifiable
fact that patches in close proximity are commonly more alike, as judged by the
yield of crops, than those which are far apart.
— R.A. Fisher, 1935
Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than
distant things.
— Waldo Tobler, 1970
That international events, decisions, outcomes, are not independent is obvious to even
casual observers of global politics. One would be remiss to talk of the recent trouble in
Northern Ireland – with ”a couple [of deaths] a year, and sectarianism [which] continues to
plague society”1 – without an appreciation of the Troubles which came before. Likewise, any
analysis into the Arab Spring or the Great Recession without reference to the role of global-
ization would be nearly impossible and highly suspect. Despite this, much of the literature
in International Relations either neglects the possible role of such dependence outright or
fails to properly capture its true effect. In either respect, our inability to adequately account
for, and generate theories pertaining to, such dependence risks biasing both our empirical
findings and, more importantly, limits our understanding as to the true causes and conse-
quences of these important events. As discussed in chapter 1, this dependence is present in
a host of important issues within International Relations and can be particularly difficult to
account for when our questions pertain to binary and rare events, as they so often do.
1Quote from ‘History trumps democracy” in the Economist on March, 29 2014
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Working under the incorrect assumption of spatial, temporal, or spatiotemporal inde-
pendence results in overconfidence and inefficiency at best, and can also result in bias. Yet,
incorrectly modeling this dependence can introduce bias into our estimates as well. There-
fore, in this chapter I review and discuss the common strategies for dealing with temporal and
spatial dependence in binary outcomes in International Relations.2 Following this, I present
an alternative simulation-based approach to estimate temporal and spatial dependence in
non-linear data using maximum-simulated-likelihood (MSL) by recursive importance sam-
pling (RIS) suggested by Franzese et al. (2014). As detailed in the remainder of the chapter,
this approach has several advantages.
First, while current approaches – e.g., including a spatial lag as an exogenous right-
hand-side regressor – suffer from simultaneity bias, thereby producing potentially wildly
inflated estimates of the spatial lag and underestimates of the remaining model parameters.
MSL-by-RIS accounts for the endogeneity of the spatial lag, providing accurate estimates
of both the dependence and model parameters. Second, while the typical approaches for
modeling temporal dependence are not as obviously flawed – in the sense that they tend not
to bias the estimates of the betas – MSL-by-RIS is the only one which explicitly models the
auto-regession in the outcome, permitting a range of ARMA specifications familiar to time-
series analysis with interval data.3 More importantly, it allows us to estimate substantive
conditional spatiotemporal effects, response-paths, and long-run-steady-state effects. Com-
mon strategies are ill-suited to generating these type of effect estimates, and as a consequence
researchers have typically ignored substantive effect-estimates when estimating models with
spatiotemporal dependence. Given that it is these effects that we are ultimately interested in,
2While much of the discussion on the current approaches would be germane to either logit or probit, I
confine my attention to probit as it has been the most common estimator when modeling complex correlation
structures in binary data. In part, this is because it is relatively easier to draw from an n-dimensional normal
than an n-dimensional extreme-value. I return to this issue in chapter 7 where I discuss how we might borrow
insights from Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM) to produce a spatial-logit and/or dynamic-logit
estimator.
3Furthermore, MSL-by-RIS is the only approach which offers consistent estimates of both temporal and
spatial dependence while maintaining a consistent assumption about the nature of the dependence in the
outcome. In this case, that it operates through latent-y∗. Other potential approaches would be forced to
defend that dependence in time occurs through observed y while dependence in space exists in latent-y∗,
which seems theoretically confused.
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I show how simulations can use the model parameters to estimate counter-factual substantive
effects.
Improving our ability to account for spatial and spatiotemporal dependence is ulti-
mately important theoretically. Recent history alone should motivate us to consider more
closely the means by which events (e.g., crises) propagate globally. It is now evident, if it was
not before, that such events are not independently determined, but instead the consequence
of both domestic and international factors. Failing to incorporate the latter into our theories
and subsequent analysis risks our ability to draw accurate conclusions over either. That is,
until and unless we account for the interdependence of these outcomes, our understanding
of the more traditional country-specific factors will be necessarily biased. These concerns
are not simply academic, but as noted by Allen & Gale (2007), when discussing financial
crises, “a full understanding of contagion is necessary before adequate policy responses can
be designed” (28). The same could equally be said about almost any area of interest in In-
ternational Relations. Appreciating this reality is only going to grow more imperative as the
world continues to ‘shrink’ and the ties between states deepen and become more embedded.
Consequently, it will only become more important that International Relations scholars have
theories and models which can speak to these developments.
2.1 SPATIOTEMPORAL DEPENDENCE
Although dependence within or across units presents many of the same problems for
credible estimation, substantially more work has explored the former concern. As such, I
begin by focusing on dependence across time, before turning to cross-sectional dependence
as well. Common strategies for modeling temporal dependence in binary data are discussed
in Jackman (2000) and Beck et al. (2001), I borrow from and build upon those discussions
here. As noted and defined in chapter 1, the non-dynamic model is given by the following 2
equations:
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0, if y∗it ≤ 0
(2.2)
which in the presence of serial dependence will, for starters, underestimate the standard
errors, resulting in overconfident estimates of the parameter significance.
This model is rarely used with BTSCS data any longer, as researchers have increasingly
recognized the presence of dependence in their data and appreciated the threats it poses
for credible inference. In particular, the work of Beck et al. (1998) singularly inspired a
shift in the way most researchers now approach temporal dependence in binary outcomes.4
Beck et al. (1998) recognized that binary-outcome data is grouped (discrete-time) duration
data, and as such simple solutions are available to model the effect of time. Specifically,
they advise researchers to model temporal trends by including a series of time-since-event
dummies, which give the baseline probability (i.e., hazard) of failure (i.e., observing a one)
in a period. Carter & Signorino (2010) propose a similar technique, with differences arising
in the approach each takes to smoothing the hazard (splines versus cubic polynomials). In
effect, these proposals both treat time as nuisance and include parameters – duration-specific
fixed effects – which, once included, provide more reasonable estimates of the substantive
parameters. While these approaches represent represent a substantial improvement over
non-dynamic specifications, they do not capture the auto-dependence on a unit’s current
propensity on its previous propensity, that is, temporal auto-regression in the outcomes.
Several strategies have been proposed which account for this more directly, and there-
fore allow for a meaningful interpretation of temporal dependence. In particular, two dis-
tinct theoretic explanations for auto-dependence can be examined (Jackman 2000). The
first explanation is that past outcomes condition future behavior, that is, as a consequence
4Beck (2008) notes that this article is the most widely cited work publish in the American Political Science
Review in the last 25 years.
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of experiencing the event the factors which determine future occurrences are altered. This
explanation centers on the impact that the observed realization of the event has on shaping
subsequent behavior; as such, models of this type are referred to as “observation drive.” Al-
ternatively, we may suspect that dependence exists in the latent factors which produce the
observed event. That is, an individuals propensity at time t is a function of their propensity
at t− 1. Elsewhere, models of this type have been referred to as the ‘parameter driven.’
Two ‘observation-driven’ models are given by the restricted-transition and full-transition
models (Beck et al. 2001). The restricted transition model is the simple and widely used,
strategy of simply including the lagged-observed value of y on the right hand side of equation
2.1 as follows:
y∗it = Xitβ + φyi,t−1 + it (2.3)
which specifies the current propensity of the event at time t to the observed realization of
the event at time t − 1. While this captures the state dependence in the model, it is not
analogous to familiar lagged-y models with continuous outcomes, but instead simply shifts
the intercept of y∗it by φ (Beck et al. 2001).
Jackman (2000) introduces a more-complete transition model, which permits distinct
factors to explain state-switching and state-dependence:
y∗it|(yi,t−1 = 0) = Xitβ0 + it
y∗it|(yi,t−1 = 1) = Xitβ1 + it
(2.4)
which can be combined into a single conditional model:
y∗it|(yi,t−1) = Xitβ0 + φyi,t−1Xitα + it (2.5)
where β1 = β0 + α, that is, the difference between parameter vectors for the distinct
transition probabilities. While it enjoys some advantages – namely, it allows us to specify and
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evaluate different models for event onset and event dependence simply in a single equation
– it has not achieved widespread use.5
Alternatively, we can model temporal dependence in the latent propensities using ‘pa-
rameter driven’ approaches. Which, assuming an AR(1) process, is modeled as:
y∗it = Xitβ + φy
∗
i,t−1 + it (2.6)
which is directly analogous to lagged-y models of continuous outcomes. This means that it
can flexibly permit a variety of ARMA specifications familiar in dynamic time-series models.
Furthermore, it allows us to assess theoretical claims about the persistence of unobserved
(or unmeasured) variables across time. That is, a units propensity to experience an event
conditional on its prior propensity. Accounting for this relationship also gives a natural
interpretation to the substantive parameters in a way that none of the other models can
easily achieve. Namely, the estimated β represent the immediate (next period) effect on the
latent outcome, with the total effect on the latent variable given by the familiar β
1−φ .
6
An additional benefit of this approach, as will be shown, is that the same strategy can
be employed to model cross-sectional (i.e., spatial) dependence as well. Unlike with temporal
dependence, there are no simple evasions of cross-sectional dependence. Current strategies
most often include either i) estimating a standard (non-spatial) probit or logit model or ii)
introducing a spatial-lag on the right-hand-side of a model as if it were exogenous. The
former strategy is obviously wrong, resulting in biased estimates from the omission of the
spatial lag. While better intentioned, the latter is also wrong as it fails to account for the
endogeneity (i.e., simultaneity) in the spatial lag.7 As such, estimates from these na¨ıve
spatial models will also be biased. Furthermore, placing the observed binary outcomes of
other units simultaneously is not algebraically consistent, as it can only logically operate
5Perhaps this is because both of the papers (Beck et al. 2001, Jackman 2000) discussing this approach
remain unpublished.
6Elsewhere, Beck (2001) has also proposed a “strain relief” estimator which is akin to the error correction
model for continuous outcomes, replacing the lagged-latent y∗i,t−1 with y
∗
i,t−1 − γyi,t−1.
7Time-lagging the spatial lag typically offers little relief from this concern. As Beck et al. (2006) note
time-lagging the spatial lag can evade the simulatneity bias but the assumptions required for this to be valid
rarely hold (see Franzese et al. 2014).
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through the latent variables or errors (Heckman 1978). Equation 2.6 shows how we can do
this, rewriting it for spatial dependence:
y∗it = Xitβ + ρWy* + it (2.7)
where W is a weights matrix identifying connections between units and y* is a vector of
the latent outcomes, which, taken together, is the spatial lag Wy*. In this formulation the
propensity for unit i is conditional on the propensity of unit j 6= i up to some weighting pa-
rameter wij. As such, we can see how the model for latent-y
∗ can be written to accommodate
both spatial and temporal dependence. Yet, the largest complication remains: estimation.
Despite their desirable properties, little work has pursued this approach given that estimating
these models has been described as “notoriously difficult” given the “formidable” expression
of the joint probabilities which poses a “ferocious maximization problem” Jackman (2000). I
briefly explain the econometric challenges that are raised in estimating these models, before
raising a simulation-assisted solution.
With time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data - both temporal and cross-sectional de-
pendence – the spatiotemporal probit model takes the structural form:
y∗ = ρWy∗ + φLy∗ + Xβ +  (2.8)
Which, written in reduced form is given as:
y∗ = (I− ρW− φL)−1Xβ + u, with u = (I− ρW− φL)−1 (2.9)




it > 0⇒ [(I− ρW− φL)−1]it > −[(I− ρW− φL)−1Xβ]it
0, if y∗it ≤ 0⇒ [(I− ρW− φL)−1]it ≤ −[(I− ρW− φL)−1Xβ]it
(2.10)
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Where yit is an observed binary outcome, X is a k × NT matrix of covariates, and (I −
ρW − φL)−1 is the spatiotemporal multiplier consisting of an NT × NT identity matrix,
I, an NT × NT spatial-weights matrix W, and an NT × NT time-shift matrix L. More
simply, each element wit,jt of W identifies whether (or to what extent) units i and j are
related spatially at time t. While, matrix L is binary, with ones – for a single-period lag –
indicating the previous period for the same cross-sectional unit ( it in the row and i,t-1 in
the column).8
The probability that the itth observation is one is calculated as follows:
p(yit = 1|Xit) = p([(I− φL− ρW)−1Xβ]it + [(I− φL− ρW)−1]it > 0)




Therefore, as in standard probit (see 1.4, a cumulative-normal distribution, Φit{·}, gives
the probability that that systematic component,[(I−φL−ρW)−1Xβ]it/σit, exceeds the stochas-
tic component, uit. However the Φit{·} here is the itth marginal probability from the n-
dimensional cumulative-normal evaluated at the n cutpoints,[(I−φL−ρW)−1Xβ]it/σit, because the
interdependence in latent-y∗it in spatiotemporal probit induces nonsphericity in the stochastic
components u. Specifically, u is distributed n-dimensional multivariate normal with mean 0
and variance-covariance [(I − φL − ρW)′(I − φL − ρW)]−1. Computing these probabilities
is intense as one must read the probability that [(I−φL−ρW)−1Xβ]it/σit exceeds uit from the itth
marginal distribution of the multivariate cumulative-normal Φit{·}, which requires integrat-
ing that joint distribution over all n dimensions. Also, because σit is not constant – the
it, itth element of the variance-covariance – interdependence also induces heteroscedasticity.
This heteroscedasticity and, more crucially, the interdependence (i.e., the non-independence)
for the u render standard probit inappropriate and generate the computation intensity. That
is, because the outcomes are interdependent, their joint distribution is not the product of
8For example, in the single-period lag instance, the L matrix would be all zeroes except for ones along
the diagonal of the lower block first-minor.
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the n univariate marginal distributions, instead maximizing the log of one non-separable
n-dimensional distribution.
2.2 MSL-BY-RIS: ESTIMATION
High dimensional integrals, like the one encountered here, are difficult to calculate
numerically, but can be well approximated via simulation (Train 2009). Drawing upon the
strategy first proposed by Beron et al. (2003) and Beron & Vijverberg (2004), Franzese et al.
(2014) offer a maximum simulated-likelihood (MSL) by recursive-importance-sampling (RIS)
strategy to estimate spatiotemporal qualitative dependent variable models. In this section I
briefly describe the technical details of MSL-by-RIS detail its performance against standard
estimators, outline a related simulation-based strategy for calculating substantive effects,
and conclude with a discussion of its applicability to rare events.
RIS approximates densities which are difficult to calculate analytically, such as the
cumulative multivariate normal distribution introduced by interdependence in spatiotempo-
ral probit. Given our inability to draw from f(x) (i.e., the target density), we can instead
approximate the sought probabilities by taking repeated draws from a better known density
with the same support g(x) (i.e., the proposal density) and weighing them by f(x)/g(x) (Train
2009). When repeated R many times, the weighted draws are equivalent to draws from
original target density, as the CDF of the weighted draws of g(x) is the same as the CDF of
draws from f(x) itself.





where fn(x) is the density and [−∞,x0] the interval over which one wants to integrate,
one chooses n-dimensional sampling-distribution with well-known properties, and defines a
truncation of this distribution with support over the same interval as gcn(x). Multiplying
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This integral is a mean which gives the probability sought, p, as the mean of fn(x)
gcn(x)
, which can













With RIS, we draw x from a truncated multivariate normal and calculate fn(x)
gcn(x)
.
While this would serve in suffice in standard probit with independent errors, we still
haven’t confronted the issue of interdependent errors, as the numerator in equation 2.14 is
still a single n-dimensional cumulative-normal. However, given that the variance-convariance
matrix, Σ = [(I − φL − ρW)′(I − φL − ρW)]−1, is positive-definite we can use Cholesky
factorization to decompose the NT correlated probabilities as NT independent components.
That is, a decomposition exists such that Σ−1 = C’C’ with C an upper-triangular matrix
and η ≡ Cu given n independent standard-normal variables, η. Let B ≡ C−1 and substitute
u = C−1η ≡ Bη. From this we can determine the sought probability, p(u < v) = p(Bη <
v) by evaluating the CDF at the implied upper bounds, which are determined recursively













≡ ηj0(vj, ηj+1, . . . , ηn) ≡ ηj0
(2.15)
The probability of having observed a sample of ones and zeros can now be found by eval-







Φ(vj). Repeating R times and averaging gives the maximum simulated likelihood
lˆ which, given enough runs of R, is asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood. As in
ML then, it provides consistent estimates of the parameters.
The performance of MSL-by-RIS is examined via mone carlo analysis in Franzese et al.
(2014), I highlight some of our more significant findings here.9 The data-generating process
for the Monte Carlos closely follows that of Beron & Vijverberg (2004), but expands to
include a time dimension. In particular, the DGP takes the form:
y∗ = (In − ρW− φL)−1(β0 + β1x + ),  ∼ N(0, 1) (2.16)
with the measurement equation linking y∗ to y. For W, a row-standardized binary-contiguity
matrix of the 50 U.S. states is used. Data for each unit is generated for 20 periods, giving a
sample size of 1000 in each of the reported monte carlo experiments. In these experiments
β0 = 1.5 and β1 = 3.0 are held fixed, while ρ = 0.10, 0.25 and φ = 0.3, 0.5 vary to represent
difference levels of dependence. Lastly, x0 is drawn from a standard uniform distribution
on the interval [−1, 2], resulting in an expected value of 0.5 and a variance of roughly 2.
The results are presented in Table 2.1, with 100 trials for each experiment and R=100, and
provides support for the estimator. That is, the estimates are all quite accurate when the
data follow a spatiotemporal DGP.
9Many results will not be presented or discussed here. If, for example, the reader is interested in how
MSL-by-RIS performs as compared to traditional strategies for temporal dependence (e.g., time-since-event
counters, regime-switching models, etc. . . ) they should refer to the article.
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Table 2.1: Simulation Results for MSL-by-RIS Coeff. Est.
β0=-1.5 β1=3.0 φ ρ
Experiment #1: ρ=0.10, φ=0.30
Coeff. Est -1.467 2.962 0.092 0.276
RMSE 0.104 0.173 0.043 0.032
Std Dev 0.101 0.169 0.042 0.021
SE 0.129 0.231 0.045 0.025
Overconfidence 0.784 0.730 0.938 0.840
Experiment #2: ρ=0.10, φ=0.50
Coeff. Est -1.385 2.797 0.097 0.464
RMSE 0.150 0.273 0.034 0.042
Std Dev 0.095 0.183 0.034 0.021
SE 0.105 0.199 0.042 0.020
Overconfidence 0.906 0.920 0.802 1.022
Experiment #3: ρ=0.25, φ=0.30
Coeff. Est -1.450 2.922 0.224 0.280
RMSE 0.117 0.197 0.047 0.028
Std Dev 0.106 0.181 0.038 0.020
SE 0.119 0.212 0.046 0.024
Overconfidence 0.884 0.854 0.834 0.833
Experiment #4:ρ=0.25, φ=0.5
Coeff. Est -1.363 2.752 0.241 0.471
RMSE 0.172 0.322 0.034 0.035
Std Dev 0.104 0.205 0.033 0.019
SE 0.107 0.202 0.031 0.020
Overconfidence 0.969 1.013 1.043 0.946
2.3 MSL-BY-RIS: EFFECTS
Ultimately, however, we are not interested in parameter estimates as such, but the
effects δp(yi=1)
δxi
they suggest. Estimating these effects is complicated in the presence of spatial
or spatiotemporal interdependence as even within-unit counterfactuals – e.g., xi on yi –
involve feedback from i through other units j 6= i back to i. Furthermore, with dependent
data we are often interested in cross-unit effects as well, up to and including, counterfactual
outcomes in other units ∆p(yi=1)
∆yj
. As in estimation, interdependence complicates our ability
to generate such conditional effects. While we could estimate these in a manner analogous to
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that used in estimation – using RIS to approximate the conditional probability sought – this
would be extremely computationally burdensome and neglect more expedient alternatives.
Franzese et al. (2014) show how these counterfactuals can be calculated, using the
definition of conditional probability they are simply:
p[yi,t+s = 1|yj,t = 1;X,W,L]− p[yi,t+s = 1|yj,t = 0;X,W,L]
=
p[yi,t+s = 1, yj,t = 1|X,W,L]
p[yj,t = 1|X,W,L] −
p[yi,t+s = 1, yj,t = 0|X,W,L]
p[yj,t = 0|X,W,L]
(2.17)
With the estimates of ρ, φ, and β, one calculates the CDFs for the two univariate (de-
nominators) and two multivariate-normal (numerators) distributions to produce an estimated
spatiotemporal responses path. Standard errors for these point estimates are calculated via
parametric bootstrap: repeat the procedure for each of the many draws of the parameter
estimates form their estimated joint distribution, and average the standard deviation across
draws to give the estimate and its standard error.
The accuracy of this approach is shown in Figure 2.1. Selecting a specific pair of
units i and j (Alabama and Mississippi) we first calculate the true effect, p[yi,t+s = 1|yj,t =
1;X,W,L] − p[yi,t+s = 1|yj,t = 0;X,W,L], assuming x equals its last sample-values. Then,
using the parameter estimates from the monte carlos, we calculate the effects using the
spatiotemporal-lag probit model as just described. Figure 2.1 provides information about:
i) the bias in the response paths (comparing the truth triangles to the average-estimate
diamonds); ii) the efficiency of these estimates (the vertical lines indicate the standard
deviation across trials); and iii) the accuracy of our uncertainty estimates (the horizontal
ticks indicate the estimated standard errors).10 By and large, we observe that the estimated
response-paths are very accurate.
While this strategy suffices with lower dimensions (i.e., the number of counterfac-
tual conditions), it becomes computationally burdensome (or impossible) with higher-order
10That is, comparing the vertical lines to the horizontal lines indicates the (over)confidence of the estima-
tors standard error estimates.
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Figure 2.1: Accuracy of RIS for Long-Run Response Paths
 
 
♦ Estimated response-paths; ▲ True response-paths 
Horizontal bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using the estimated standard errors (within trials); 
Vertical lines indicate 95% intervals using the actual standard deviation of the effect estimates (across trials). 
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dimensions. In these instances an alternative strategy may be preferable: brute-force sim-
ulation. First proposed by Hays (2009), one can simply draw from the disturbances and
coefficients (using the sample estimates as the mean for the draws), pre-multiply each by
the spatiotemporal filter to generate reduced-form disturbances and reduced-form cutpoints
(for some pre-selected and fixed counterfactual X1 X0), and generate a vector of hypothet-
ical realizations of y1 and y0. In other words, we can use the estimated model to generate
counterfactual probabilities of interest.
As with the last strategy, this technique can be used to generate probabilities and effects
conditional on observed outcomes in others units, for example p[yi,t+s = 1|yj,t = 1;X,W,L]
and p[yi,t+s = 1|yj,t = 0;X,W,L]. As I show in chapter 3 and ?? for many applications
these kind of counterfactuals are often more substantively interesting than an average effect.
The probabilities are ratios of the quadrant counts from a 2-dimensional graph where the
axes represent the negative of the reduced-from cutpoints for units i and j, the ith and jth
elements of the vector −(In − ρW)−1Xβˆ. Figure 2.2 helps to illustrate how we can use the
parameter estimates to generate simulated realizations of the counter-factual outcome. A
single draw from the reduced-from disturbances for units i and j, the ith and jth elements of
vector −(In− ρW)−1 identifies an x-y coordinate (a point) located in one of the quadrants.
If this point is in quadrant I, for example, the reduced-form disturbances for both i and j
are above the negative of their respective reduced-form cutpoints and yi = 1 and yj = 1.
Conditional relative frequencies, which are ratios of quadrant counts, provide estimates for
the conditional probabilities of interest. Specifically, the probabilities are estimated by:
Pr[yi = 1|X,W, yj = 1]
Pr[yi = 1|X,W, yj = 0]
(2.18)
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Figure 2.2: Estimating Spatial Effects via Simulation
 
As before, to reflect the uncertainty about the model’s parameters (i.e., the cutpoints),
we can draw from the estimated sampling distribution for the parameters. Each draw gener-
ates a new set of reduced-form cutpoints which leads to a new set of conditional probabilities.
The results produced using this method are equivalent to those obtained using the other
technique and will occasionally may prove more computationally efficient (and/or feasible)
in higher dimensions.11
With either proposed method for estimating effects, we are able to generate long-
run spatiotemporal response paths (as in Figure 2.1). That is, we can assess to the effect
of a shock in t many periods into the future. Asking, for example, what the impact of
unit j experiencing an event at t has on unit i’s probability of experiencing an event at
t + 5? This is one of the chief benefits of MSL-by-RIS as no existing strategy and easily or
straight-forwardly calculate these dynamic response paths for binary data. Furthermore, by
11Results detailing the efficacy of this brute-force simulation strategy available upon request.
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conditioning on several outcomes we can generate different counter-factual histories for a unit
(or several units). This allows researchers to examine the differences in current probabilities
that obtain from several potential historical paths ranging from never having experienced
the event (i.e., all zeroes) to incidence in every years (i.e., all ones).
2.4 DISCUSSION
That the outcomes for one unit(-time) depend on the outcomes of other unit(-time)s
seems obvious. This is only made more likely when the population is small, well-defined,
and placed in a system where interactions occur often and repeatedly, such as international
affairs. Yet, International Relations scholars have only recently began to appreciate the
impact this has only almost all over our theoretical questions. As I noted at the outset, this
is particularly true for binary outcomes, where interstate and civil wars, economic shocks
and sanctions, are all clearly interrelated. In this chapter, I described how dependency can
manifest in binary-TSCS data and presented a simulation based strategy for estimating this
dependence in terms of latent-y∗. Monte Carlo experiments have revealed the efficacy of this
estimation strategy in obtaining accurate estimates for both the dependency parameters
and the substantive parameters of interest. Furthermore, I have noted how, once obtained,
these parameters can be used to estimate counter-factual conditional effects using related
simulation methods. Thereby allowing for the estimation of the change to short- and long-run
outcome probabilities associated with a hypothetical shift to some X, up to and including
changes in the same-period outcome of other units.
One question which remains to be explored is the efficacy of these strategies for explic-
itly rare events, as we so often find in International Relations. Franzese et al. (2014) find that
MSL-by-RIS exhibits the well-known small sample bias in maximum likelihood estimates of
spatial-lag models. That is, likelihood estimates of the dependence parameters (ρ and φ) are
typically downwardly biased, which induces inflated estimates of the remaining parameter
estimates (β). While a similar bias is found in spatial-ML estimates for continuous outcomes,
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it is a more pernicious problem with binary outcomes as indicated here. With rare events
the challenge may be event greater as the rate of switching – which is required to update ρ
and φ – is lower. In short, rare events only further exacerbate the “small sample” problem
and can persist in even relatively large samples if the event count remains low.12 This likely
implies when estimating models of rare events the dependency parameter estimates will be
further attenuated. Given that many of the applications of this method will be into areas
with rare events, it is important to get a handle on the extent of this bias. Therefore, in
the future I plan to run experiments varying the sparseness of the data when estimating
MSL-by-RIS to assess the extent of this downward bias with rare events.
Furthermore, there are deeper theoretical questions about the nature and dynamics
of interdependence which will require more computationally efficient estimation techniques.
While showing that outcomes are interdependent is an important first step, it neglects the
other ways in which states likely respond to these anticipated spillovers. These actions
could, in turn, influence the likelihood of witness both spillovers to that state and, more
interestingly, whether we observe an event in the originating states at all. As a toy example,
anticipating a potential crisis in state i, state j undertakes some intervention intended to
reduce this possibility, motivated to do so because the ties between state i and j risk contagion
in the event of a crisis. Now the event outcome (e.g., crisis) in states i and j are not just
dependent upon one another, but also the related policy outcome(s) (e.g., intervention) of
these states as well:
Pr(crisisi = 1|crisisj, interventioni, interventionj)
Pr(crisisj = 1|crisisi, interventioni, interventionj)
Pr(interventionij = 1|crisisj, crisisi, interventionji)
Pr(interventionji = 1|crisisj, crisisi, interventionij)
This provides a much richer theoretical account about the possible strategic role states play
in the co-determination of international events. Furthermore, such analysis would provide
12This poses problems for ML-estimation in general as discussed in chapter 5
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more insights into the incentives of states when determine to take some interventions and
not others. However, this also greatly expands the analysis as the intervention outcome
is (in this formulation) dyadic, that is, j intervening into i, etc... Furthermore, absent
some arbitrarily imposed sample constraint, every possible dyadic combination is able to
intervene, with the decision to do so a function of all other choices. This is significantly
more computationally burdensome – the estimation sample is no longer N but N-choose-2 –
and as such improvements on or alternatives to MSL-by-RIS will need to be pursued.13
13(Wilhelm & de Matos 2013) new R package ‘spatialprobit’ implements an MCMC approach using Gibbs
sampling, the Bayesian analog to the method discussed here, which appears to possess considerable processing
advantages and as such may prove useful for these purposes.
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3.0 THE DYNAMICS OF CIVIL WAR
The past is prophetic in that it asserts loudly that wars are poor chisels for carving
out peaceful tomorrows.
— Martin Luther King, Jr., 1967
The principal cause of war is war itself.
— C. Wright Mills, 1959
In the last 65 years there have been more than 300 civil conflicts.1 The stark conse-
quences of these conflicts – displaced populations, increased crime, environmental degrada-
tion, death tolls in the millions, economic destruction in the billions, etc – have generated
an immense research agenda attempting to better understand and explain the factors which
cause these events. One key finding of this research is that civil wars themselves foster the
conditions that increase the risk of further conflict. That is, the causes and consequences
of civil war are one in the same: economic instability, political uncertainty, social unrest, a
mobilized and divide populace. As such, the ultimate consequence of civil war is often more
war, with states caught in a recursive sequence of conflict (i.e., the ‘conflict trap’). Given
that the majority of conflicts take place within these countries, understanding the nature of
conflict recurrence is essential for explaining civil war occurrence.
A substantial literature examines the persistence of conflict, whereby an initial conflict
significantly increases the risk of future fighting (Collier et al. 2003; 2008, Hegre et al. 2011,
Walters 2004). This research has focused on characteristics of the country (e.g., economic
1Defined as violent incidents between the government and organized opposition within a state that results
in at least 25 battle-related deaths (Themne´r & Wallensteen 2013)
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underdevelopment, natural resources) and the conflict (e.g., duration, issue, outcome) which
make recidivism more likely. These factors, it is argued, explain why we observe the clus-
tering of conflicts within a set of countries. However, these conflicts not only cluster within
but across countries, with neighboring states frequently undergoing conflict concurrently.
Moreover, many of the countries used to illustrate the persistence of conflict (e.g., Burundi,
Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo), are the same states used as anecdotes in the
literature on regional conflict contagion, wherein scholars argue that neighboring conflicts
increase the risk of civil war (Buhaug & Gleditsch 2008, Diehl 1991, Gleditsch 2002, Ward &
Gledistch 2002). In fact, what we observe is not just states, but entire regions mired in recur-
rent conflict. Yet, we lack a clear understanding of the process by which this emerges: is it a
country’s own history with conflict (i.e., persistence), the outbreak of war in a neighboring
state (i.e., contagion), or both, that makes these protracted conflicts more likely?
I argue that any attempt to understand the means by which conflict breeds conflict
must fully consider both of these dimensions, that is, the dependence of civil war across
both time and space. Failure to do so risks misunderstanding the process by which these
cycles or patterns of conflict emerge, erroneously favoring one or the other. Specifically, I
argue that the contagion of civil conflict is a cause of its persistence, and vice-versa. Each
states risk of conflict influences, and is influenced by, their neighbors risk of conflict, creating
an additional cycle through which civil war persists. In this way the contagion of conflict
makes persistence more likely, and, in turn, longer conflicts make contagion more likely. As
such, the so-called ‘conflict-trap’ is, in part, a regional phenomenon, wherein each individual
states sporadic episodes of conflict are augmented by those of their neighbors. This feedback
produces conflict prone regions – or, conversely, peace prone regions – with persistently
higher risks of conflict than would be expected from any single state alone, explaining why
peace has been so difficult to obtain in particular states and regions (e.g., the Great Lakes
region of Africa, West Africa, parts of Southeast Asia). In sum, it is both the dependence of
conflict within a country and the interdependence of conflicts across countries that makes
civil war recurrence so common.
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Little work in the civil war literature has modeled the dependence of civil conflict in
time or space in a manner which can provide insights into these dynamics, and no work al-
lows us to directly discriminate between the two. Instead, I utilize the approach introduced
in chapter 2 which uses discrete-choice simulation to produce consistent estimates of both
the dependence of conflict across time and space. This approach has several advantages over
common alternatives in the literature. First, it directly models the temporal-autoregressive
process, that is, the auto-dependence of a states conflict propensity on its prior conflict
propensity. Unlike alternatives (e.g., peace years with splines, cubic polynomials), this al-
lows us to model the dynamic responses we are interested in when examining conflict recur-
rence. Stated more simply, it allows us to directly measure the persistence of civil war risk.
Second, it allows us to estimate the simultaneous spatial effects of conflict, whereas common
approaches (e.g., including a spatial lag of neighboring conflict as a regressor) are necessarily
biased. As such, this is the first work in the conflict literature to offer consistent estimates
of the spatial effect of civil war. Finally, it permits more direct comparisons between the
effects of previous conflict and neighboring conflict, allowing us to decompose effects into
short- and long-run, spatial and non-spatial, to get a more complete understanding of the
dynamics of civil war. In all, it allows us to better understand whether, how, and the extent
to which, conflict begets conflict.
More than most, this issue has clear and important policy consequences. That con-
flict persists across time and spreads amongst neighbors is widely accepted as fact by the
policy community and popular media alike. These beliefs drive numerous large-scale pol-
icy decisions, from the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, addressing conflict
recurrence, to the hundreds of millions in assistance given to countries near conflict zones,
most recently Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon in response to the Syrian civil war. As such,
the challenge is not in convincing policy makers that these relationships exist, but rather in
ensuring that we have the correct understanding of these dynamics. Suhrke & Samset (2007)
chronicle how previous estimates on the risk of conflict recurrence quickly spread, became
conventional wisdom, and shaped policy debates, only to later be significantly amended by
these same authors (the work of Collier and his co-authors). In addition, they highlight two
problems of providing effects estimates for ‘the typical country,’ arguing that: i) different
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interpretations of ‘typical’ produce significantly different estimates, and ii) it is difficult to
know what these estimates mean in any particular context. This paper attempts to redress
these shortcomings, providing consistent estimates of spatiotemporal dependence in conflict,
and a strategy to obtain country-specific effects estimates for substantively important cases
via simulation.
I proceed with the analysis as follows. In the first section, I discuss the relevant liter-
atures on the persistence and spread of civil conflict. Within this, I detail my argument on
how these dynamics are necessarily related and therefore require a unified model. Following
that, I evaluate the dependence of civil conflict using a spatiotemporal probit model of con-
flict incidence using maximum simulated-likelihood with recursive-importance-sampling. In
addition, I show how conventional estimation strategies – ones with no or na¨ıve measures of
the spatial and/or temporal dependence – can produce substantially different results. After
estimating these models, I use simulation to produce counter-factual estimates of the short
and long-run effect that a civil war in one country has its risk of later conflict and the risk of
conflict in neighboring states. This strategy also allows me to explore the cumulative effect
of specific conflict histories, which, to my knowledge, do not exist in the current literature.
Finally, I discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of civil war as a
recursive process and conclude.
3.1 A REGIONAL THEORY OF CONFLICT TRAPS
Since World War II, civil war has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict.2
In any given year, close to 30 countries are engaged in active civil conflict. However, as
illustrated in Figure 3.1, these events are not evenly distributed.3 Instead, we see that
particular countries experience far greater rates of civil conflict, with as few as 15 countries
accounting for more than half of the conflict incidents since 1950. If anything, recent patterns
2See Buhaug, et al. (2007) for a detailed discussion on the global trends in armed conflict.
3Data come from UCDP/PRIO (detailed below), with the lightest blue indicating no conflict episodes
and the darkest blue indicating frequent incidents of civil conflict.
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suggest that these episodes of civil conflict are becoming increasingly concentrated. An
expanding number of states are effectively at no risk of conflict, yet the probability of civil
war for the remaining pool of at-risk states continues to grow (Collier et al. 2003). What
explains these differences, that is, why do some countries experience civil conflict with such
regularity?
Figure 3.1: Global Incidence of Civil Conflict, 1950-2000
*
Note: The lightest blue indicates no conflict with successively darker shades denoting a greater
number of conflict years
At the most basic level, the answer, if somewhat tautological, is that states vary with
respect to the factors that produce conflict. There is a wealth of quantitative empirical schol-
arship in international relations and comparative politics indicating the importance of some
country-level characteristics in producing conflict (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, Fearon & Laitin
2003, Hegre & Sambanis 2006, Sambanis 2004). Low levels of economic development, weak
governance, social and economic inequalities, ethnic divisions, large populations, mountain-
ous terrain, natural resources, among others, have been argued to increase the risk of civil
conflict. As such, states with the greatest abundance of these characteristics should experi-
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ence the most conflict. However, we observe substantial variation in the regularity of civil
conflict that cannot be well explained by these initial conditions alone. Why, for example,
has Kenya never experienced a civil war, while neighboring Ethiopia and Somalia have had
repeated and lengthy episodes of conflict, despite similar structural risk factors?
These results have led many to conclude that civil war itself makes successive episodes
of conflict more likely. As Collier et al. (2003) suggest “once rebellion has started it appears
to develop a momentum of its own.” While not the first to recognize the apparent cyclical
pattern of civil war, the work of Collier and his colleagues has produced a well-known theo-
retical explanation for this recursive process, namely, the conflict trap. Specifically, Collier
et al. (2003) identify several ways in which civil war makes conflict more likely: (i) reversing
development, (ii) triggering emigration and diasporas, (iii) leaving a persistent and dam-
aging military lobby, (iv) changing the balance of interests and intensifying hatreds. Each
of which has been shown elsewhere to increase the risk of civil conflict (Blattman & Miguel
2010). In effect, fighting a civil war generates or exacerbates conditions which make civil
war more likely, as the consequences and causes of civil war are often the same. Thus, once
on a path of conflict, it can difficult for states to achieve the conditions necessary to promote
sustained peace.
Earlier work exploring the conflict trap focused on the ways in which aspects of the
prior conflict contribute to the likelihood of future war. Walters (2004) summarizes these
studies as those which have focused on: i) why the original war began, ii) how the war
was fought, iii) how the war ended. More recently, a growing literature has examined the
ways in which conflict promotes recurrent conflict via the mechanisms identified above (e.g.,
economic destruction, societal polarization and militarization, etc...), or what Hegre et al.
(2011) calls the production of “conflict capital” (Collier et al. 2003, Hegre et al. 2011, Walters
2004). In particular, the majority of this work focuses on the ways in which conflict destroys
infrastructure, reduces investment, diverts capital from productive sectors of the economy,
and can drive away intellectual capital. Each of these reduces the economic capacity of the
state following the war, which itself is widely considered one of the most robust determinants
of civil conflict (Hegre & Sambanis 2006). Collier et al. (2003) argue that, in addition to these
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observable consequences, many unobservable factors also emerge from fighting: increased
animosity and hatreds, the production of a solider class, the destruction of social capital.
Each is argued to increase the likelihood the we observe repeated conflicts within the same
country.
However, I argue an additional conflict-generating consequence of war has gone un-
deranalyzed in the current literature on conflict inertia: contagion.4 While the literature
conflict persistence has focused on the ways in which fighting creates conditions favorable to
additional conflicts in that state, the literature on contagion identifies the ways in which civil
war increases the risk of additional conflicts in neighboring states (e.g., Diehl 1991, Gleditsch
2002, Lake & Rothchild 1998, Most & Starr 1980, Starr & Most 1983, Ward & Gledistch
2002). Civil wars trigger refugee flows to surrounding countries, depress regional economic
capacity and investment, and introduce combatants, weaponry, and ideologies to the region,
each of which is argued to make conflict more likely in neighboring countries (Buhaug &
Gleditsch 2008, Murdoch & Sandler 2002, Salehyan & Gledistch 2006). In sum, civil war
increases the likelihood of conflict regionally.
Thus, the current literature has suggested two independent processes whereby civil
conflict causes additional conflict: persistence and contagion. Deviating from this work, I
argue that these are part of a single system of positive feedback, with persistence augmenting
contagion and contagion augmenting persistence. First, protracted or repeated conflicts
should make regional spillovers more likely. Longer or recurrent conflicts simply provide
more opportunities for instability to spread. Each of the mechanisms through which conflict
is argued to spread – e.g., refugee flows, economic disruption, weapons proliferation – is more
likely to be triggered in environments with persistent conflicts.5 Second, the contagion of
conflict regionally increases the risk of conflict persistence, as each state’s risk of conflict
influences, and is influenced by, neighboring states. That is, the likelihood of conflict in any
single state is a function of both its independent risk of conflict (e.g., country-level factors,
4Where noted it is given a cursory treatment – (Collier et al. 2003), for example, devote less than a page
of a more than 200 page manuscript to the subject – and no work, to my knowledge, has linked contagion
to conflict persistence itself.
5This argument, if unstated, is implicitly made by much of the civil war contagion literature already when
they use a spatial lag of conflict incidence in models predicting civil war onset.
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conflict history, etc...) and the risk of conflict in their neighbors. Thus, ceteris paribus states
surrounded by at-risk countries are at a greater risk of (re-)experiencing conflict themselves.
To further clarify how contagion serves as a multiplier exacerbating persistence, con-
sider the impact of an exogenous increase (x) to the risk of conflict in country i at time t. In
Figure 3.2, I depict expected impact of a such a shock given contemporary understandings
of conflict dynamics Figure 3.2a, and my argument on systemic dependence Figure 3.2b.
With our current understanding, this shock increases the latent propensity (i.e., risk) of
civil conflict in it which then increases the risk of conflict in it+1 directly via temporal per-
sistence. However, I argue that such a theory offers an incomplete account of the conflict
dynamics and, as a consequence, underestimates the propensity for conflict in it+1 – that is,
the persistence of conflict – in at least 2 ways. First, it neglects the simultaneous spatial
feedback through the increase to the regional risk of conflict, with any increase x having
a direct and indirect (i.e., spatial) effect on i’s conflict propensity.6 That is, an increase
to i’s risk (direct) increases j’s risk which then feeds back into i’s risk (indirect), these are
known as second-order (or ‘echo’) effects.7 Secondly, the increase in j’s risk at t increases
the propensity for conflict in jt+1 (via persistence), which itself increases the risk of conflict
in it+1 (via contagion), and so on and so forth. In sum, we underestimate the propensity
for conflict in it+1 by neglecting the way in which the persistence of conflict is augmented
through this positive and recursive spatial feedback loop.
6Conventional conflict contagion theories also neglect this dynamic.
7In short, the intuition here is that any state is itself a neighbor of its neighbor. Therefore, in the same
way effect of a change diffuse to non-contiguous states they also feedback to the originating country.
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Figure 3.2: The Dependence of Conflict in Space and Time
(a) Status Quo Understanding (b) Systemic Dependence
This system of feedback can produce conflict (or peace) prone regions, as any initial
increase to the risk of conflict (or the observation of civil war in any state) can increase the
risk of conflict amongst a set of interconnected states many times over. This suggests that
the so-called ‘conflict-trap’ may be better understood as a regional phenomenon, with each
state’s individual probability of conflict multiplied through those of their neighbors.
There is strong anecdotal evidence for the importance of these dynamics in the produc-
tion of conflict prone regions in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. Several countries
in the Great Lakes region of (East) Africa (e.g., DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tan-
zania) have seen persistent and repeated civil conflicts that appear related. O’Loughlin &
Raleigh (2008) argue that this set of conflicts “highlight how many current civil wars are
not state-specific, but related and supported by a host of external conditions” (10). Ciaran
Donnnelly, head of International Rescue Committee effort in Uganda, reiterates “in general,
what you can see in this whole region is a set of interrelated conflicts” (McHugh 2005, 5).
Furthermore, the West Africa region (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Senegal) seems to ex-
hibit similar regional conflict dynamics. In 2003, The Economist reported: “West Africa’s
civil wars are usually reported as tragedies befalling individual states...In fact, all these wars
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are intertwined, and it is impossible to understand one without reference to the others.”
Thus, countries located in such clusters have persistently higher risks of conflict than would
be expected from any single country.
Though these accounts suggest the importance of spatial interdependence in producing
persistent regional conflict, little empirical work in political science has systemically explored
this question. Therefore, in following sections, I test the extent to which spatial dependence
contributes to recurrent civil conflict.
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
To test the preceding propositions, I estimate a series of temporally and spatially
lagged probit models of civil conflict using maximum simulated-likelihood with recursive-
importance-sampling (RIS).8 As the method has already been discussed at length in chapter
chapter 2, I limit any explicit discussion of the setup, formula, and estimation, focusing
instead on describing the data in the model and briefly discussing the leverage MSL-by-RIS
offers me in answering my theoretical question.
The general form of the time-series cross-sectional model is given in Equation 2.9.
Here, yit is Civil Conflict, which takes the value of 1 for any country-year in which a civil
conflict occurs and 0 otherwise, evaluated for all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1961
to 2008.9 The data on civil conflict incidence comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Database (Harbom & Wallensteen 2007), which defines civil conflicts as violent incidents
between a state government and organized opposition which result in at least 25 deaths.
The spatiotemporal multiplier, (I − ρW − φL)−1, captures the extent to which there is
8Note that the computational costs of estimating these models is severe, with each doubling of N de-
creasing the the rate of convergence by about 3.5 times. As such, a model with 1,800 units – e.g. therefore,
a 1,800-dimension integral to be simulated) – can take a full day to estimate.
9There are three reasons I limit the current analysis to Sub-Saharan Africa. First, substantively it is the
most important region for understanding the dynamics of civil conflict. Second, Achen (2002) suggests we
should select samples which enable us to reduce the need for extraneous independent variables. Finally, the
computational costs for estimating models with a global sample are immense, with each model taking days
to compute.
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spatial and temporal dependence in civil conflict incidents. In this analysis W is a row-
standardized binary-contiguity matrix, with each element of wij identifying whether states i
and j share a common border as defined using the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity v3.1
data (Stinnett et al. 2002). Therefore, the spatial lag (Wy∗) captures the effect (ρ) that
civil conflicts in neighboring states (Σj) have on the likelihood of a civil conflict in country
i. Similarly, the time lag (Ly∗) – with L coded as the standard single-period lag discussed
in chapter 2 – captures the effect (φ) of the previous periods likelihood of conflict on its
current value, within unit. Positive and significant estimates of these parameters (φ and ρ)
would offer support for the dependence of civil conflict across time and space respectively,
with significant effects in both indicating a regional conflict trap.
Using MSL-by-RIS allows us to model the dependence of binary outcomes in terms
of latent-y∗, which has three principle advantages. First, it allows us to directly model the
auto-regressive process, analogous to familiar time series models of continuous outcomes.10
That is, we can model temporal auto-dependence, the dependence of a state’s current conflict
propensity on its prior conflict propensity. Importantly, this provides us a flexible strategy
to model conflict dynamics, including the effect of unobserved factors on the realization (and
recurrence) of conflict.11 Despite these benefits, computational difficulties have prevented
the wider utilization of such models. Instead, civil war scholars have largely evaded the issue
by using event-history approaches suggested by Beck et al. (1998) and Carter & Signorino
(2010).12 As discussed in chapter 2, while these evade the bias induced by erroneously
assuming independence, they do not directly model the temporal-autoregressive process.
Furthermore, they cannot effectively incorporate conflict dependence across space which can
only consistently be modeled via latent-y∗.
Second, although spatial models of civil conflict have become increasingly frequent,
these all involve the inclusion of a spatial-lag of neighboring conflict as an exogenous right-
10Here I model these dynamics as an AR(1) process, but this strategy can accommodate a range of AMRA
model.
11While Jackman (2000) suggests this is an ideal approach to capture these effects, directly modeling unit
effects (in addition to possible dependence in the outcome) seems a more complete approach. This is a
possibility I currently explore in co-authored research elsewhere (Cook, Hays, and Franzese 2013).
12The notable exceptions being the working papers of Jackman (2000) and Beck et al. (2001) discussed in
chapter 2
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hand side regressor in a standard logit or probit model (e.g., Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008;
Saleyhan and Gleditsch 2006). Such analyses are all necessarily biased, having failed to
account for the endogeneity induced by including the spatial lag simultaneously.13 That is,
in the same analysis these models regress yjt on yit and yit on yjt, thereby producing results
that are badly biased. Time lagging the spatial-lag, as is occasionally done, only evades this
bias if we assume there is no within-year (i.e., simultaneous) effect of neighboring conflict,
which history suggests is rarely, if ever, the case. Failing this, we can only model spatial
effects consistently through the latent variables or errors (Heckman 1978). MSL-by-RIS
allows me to achieve this, thereby providing the first consistent and efficient estimates of
spatial effect of civil conflict in the literature.14
Finally, modeling both temporal and spatial dependence in latent-y∗ provides the most
effective means of discriminating between their individual effects and exploring their joint
impact. Notably, it is the only estimation strategy which provides consistent estimates of
both dependence parameters while employing a consistent theoretical logic.15 Furthermore,
it easily allows us to decompose the effect of the regressors into short- and long-run, spatial
and non-spatial, thereby providing clearer insight into the means by which they influence
conflict.
In addition to modeling the dependence in civil conflict, I include a battery of additional
covariates (X) to account for several of the well-known country-level determinants of civil
conflict. GDP (ln) is the natural log of per capita GDP, which has been argued to influence
state capacity to prevent rebellion, with greater levels of development reducing the risk of
conflict. GDP growth is the percentage over per capita GDP growth over the previous year,
with higher rates of growth argued to make conflict less likely by increasing the opportunity
13Franzese et al. (2014) provides evidence of the extent of this bias using monte carlo analysis.
14Somewhat more technically, with interdependent outcomes the probabilities for each unit are necessarily
related, meaning that instead of maximizing the log of the product of N marginal distributions, we face
a single N -dimensional integral. High-dimension integrals lack analytical solutions, instead a numeric or
simulation strategy is required. My approach builds on a sampling strategy discussed in Train (2009) and
outlined specifically in Franzese et al. (2014).
15For example, one could construct a consistent hybrid model using a regime-switching model (for time)
and MSL-by-RIS (for space). While econometrically feasible, there is a clear incongruence in the underlying
theory of dependence in this model (using observed-outcomes for time by latent-propensities for space).
Furthermore, such an approach would alleviate none of the computational challenges confronted in estimating
these models (principally one of the chief reasons for pursuing alternative approaches).
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costs of joining rebellion. Pop (ln) is the natural log of national population, which has
been argued to increase the likelihood of conflict, making recruitment easier and deterrence
strategies more complicated. All three of these measures come from the Penn World Table
8.0 data (Heston et al. 2012). Lastly, I include a binary measure of regime type, Democracy,
from Cheibub et al. (2010) Democracy-Dictatorship data, which should reduce the risk of
conflict by providing non-violent means with which to pursue political grievances. For each
of these covariates, I estimate both the short- and long-run effects, which, to my knowledge,
have not been calculated in any of the civil conflict literature to date.16
3.3 RESULTS
The results from my model suggest considerable support for the dependence of civil
conflict across time and space (Table 3.1). Model 1 provides the estimates of the regressors
when we assume conflict incidence is independent, with each of the regressors achieving
traditional levels of significance in the expected directions. However, as expected, there is a
persistent effect of civil conflict, as the temporal lag is highly significant (Model 2). Though
we cannot yet speak to the substantive significance, an issue I turn to shortly, a coefficient
of 0.710 suggests considerable dependence in the model. Furthermore, this model provides
insight into how the regressors influence civil conflict. Notably, the parameter estimates for
GDP and Democracy both fail to obtain traditional levels of significance when lagged-y∗
is included in the model, suggesting that the impact of these variables is predominantly
through their long-run effects.17 As in continuous-outcome models, the total effect is now
given by β
1−φ , which is -0.135 and -0.324 for GDP and Democracy respectively, which is quite
similar to the estimated values given in the independent model.
16More completely, the inclusion of latent-y∗ allows me to estimate the short- and long-run, spatial and
non-spatial effects.
17As in OLS models with lagged-dependent variables the coefficient estimates for the variables indicate
their short-run or immediate effect. See Keele and Kelly (2006) for an thorough discussion of these issues
with continuous outcomes.
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Table 3.1: Dependence of Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4








-0.143*** -0.039 -0.131** -0.034
(0.051) (0.036) (0.051) (0.036)
Pop (ln)
0.383*** 0.142*** 0.381*** 0.147***
(0.032) (0.024) (0.032) (0.024)
GDP Growth (%)
-1.061** -1.026** -1.090** -1.079**
(0.413) (0.410) (0.414) (0.414)
Democracy
-0.353*** -0.094 -0.363*** -0.097
(0.119) (0.090) (0.119) (0.090)
Constant
-3.218*** -1.318*** -3.174*** -1.332***
(0.467) (0.349) (0.469) (0.352)
N (states) 1780(41) 1780(41) 1780(41) 1780(41)
SEs in parentheses. ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
There is also strong evidence for a spatial and spatiotemporal dependence in the model.
In Model 3, I include the spatial lag, but omit the temporal lag. While, of course, not as
strong the temporal dependence, the effect of spatial dependence is still positive and signifi-
cant. Though there are less noticeable changes to the included regressors, our interpretation
of these estimates again changes following the inclusion of a dependence parameter. In this
case, the coefficients represent the direct (i.e., non-spatial) first-period effect of the regres-
sors.18 When I include both the temporal and spatial lags in the model (Model 4), we see
that both are positive and significant, indicating that there is temporal and spatial depen-
dence in civil conflict. This provides support for my argument about the need to account
for both of these complementary and reinforcing channels of conflict propagation.
Yet, these findings can only tell us so much. Ultimately, we are interested not only
in properly estimating the parameter coefficients, but in calculating substantive effects in-
dicating the increased risk conflict given previous or neighboring civil conflict. Despite this,
18Total effects can be calculated using the direct coefficient and the spatial filter (I− ρW)−1.
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few studies have explicitly calculated the substantive effects of conflict persistence and even
fewer for contagion.19 As discussed in chapter 2, estimating these quantities with a spatial
or spatiotemporal probit model is not straight-forward, as it is complicated by the same
nonlinearities in and interdependence across outcomes which plagued estimation. Therefore,
I use the simulation strategy detailed in chapter 2 to estimate conditional counter-factual
effects. To review, I sample from the distribution of disturbances () using the reduced-form
model and generate simulated conflict episodes according to the measurement equation:
Pr(yit = 1) = Pr(−(I− ρW− φL)−1Xitβ < (I− ρW− φL)−1it) (3.1)
That is, the outcome (yit) is a function of whether the reduced-form disturbance, (I−ρW−
φL)−1it, is greater (or less than) the negative of its reduced-form cutpoint, (I − ρW −
φL)−1Xitβ. From this new set of y’s, we can estimate the counter-factural probabilities
of interest and then estimate frequencies over outcomes. For example, to calculate the
contemporaneous spatial effect we would compare:
Pr[yit = 1|X,W,L, yjt = 1] and Pr[yit = 1|X,W,L, yjt = 0] (3.2)
Simply put, we can estimate the difference in the probability that yit experiences civil conflict
conditional on the outcome in yjt.
Figure 2.2 helps to clarify this point further. In short, the reduced-form cutpoints,
(I − ρW − φL)−1Xβ, for two selected units, divide the plane into four possible quadrants.
For both units, we take a draw from the reduced-form disturbance, (I−ρW−φL)−1, which
jointly identify an x-y coordinate (a point)20. The relation of this point to the cutpoints (i.e.,
the quadrant it is located in), indicates one of four possible outcome profiles. For example, if
the point is in quadrant I, then both i and j are above their respective reduced-form cutpoints
and yit = 1 and yjt = 1. After repeating this many times, we can calculate conditional
19A notable exception is the working paper by Hegre et al. (2011) which is notable in two respects: i)
it uses a transition (i.e., regime-switching) model to capture the persistence in conflict and ii) it provides
country-specific effects estimates using predicted probabilities. However, in addition to other differences,
they treat the spatial lag of conflict as exogenous, resulting in biased estimates of both the spatial and
temporal parameters for the reasons outlined above in the text.
20To clarify further, the disturbances are drawn for the entire vector of units in the model, but for this
illustration I simply utilize the slice corresponding to the two units of interests
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relative frequencies from the ratios of the quadrant counts which provide estimates for the
conditional probabilities. Specifically, the probabilities given in (3.1) are estimated by:
Pr[yit = 1|X,W,L, yjt = 1] = Quadrant I Count
Quadrant I Count + Quadrant IV Count
Pr[yit = 1|X,W,L, yjt = 0] = Quadrant II Count
Quadrant II Count + Quadrant III Count
(3.3)
With the difference between the two estimated probabilities giving us the increased (de-
creased) probability that yi is equal to 1 given the outcome in yj (i.e., the conditional con-
temporaneous spatial effect). This same approach extends straightforwardly for estimating
the substantive effect of conflict persistence, we simply estimate the probabilities in (6.3)
conditioning on counter-factual realizations of the outcome in yit−1 as opposed to yjt.
This strategy enables us to answer hypothetical counter-factual questions about the
extent to which neighboring and prior conflict make the realization of conflict more likely for
specific countries. Even a cursory review of recent political coverage uncovers the frequency
with which such questions are (implicitly) posed: “UN Chief Fears Resumption of Civil
War In Ivory Coast,” “New Civil War Feared in Sudan As Town Empties,”“Fears mount
that Coˆte d’Ivoire conflict could spill to Liberia,” “Zambia Concerned About DRC conflict
spillover,”“The conflict in Mali could be creating a ‘ticking time bomb’ for neighbouring
Western Sahara.” Current research offers us little purchase over these questions, which are
important for both academics and policy makers alike. However, these are exactly the type
of conditional effects we can estimate via simulation.
Using this strategy, I first explore the extent to which the outbreak of conflict in
Rwanda in 1990 increased the risk of civil conflict in neighboring Burundi. The history
between these locations runs deep, to a time since before they were states, having each
emerged from German (and later Belgian) colonial control. Both achieved independence
in 1962, followed shortly thereafter by repeated bouts of ethnic conflict between Hutu and
Tutsis factions. Rwanda and Burundi’s close proximity and common ethnic divisions have
frequently resulted in both countries, directly or indirectly, playing a role in any conflict
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in the other (Chossudovsky 1996). In 1990. the – primarily Tutsi – Rwandan Patriotic
Army invaded Rwanda from Uganda, triggering a series of events which culminated in the
Rwandan Civil War. Given the proximity of Rwanda and Burundi, what impact did this
initiation of fighting have on the likelihood of conflict in Burundi? With respect to the model,
the question becomes: given that Rwanda’s reduced-form disturbance is above/below the
negative of its reduced-form cutpoint, what is the probability that Burundi’s reduced-form
disturbance will be above/below the negative its reduced-form cutpoint?
Using the approach indicated above, I draw 10,000 times from a N (0,1) for each of
the observations in the sample and then multiply them through the spatiotemporal filter to
estimate the reduced-from disturbances. The reduced-form cutpoints, which are generated by
multiple Xβ, for Burundi and Rwanda by the spatiotemporal filter, are -1.1395 and -1.0907
respectively. Therefore, a civil conflict occurs if the reduced-form disturbances are greater
than 1.1395 and 1.0907. The distribution of the disturbances in relation to the (adjusted)
cutpoints is presented in Figure 4. In these simulations, Burundi experiences a civil conflict
19.7% of the time when Rwanda does not (1537/7790), yet 24.6% of the time when Rwanda
is also embroiled in civil conflict (544/2210). Thus, conflict in Rwanda increases the risk
that Burundi will experience conflict by 4.88%. To calculate our uncertainty about these
estimates – that due to sampling uncertainty about the coefficient values – we can resample
the model parameters (β, ρ, φ) from a multivariate normal using the estimated means and
variance-covariance matrix from the preceding estimation. Doing so 100 times indicates that
with 95% confidence the immediate effect estimate lies between 2.27% and 5.94%
These results confirm the presence of significant and substantive positive spatial in-
terdependence interdependence in civil conflict. However, we are interested in whether this
dependence also contributes to regional conflict persistence. Therefore, I expand the analy-
sis in two ways. First, I include an additional country, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), which gives greater leverage over the influence of multiple neighboring conflicts, as
is frequently the case in such clusters. Second, and more importantly, I expand the analysis
in time to look at how spatial and temporal dependence jointly contribute to the persistence
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Figure 3.3: Contagion: Contemp. Spatial Effects of Conflict(Burundi & Rwanda)





















The strategy for multiple countries is largely the same as in (6.3), except now we must
expand to three, or more, dimensions. Now the reduced-form disturbances for the three
units, (I− ρW− φL)−1, identifies (X, Y, Z) locations on the Cartesian coordinate system.
As before, the location of the point relative to the reduced-form cutpoints, now indicated by
planes, specifies an outcome profile, with {1,1,1} indicating conflict in all 3 states. Using this
strategy, we can calculate multiple conditional frequencies. For example, if we just wanted
to compare the case in which both neighbors experience conflict to that in which neither do,
we calculate:
Pr[yit = 1|X,W, yj1t = 1, yj2t = 1] = freq{1,1,1}
freq{1,1,1} + freq{0,1,1}




Though, of course, more elaborate sub-comparisons are possible – the effect of conflict in
one and not the other – through different calculations of the conditional probabilities and
subsequent frequencies.
Figure 3.4: Contagion: Regional Spatial Effects of Conflict(Rwanda, Burundi, & DRC)
Figure 5 shows the results of this strategy for Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, with
the planes representing the cutpoints for each of the countries and the points representing
the locations of the draws of the disturbances. To facilitate comparison, I note the location
of the points in relation to the cutpoints by their color, with white indicating the point is
beneath all of the cutpoints (e.g, no conflict, located in the bottom front-most region) and
the darkest points exceeding all 3 of the cutpoints (i.e., conflict in all, located in the top-rear
region). Calculating the effects indicated in (3.4) for the DRC is achieved by calculating the
frequency of points above/below the horizontal plane in the foremost region, and comparing
those to the frequency of points above/below that plane in the rear region. The results from
this indicate that the probability of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo increases
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by 35.7% when both Rwanda and Burundi are currently undergoing conflict (as compared
to when neither are).
Figure 3.5: Conflict Trap: Persistence & Contagion (Rwanda, Burundi, & DRC)
These effects are also represented in the complete spatiotemporal regional feedback
cycle, presented in Figure 6. In this analysis, I also explore the impact that such a transition
would have on the risk of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (CD in the illustra-
tion) moving forward. Conditional on conflict occurring at time t – made 35.7% more likely
due to spatial feedback – the risk of conflict in the DRC in the next period is 34.22% greater.
To see how these effects feedback yet again, I calculate how this increased risk contributes to
the risk of conflict in Rwanda and Burundi in t+1. Conflict in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (at t+1 ) increases the risk of conflict by 21.03% in Rwanda and 17.64% in Burundi.
Which, if it results in conflict in either, feeds back again into an increased risk of conflict in
the DRC. This illustrates the means by which several interconnected countries can experi-
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ence persistence which arises from contagion, as any risk of conflict is further heightened via
these simultaneous spatial channels.
3.4 DISCUSSION
“Once rebellion has started it appears to develop a momentum of its own,” moving
through both time and space (Collier et al. 2003). Evidence presented here suggests that the
persistence of conflict occurs not just because of its impacts on country currently fighting, but
also because of the consequences that fighting has on its neighbors. I have shown here that
such conflict increases the risk of conflict in neighboring countries which, in turn, increases
the risk of conflict in the originating state. Furthermore, this increases the probability of
conflict in neighboring states during future periods, which again spatially feeds back into
a heightened likelihood of persistence or recurrence in the original conflict country. This
system of simultaneous and sequential positive feedback explains the clusters of states with
recurrent conflict (i.e., conflict regions) that we frequently observe. In sum, the evidence
supports my argument for regional conflict traps, wherein states become locked in persistent
and interrelated civil conflicts. This not only offers a more complete understanding of conflict
dynamics, but helps to explain why peace has been so difficult to achieve in some areas.
Furthermore, these results indicate that once spatiotemporal dependence is modeled,
traditionally important causes of conflict (Democracy and GDP) are no longer significant.
The finding for GDP per capita is particularly interesting, as this is widely considered one
of the most robust relationships in civil war (Hegre & Sambanis 2006). From my findings it
appears instead that GDP emerges as a significant predictor of conflict because of a failure
to adequately capture the temporal and spatial dependence. Why should this matter? First,
countries that are poor also experience more (and repeated) conflict, meaning treating these
events as serially independent artificially inflates the relationship between GDP and conflict.
Second, poor states are spatially distributed in a pattern similar to conflict prone states –
recall the African states discussed in the last section – meaning, again, that failing to capture
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this spatial dependence in the outcomes will erroneously inflate the relationship between
GDP and conflict. Given the significance assigned to development as an instrument for
promoting peace, this is a very important relationship to properly understand. Therefore, in
chapter 6, I explore an additional explanation, that unobserved constant unit factors make
some states more likely to experience both low development and conflict, suggesting the
relationship between the two is spurious. Ultimately, it will be important to distinguish
completely between these three possible explanations for the “developmental peace” – is it
low development, conflict dependence, or unobserved unit heterogeneity which causes some
states to experience conflict so regularly? – but parsing out these individual effects is not
easily achieved with linear models, let alone in non-linear ones Nickell (1981). As such,
in chapter 7, I propose dynamic panel models for binary outcomes which may allow us to
discriminate between these accounts.
In addition to that work, several other questions need to be answered in the future to
better understand how and why states become trapped in conflict. First, we need to better
understand the role of exogenous-external factors in triggering and continuing these cycles
of conflict. In future work, I plan to explore the affect of commodity price shocks on conflict
resumption. Are post-conflict countries at greater risk of experiencing conflict following an
economic shock, and do such shocks, in turn, indirectly impact the likelihood of conflict
in surrounding states. This is particularly important to the extent that these exogenous-
external factors simultaneously impact several states in the region – e.g., clusters of states
export a similar resource, neighboring states experience similar rainfall levels, etc... – as
these common shocks could also explain the regional clustering of conflict episodes. Second,
how does the risk of conflict contagion impact the decision for states to become directly
involved in neighboring conflicts (e.g., intervention), and does such intervention actually
decrease the risk of conflict contagion? Scant work in the current literature on intervention
has explored these questions (notably Kathman 2010; 2011), and none has accounted for the
endogenous dynamic evident in this relationship. Estimating models to fully capture this
dynamic is challenging, however, for the reasons discussed in chapter 2.
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Does this analysis suggest that countries in ‘bad neighborhoods’ are fated to continu-
ously suffer the ills of war? Or that states should attempt to wall themselves off from their
neighbors? Far from it, the same positive feedback cycles actually provide a possible means
out of the trap. Just as cluster of conflict-prone states can emerge, so to can a pocket of
peace-prone states (e.g., West Europe). That is, as any state begins to reduce its risk of
conflict, this also feeds back and reduces the risk of their neighbors conflict, and so on and
so forth. What is needed are strategies for reducing the risk of conflict such that those gains
might also diffuse. Obviously, such research is already underway, with political scientists
and policy makers both exploring strategies for building social capital, improving economic
investment, promoting sound governance. My analysis here suggests that while states cur-
rently in clusters of conflict have it the most difficult, any successes achieved there may also
be felt many times over. Furthermore, it also indicates that the costs of failing to do so are
greater than previously assumed, with several states affected, which should serve to bolster
our desire to root out conflict.
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4.0 MODEL MISSPECIFICATION: POLITICS AND THE CONTAGION
OF FINANCIAL CRISES
Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the
“falling domino” principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the
first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over
very quickly.
— Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954
While, civil conflict may require borders to spread, this is not the case for many other
phenomena. The relationships between states are complex and multidimensional, with states
varying in their respective levels of economic, political, and military integration with one an-
other. Each creating a tie with the potential to cause events in one state to affect events in
another. While early work in spatial statistics – focusing on the proximity of agricultural
plots – did not often require complex measures of spatial association, spatial econometric
analysis is now applied to estimate a variety of models which include more complex spa-
tial structures. In International Relations states are connected through a multiplicity of
overlapping direct (e.g., alliances, trade, IOs, treaties) and indirect (e.g., common political
institutions, language, colonial origin) ties. As such, conventional spatial- and spatiotempo-
ral autoregressive models (i.e., single spatial-lag) are biased, both over -estimating the effect
of the included spatial-lag and under -estimating the total spatial dependence in the data.
One research area where this has proved problematic is the study of panics and manias.
Over the last several decades, financial crises have become an increasingly common and
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debilitating phenomenon.1 Notably, there have been a rash of severe financial crises in
recent years (e.g. Mexico 1994; East Asia 1998; Russia 1998; Argentina 2001), peaking with
the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 (e.g. the ”Great Recession”) and its aftermath (e.g.
Greece 2012). The severity and scope of these events has triggered a renewed interest in
understanding the causes of and responses to such crises (see Macias et al. 2010). Though in
many respects “this time is [no] different” from previous episodes, the spread of recent crises
appears to be more common which can, in turn, make recovery more difficult (Reinhart &
Rogoff 2011). As such, it is important to understand the specific means by which financial
crises spread internationally. In particular, what factors increase the risk of crisis contagion?2
There is an extensive literature on the contagion of financial crises (useful reviews in-
clude Dungey & Tambakis 2005, Karolyi 2003, Upper 1996). To date, most of the empirical
work in this literature stream has focused on the impact of extant economic ties - such as
trade (among others, Glick & Rose 1999) or financial linkages (Allen & Gale 2000, Furfine
2003) from one country to another. Taken together, this work indicates that, while im-
portant, direct economic ties can only offer us so much purchase on the issue of financial
contagion. Consequently, many now suggest that changes to investor beliefs may spread
crises above and beyond what would be anticipated from such spillovers (Pericoli & Sbra-
cia 2003). In short, investors may respond to an initial crises by further withdrawing from
the global financial system which, in turn, spreads the crisis across otherwise unconnected
economies.
However, the pattern of these withdraws is neither random nor irrational (Kindleberger
1978). Instead, a financial crisis serves as a signal to investors about possible underlying
structural fragility in both that country, and importantly, others (King & Wadwani 1990).
From these updated beliefs, investors reduce investment in states in similarly ‘fragile’ eco-
nomic and, I argued, political positions. Specifically, I argue that a financial crises in a
country increases the uncertainty over the ability of states with similar political fundamen-
tals to prevent economic crises, precipitating withdraws from politically similar states and
1Bordo et al. (2001) find that the rate at which such crises have occurred since 1970 is matched only be
the frequency witnessed during the Interwar Years (1919-39), culminating in the Greater Depression.
2Pericoli & Sbracia (2003) define contagion as “a significant increase in the probability of a crisis in one
country, conditional on a crisis occurring in another country”(574).
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triggering ‘self-fulfilling’ crises.3 This contention builds on the well-established political econ-
omy literature on the importance of the political environment for investor decision-making
(Feng 2001, Haggard 2000, Jensen 2003; 2006, Li & Resnik 2003, etc...) and crisis manage-
ment (MacIntyre 2001). However, rather than simply treat investor beliefs about institutions
as fixed, I argue that they are consistently updated in response to recent events (e.g. condi-
tional upon the current crisis). Moreover, the impact of this new information on beliefs may
be substantial given that international investment is a notoriously low-information environ-
ment (Calvo & Mendoza 2000). As such, an event as dramatic as a financial crisis is likely to
induce significant updating of investor beliefs about the risk of these political environments.
To test this proposition, I examine the effect of ‘political proximity’ - the similarity of
political institutions between two states - on the contagion of financial crises using multipara-
metric spatiotemporal autoregressive (m-STAR) probit. While the details of this estimator
are discussed in chapter 2, it has several advantages from a theoretical perspective. First, it
allows us to both account for the simultaneity of crises and explicitly model several possible
transmission channels (e.g., economic ties, political ties, etc...) between states. This im-
proves over existing work, which has either failed to account for the endogeneity bias which
results from such simultaneity, examined any possible transmission channels independently,
or both.4 Second, associational or characteristic-based spatial lags (such as political prox-
imity) offer a means of capturing whether states with similar institutions experience the
onset/absence of crises in unison - i.e., whether the contagion occurs within groups - thereby
allowing for a possible indirect role of domestic institutions on the realization of crises. In
all, it allows us to identify and test a wider range of possible determinants of financial crises
contagion.
Understanding the means by which financial crises are likely to spread is crucial to
both the literature on political economy and resultant policy-making. In their review of
the literature on financial crises, Allen et al. (2009) argue that “we need to gain a better
3The concept of political fundamentals has been discussed elsewhere in the literature (see Hays et al.
2003). In general, it refers to any political relevant political informational. In my subsequent empirical
analysis, I focus on political institutions (formal or informal) which may influence market outcomes.
4To my knowledge, only De Gregorio & Valdes (2001) has included more than trade and finance linkages
in a single analysis. Though, in this case, the failure to account for the endogeneity of the outcomes biases
the findings and, therefore, gives us limited insight into the competing contagion channels.
63
understanding of the market failures that lead to financial crises...perhaps the most important
of [which] is contagion” (27-28). They continue that “a full understanding of contagion is
necessary before adequate policy responses can be designed.” This chapter aims to further
this effort in two ways. First, it highlights the importance of political fundamentals in the
contagion of financial crises. Second, it distinguishes between multiple competing forms of
interdependence. Anticipating my findings, the analysis suggests that after accounting for
the alternative channels of transmission, the presumed negative impact of trade is markedly
reduced. This has substantial implications for our understanding of the potential downside
risk of increased economic integration. Furthermore, I find support for the role of political
fundamentals as a novel transmission mechanism in the spread of banking crises.
4.1 COMMON POLITICAL FUNDAMENTALS AND
SIGNAL-EXTRACTION FAILURES
Since 1970, financial crises have occurred as a rate not witnessed since the Great
Depression (Bordo et al. 2001). While these events are still relatively rare, 124 systematic
banking crises and 208 currency crises have occured across more than 50 countries (Laeven &
Valencia 2012).5 Not only have such crises become more frequent, but also more severe than
in previous financial periods (Calvo & Reinhart 1996). Afflicted economies have suffered
deep and lasting recessions brought on by output contraction (Hutchinson & Noy 2006) and
capital reversals (Joyce & Nabar 2009). Ultimately, the cumulative impact of these crises
can be “several years of lost GDP” with output losses ranging between 63% and 302% (Boyd
et al. 2005, 977). Given that this surge has occurred concurrently with increasing financial
globalization, it has caused many to challenge the purported benefits of greater economic
integration (Rodrik 1998, Stiglitz 2002).6 Namely, does globalization increase the risk of
financial crises and, if so, how?
5See section 5.2 for an explicit operational definition of these events
6Including, among other factors, the rapid expansion of foreign direct investment since the 1980s and
portfolio flows since the 1990s (Agenor 2003)
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There is a vast literature on the systemic risk inherent to the modern international
financial system. Since the Morgenstern (1959) analysis into the effects of stock market
panics on foreign markets, hundreds (and potentially thousands) of articles have been writ-
ten on the potential downside risk of economic interdependence. In general, scholars agree
that a consequence of increased interdependence is that small perturbations in one part of
the global financial system can more readily spillover and generate disturbances in other
parts. Open financial markets can lead to asymmetries in access to capital, loss of macroeco-
nomic stability, and pro-cyclical flows of capital (Agenor 2003). Moreover, deeply integrated
economies are more directly exposed to volatility in capital movements, thereby increasing
the risk of large capital outflows (e.g. liquidity runs) and, in turn, a financial crisis (Ro-
drik 1998). Simply put, domestic economies are increasingly put at greater risk of suffering
macroeconomic losses from factors beyond their control.
As such, it appears that one of the most significant costs of increased integration
is the threat of contagion, that is, the spread of financial instability from one country to
another.7 A number of ‘regional’ crises in the 1990s and 2000s seemed to substantiate
and augment these concerns, generating substantial academic and policy interest in better
understanding the nature of contagion. Notably, the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis (1992-
93) negatively impacted several European countries, followed by the Mexican peso crisis
(1994) which quickly spread to other countries in Latin America (See Map 1). Additionally,
in July 1997 Thailand’s failure to defend the baht was quickly followed by the devaluation of
numerous other Asian currencies (e.g. the Asian financial crisis) and the closing of financial
institutions in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand (See Map 2).8
7The appropriate definition for contagion is a question that has received considerable attention in the
literature and will not be addressed at length here. See Dungey et al. (2006), Pericoli & Sbracia (2003) for
useful reviews.
8To clarify, these maps do not represent any particular contagious episode, but rather any crisis which
occurred within a specified period of time.
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Figure 4.1: Financial Crises, 1990-1994 (Mexican Peso Crisis and ERM)
 
Figure 4.2: Financial Crises, 1995-1999 (Asian Financial Crises)
 
These events, and our failure to predict them, caused many to challenge conventional
models of financial crises, which had largely highlighted the importance of sound macro-
economic fundamentals for avoiding crises (Gorton 1988, Kaminsky & Reinhart 2000). In
response, a large empirical literature emerged in an effort to explain the spread of these,
and other, crises. This work can be split into two conceptual categories on the causes of
contagion: fundamentals-based contagion and informational (or ‘pure’) contagion (Dornbush
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& Claessens 2000, Dungey et al. 2006, Masoon 2000).9 Figure 4.3 presents how these two
theories conceive of the spread of instability. With fundamental-based contagion, financial
crises spread across direct ties between two (or more) states (i.e., ‘spillovers’), whereas with
‘informational’ contagion, some third actors witnesses an event in state A and, consequently,
adopts a policy toward state B which generates instability there as well.
Figure 4.3: Competing Theories of Contagion (Spillovers vs. Informational)
 
Specifically, fundamentals-based contagion focuses on the cascade of crises, as domi-
noes, through the global financial systems via spillovers across extant real and financial
ties (Calvo & Reinhart 1996, Moser 2003). First, high trade flows are argued to: i) make
states more vulnerable to changes in market conditions in another state via changes to prices
and/or the quantity trade of goods; ii) induce competitive devaluations; iii) increase the risk
of speculative attacks as investors try to anticipate spillovers (Corsetti et al. 2000, Dornbush
& Claessens 2000).10 Second, financial connections are argued to cause spillovers if, in re-
sponse to some initial shock, there is a reduction in available liquidity (e.g. capital, foreign
direct investment, trade insurance). Allen & Gale (2007) summarize the variety of ways
in which global financial institutions are linked that may engender contagion: interbank
claims, payment systems, and liquidity demand.11 Finally, geographic proximity appears to
9Moser (2003) alternatively refers to these respectively as domino effects and information effects.
10Transmissions may also occur across real channels indirectly - between states that are not primary
trading partners - via changes to export competition (Goldstein 1998).
11It may be that the inability to identify a primary transmission channel - between trade and finance - is
a consequence of frequently high correlation between the two (Dungey et al. 2006).
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be a key condition in spillovers. That is, financial are argued to be a regional phenomenon,
though the specific mechanism for this relationship has not been well articulated (Calvo &
Reinhart 1996, Kaminsky & Schmukler 1999). While geography obviously correlates highly
with trade spillovers (Glick & Rose 1999), De Gregorio & Valdes (2001) find strong regional
effects which persist even after accounting for trade and economic similarities, suggesting
some (potentially unobservable) neighborhood effect capturing other economic and/or polit-
ical conditions which cluster by region.
In addition to direct spillovers, an alternative logic for contagion advanced in the lit-
erature – ‘pure’ or informational contagion – which centers on the behavior of international
investors in response to the originating crisis. If investors believe that this crisis is likely
to cause (and/or signals a greater likelihood of) additional financial crises in other markets,
they may seek to preemptively withdraw investment from these states (Dornbush & Claessens
2000). These rapid capital outflows may, in turn, trigger additional financial crises. Impor-
tantly, these crises can emerge in states unconnected to the country of origin and, possibly,
in states that would have been unlikely to experience a crisis in the absence of a change in
the beliefs about the investment climate. In effect, investors construct the outcomes they
had sough to avoid.
This result is largely the consequence of imperfect information held by investors and
the costs of acquiring superior information (Calvo & Mendoza 2000). In general, investors
lack information over: 1) fundamentals of the markets they are invested in; 2) the extent to
which two economies are interdependent; 3) the cause(s) of the initial crises. Moser (2003)
argues that, as a result, investors are left uncertain about the extent of the impact a financial
crisis in one country has on economic outcomes in others. He summarizes two ways in which
such signal extraction failures - wherein a “crisis in one country leads to an inefficient revision
of fundamentals and a less accurate assessment” - may cause investors to overestimate the
downside risk posed by the initial crisis on other states (163). First, investors overestimate
the extent of interdependence between markets, believing spillovers to be more likely than
is actually the case (Pritsker 2001). Second, investors conclude that countries similar to the
crisis country possess a similar risk of undergoing a crisis. That is, there is belief among
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investors that the initial crisis reveals information about the market characteristics likely to
generate financial crises in other states. In this way, similar states get “lumped together”
(Moser 2003).
King & Wadwani (1990) is among the first work to show evidence for such an effect
in stock market co-movements, where ‘mistakes’ in asset pricing in one market are quickly
transmitted to other markets. Specifically, price changes in one market are perceived as
having implications for asset pricing in other markets, thereby inducing revisions across
countries (Kodres & Pritsker 2002). Furthermore, Kodres & Pritsker (2002) argue that
countries are at the greatest risk of contagion when information is low. Given low levels
of initial information on metrics of interest, investors are likely to place undue importance
on highly salient events such as the crisis. As a result, they may erroneously assume that
the recent shock reveals more accurate or ‘true’ information about the stability of market
fundamentals, and are therefore at greater risk of over-correcting their beliefs. Moreover, in
high-cost low-information financial environments an information cascade can arise wherein
investors take cues from the decisions of other actors, believing them to be better informed.
Such actions prevent optimal market corrections – e.g., new investors capitalizing on the
arbitrage opportunities presented – thereby resulting in Pareto-inferior outcomes such as
financial crises. In particular, research has shown how perceived asymmetries of information
can further exacerbate contagion, as actors update their beliefs over market fundamentals
based upon the actions of other money managers and traders whom they perceive to be
better informed (Calvo & Mendoza 2000, Pasquariello 2007).
To this point, however, this research has focused exclusively on economic fundamentals
and been largely silent on the importance of political fundamentals. I argue we should also
observe lumping over political fundamentals, thereby producing contagion between states
with similar political institutions. First, it is well established that investment decisions
made by market participants are determined, in part, as a function of the political environ-
ment. Investors seek economies with political fundamentals that both promote macroeco-
nomic stability (Quinn & Woolley 2001) and limit costly uncertainty over political risk (e.g.,
government opportunistic behavior, expropriation, etc...). Extant literature suggests that
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investment flows to states with secure property rights protections (Jensen 2003, Li 2006),
strong governance (Daude & Stein 2007, Jensen 2003), government transparency (Haggard
2000), and policy stability (Feng 2001, Haggard 2000, Jensen 2006).
Second, the political economy literature has also indicated the importance of political
institutions in avoiding financial crises. In particular, it is suggested that the ability to
quickly respond to a shock to macroeconomic fundamentals is crucial in avoiding financial
crises. MacIntyre (2001) argues that, in such instances, the heightened “uncertainty and
nervousness” of investors places a premium on rapidly responding to assuage such fears and
avoid market panics. Constraints on the executive may limit the ability to effectively take
such actions, as leaders are required to achieve the consent of a greater number of actors
with potentially divergent preferences (Haggard & McCubbins 2001, Tsebelis 1995). That is,
the ability of states to take actions to promote macroeconomic stability, typically stimulus,
following a shock may be either delayed or constrained as a consequence of the institutional
structure, reducing the efficacy of crisis-averting policies. However, this work is contrasted
by literature arguing that democracies better assuage investors because of their greater
transparency (Haggard 2000), and market concerns about over-corrections, wherein states
with policy flexibility may adopt unnecessary (and potentially harmful) policies because of
a perceived risk of crisis. In sum, theories suggesting a direct effect of political constrains
on investment seems mixed. However, there seems to be consensus that these political
institutions are consequential in determining whether a country experiences (avoids) a crisis.
Taken together, investor beliefs over political fundamentals are important for deter-
mining investment ex ante, and for the presumed risk of those investments once a crisis is
though imminent. However, research indicates that these beliefs are highly volatile. Hill
(1998) argues that political risk is notoriously difficult to assess, as what constitutes a politi-
cal risky environment is highly fluid.12 This can result in rapid revisions of beliefs because the
definition of political risk itself is potentially endogenous to the changing conditions. There-
fore, Hill (1998) argues that “when assessing political risk during or shortly after a crisis,
investors use the best information they have - information as to the recent crisis”(289). In
12Political risk is considered broadly - not simply sovereign risk - to note any variety political factors which
may impact the stability, certainty, performance of the market.
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effect investors mark use of (or suffer from, depending on one’s perspective) the availability
heuistic, wherein the probability assigned to an event is a function of the ease with which
one can recall similar episodes (Tversky & Kahnemen 1973). Evidence of this bias exists for
a range of financial decisions, including stock selection (Barber & Odean 2008), investment
category choice (Shiller 2005), level of investment (Furfine 2003), purchasing (Folkes 1988),
and analyst forecasting (Lee et al. 2008).
I argue that a similar dynamic exists in the behavior of international investors fol-
lowing a financial crisis. First, following an initial financial crisis occurrence the subjective
probability of additional crises will rise to levels greater than the true risk (Herring 1999).
Second, these heightened perceptions of risk cause investors to take actions to minimize their
potential losses, that is, to withdraw capital from at-risk markets. In making these determi-
nations investors consider a variety of factors including beliefs about political fundamentals
and their influence on the likelihood of crises. However, in so doing, investors will privilege
recent information, that is, information they have gleaned from the recent crisis. It is the
revisions of these subjective assessments of political risk which, in turn, fuel investment de-
cisions. These revisions are likely to be pronounced given the recency and salience of the
crisis, both of which contribute to a propensity to privilege current information over prior
beliefs in decision-making processes (Tversky & Kahnemen 1973).
Therefore, deviating from the current political economy literature, I contend that in-
vestors do not have fixed beliefs as to the efficacy of certain political environments. Rather,
these dispositions are fluid and heavily conditional on information provided by the recent
crisis. In effect, the crisis induces a discontinuity in their beliefs about the risk of particular
political fundamentals or characteristics. That is, while investors may have some prior be-
liefs about over political fundamentals, the crisis itself disrupts these and causes investors to
reach new subjective understandings as to the stability of the political climate. I argue that
these updated beliefs, in turn, percipitate capital outflows and trigger self-fulfilling crises.
Therefore, I anticipate that states with similar political fundamentals should be more likely
to experience financial crises contagion. A proposition I test in the following sections.
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4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
To test the preceding proposition, I estimate a series of spatially and temporally lagged
probit models of financial crises using maximum simulated-likelihood (MSL) by recursive-
importance-sampling (RIS) as detailed in chapter 2. Spatial estimation allows us to explicitly
model and discriminate between the possible channels of contagion along which financial
crises may be transmitted. In particular, MSL-by-RIS improves upon existing spatial work in
the conditional crisis literature by accounting for the endogeneity in the relationship between
the propensity for financial crises, that is, the risk of a crisis in country at is country i is
a function of the risk of a risk in country j and vice-versa.13 As noted in chapter 2 and
Franzese et al. (2014), failing to properly account for this simultaneity has been shown to
produce biased estimates, and therefore our understanding of the contagion of financial crisis
remains limited.
The characteristics of the model are given in Equation 2.8 - Equation 2.10, where yit
is the binary outcome, Financial Crisis, which takes the value of 1 for any country-year
in which a banking crisis occurs are 0 otherwise, evaluated for all states between 1970 and
2007. The data comes from a new systematic database on financial crises from the IMF which
identifies a banking crisis as having taken place when the financial sector experiences a large
number of defaults, financial institutions face difficulties repaying contracts on time, non-
performing loans increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking system capital
is exhausted Laeven & Valencia (2012). The possible channels of contagion are included
in the spatial filter (I − ρW − φL)−1 as W. Before detailing each of these channels, the
general strategy is to first estimate a series of single-W (e.g. one contagion channel) models,
allowing me to better compare these to previous work (with the differences arising primarily
from the proper estimation of the model). Then, to discriminate between these sources, I
estimate a multi-parameteric model as discussed in ??. This entails a simple expansion of
the spatiotemporal multiple to include several measures of spatial dependence:
13To my knowledge, only Novo (2003) has estimated a spatial lag model via MSL-by-RIS (or any analogous
approach) on a single cross-sectional analysis of the ERM crisis.
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y∗it =(I− ρ1W1 + ρ2W2 + . . .+ ρRWR + φL)−1 + Xitβ + u,
with u = (I− ρ1W1 + ρ2W2 + . . .+ ρRWR + φL)−1
(4.1)
In order to test my argument on the importance of the similarity in political fundamen-
tals for the contagion of crisis, I include a weights matrix of political proximity, WPolProx.
Specifically, ‘political proximity’ is measured as the inverted difference in the political con-
straints index Henisz (2000). Henisz’ measure is a spatial model (of a different sort) of
political interaction – ranging from 0 to 1 – which identifies the number of veto players
in a state and the distribution of their policy preferences. In effect, this measure captures
the predicted difficulty of enacting policy reform, with each element of the weights matrix
WPolProx representing the similarity of states in their ability to achieve such innovations.
MacIntyre (2001) and others have argued that investors specifically look to this dimension
when determining their response to a crisis, as such it is uniquely suited for my analysis.14
If my hypothesis is correct, then WPolProx should be positive and significant, suggesting the
importance of political proximity in the spread of financial crises.
Prior work has included this measure, or its quadratic, as a right-hand side regressor
in analyses of financial crises, so it is important to note what is distinct about my use
of this measure. Specifically, the ‘political proximity’ spatial lag – and also the economic
proximity spatial lag I discuss shortly – uses an associational or characteristic-based measure
of proximity between a group of actors, traits that could (and have) been included separately
as right-hand side regressors. In a model with a regressor and a spatial lag generate from
the same underlying factor the parameters capture different aspects of the measure and,
therefore, test fundamentally different theories. In particular, the right-hand side regressor
tests whether there is a direct (non-spatial) effect of being that ‘type’ (e.g., whether states
with fewer political constraints experience crises more frequently) on the outcome of interest,
whereas the spatial lag tests whether there is a peer effect of being in that group (e.g., whether
14As an additional robustness check, I also estimate models in which political proximity is captured by the
similarity of a states political institutions. This allows me to test the idea that investors have low information
on political fundamentals and take cues from the most obvious signals (e.g., regime type). My results remain
consistent to this alternative specification.
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states with fewer political constraints experience crises concurrently).15 Spatial lags which
use associational or characteristic-based measures of proximity between a group of actors
offer us a means of capture indirect and potentially time-varying effects of group inclusion.
That is, even if we find no average direct effect of a group variable - via the coefficient
on the right-hand side regressor - we would be incorrect in interpreting that directly as
indicating that there is no effect of that group or type. Instead, it may suggest that the
impact of being in a group of actors on the outcome is not constant across time (e.g.,
oscillating effects) and, therefore, has no significant average direct effect. However, with
characteristic-based spatial lags, we are able to assess whether being part of a group itself
causes actors to “move together” in that outcome or state across time.16 As such, they are
uniquely able to test the theory I outline above over the evolving state of investor beliefs as
to what constitutes politically risky/safe institutions. I make no claim about the likely direct
effect of political institutions (captured by PolConvV ), and defer to the previous literature
on this point. My claim is only that states at a similar location on this measure (i.e., those
with similar institutions) will have a higher probability of experience similar outcomes as
a consequence of investor “lumping,” if correct this would be evidenced by a significant
parameter estimate on WPolProx.
In addition to my main measure, I also include three weights matrices to assess the com-
mon economic connections advanced in the literature. First, I include a matrix of geographic
contiguity WContig which captures whether states share a common border, as indicated by
the Correlate’s of War Direct Contiguity data (Stinnett et al. 2002). This both tests ex-
tant arguments on the importance of regional proximity in the spread of financial crises and
proxies for a number of omitted spatially proximity features, ensuring the remaining spatial
15Perhaps an additional example will help to clarify this further. Say one was interested in how European
Union (EU) membership influence growth. one could ask whether EU member states have higher growth
rates than non-members, which could then be tested with a binary right-hand side regressor. Alternatively,
one could ask whether the growth rates of the EU member states trend together, which could then be tested
using a spatial lag with EU membership as the weights.
16There are, of course, other ways of capturing time-dependent effects of regressors such as regime-switching
models. However, this strategy may be helpful in that we are not required to make strong claims about the
periods in which we expect the regressor to have different impacts. Rather, we merely wish to hypothesize
about about the co-movement of particular groups with respect to the outcome.
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regressors are not erroneously capturing the effect of some omitted variable.17 As such, it
is an extremely conservative estimation strategy, requiring the other spatial lags to have an
effect which does not operate through simple geographic proximity. Second, to assess the
impact of real spillovers, I include a matrix of trade flows WTrade between all countries using
the Correlates of War data on bilateral trade (Barbieri et al. 2009; 2012). Finally, I capture
the importance of macroeconomic similarity by using the inverted difference in the level of
development WEconProx with higher values representing ‘closer’ proximity.
18
In addition to the possible channels of contagion, I include a number of additional
country-level macroeconomic and political characteristics which are argued to increase the
risk of financial crises (Gorton 1988, Kaminsky & Reinhart 2000). GDPpc and Population
(both logged) are included to capture elements of the general socioeconomic climate.19 Ad-
ditionally, government consumption as a share of GDP (Kg/GDP), investment as a share
of GDP (Ki/GDP) and the ration of the money supply to international reserves (M2/Res)
are included as measures of macroeconomic fundamentals.20 Furthermore, to account for
possible changes in the domestic economy which may trigger financial crises, I included the
growth rate of GDP (GDP Growth % ), the inflation rate (Inflation), and the real interest
rate (Interest Rate). Finally, to capture the potential direct importance of domestic political
institutions, I included a measure of political constraints (as explained above).
17This was a flaw of prior analyses and is particular important given that many of the factors of interest
(e.g., trade, political institutions, etc...) often cluster in geographic space.
18The level of development is seen by many as a key feature for predicting where financial crises and
financial crises contagion will occur, as the similarity in market positions exposes them to more frequent
common shocks(Bekaert et al. 2005, Lagoarde-Segot & Lucey 2006). I also estimate models using government
consumption as a percentage of GDP and money supply over reserves and obtain similar results.
19Data on GDP, population, GDP growth, government consumption and investment come from the Penn
World Tables 7.1 (Heston et al. 2012)




The results from the models of a single spatial lag indicate substantial support for the
common channels of contagion (Table 4.1). Contiguity (Model 1), trade flows (Model 2, and
economic proximity (Model 3) are all found to positively and significantly related to banking
crises. That is, a banking crisis is one state significantly increases the risk of a banking crisis
occurring in geographically or economically connected states. Furthermore, I find support
for the role of common political institutions in spreading crises (Model 4). This indicates
that a banking crisis increases the risk of additional banking crises in states with similar
political fundamentals, as captured here by veto players.21 However, given that many of
these factors are likely to be correlated (e.g., trade flows are greater between neighboring
states), we need to estimate a more fully specified spatial model to discriminate between
their individual effects.
As such, I estimate a multiparametric spatial lag model in which all of the spatial lags
discussed previously are jointly estimated (Model 5). In these results, the impact of political
proximity remains positive and significant even after accounting for other channels of spatial
contagion. Moreover, the size of the dependence parameters ‘rho’ is quite high, suggesting
the strength of the relationship and lending support for the role of an indirect political
channel across which financial crises spread. We also observe that after controlling for the
spatial-effect of political proximity there is no support for a direct (i.e., non-spatial) effect of
political constraints on the realization of crises; the coefficient on PolConV is insignificant,
or at least not one that is systematic over time.
Yet, the estimate of the spatial lag for political proximity suggests that these institu-
tions do matter, simply not in the way that has been traditionally assumed. Instead, the
evidence here suggests that states with similar political institutions are correlated in their
21In additional models (not reported), I also find support for this channel using less sophisticated measures
of political similarity - reflecting the possibility of less-informed investors updating on basic cues - such as
the Polity IV measure of democracy.
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Table 4.1: Bank Crisis Contagion (Spatial Probit), 1970 – 2007
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Contig Trade Econ Prox Pol Prox Full Model
GDPpc (logged) 0.0377* 0.0405* 0.0385* 0.0521* 0.0484*
(0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0199) (0.0247) (0.0246)
Population (logged)
-0.0026 -0.0045 0.012 0.0313 0.0225
(0.031) (0.0314) (0.0299) (0.0389) (0.0391)
GDP Growth (%)
- 4.1464*** - 3.9939*** - 4.1566*** - 4.2302*** - 4.1552***
(0.6337) (0.6391) (0.6328) (0.8338) (0.827)
Kg/GDP
0.0033 0.0029 0.003 0.006 0.006
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0055) (0.0055)
Ki/GDP
-0.003 -0.002 -0.0023 -0.001 -0.0008
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.004) (0.004)
M2/Reserves
-0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Inflation
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Interest Rate
0.0009 0.0011 0.0009 0.0043* 0.0044*
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0026)
PolConV
0.0074 0.0519 -0.0132 0.0189 0.03
(0.1157) (0.1157) (0.1139) (0.1396) (0.1396)
LDV 0.5170*** 0.5213*** 0.5216*** 0.5288*** 0.5236***














- 0.9609*** - 0.8221** - 0.9682** - 1.0051** - 0.9006*
(0.3173) (0.3239) (0.3121) (0.4154) (0.4239)
N (states) 2459 (115) 2459 (115) 2459 (115) 2459 (115) 2459 (115)
SEs in parentheses. ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
realization of financial crises, trending together within “types.”22 Thus, the evidence sug-
22As with most of the work in empirical IR, more research is required to provide the micro-level support
for my presumed casual mechanism. In future work I intend to estimate models using higher frequency data
(e.g., portfolio flows) to more acutely test the behavior of investors in response to financial crises.
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gests that no particular institutional design is unconditionally superior in the avoidance of
crises. Rather, the impact of institutions appears to vary across, conditional upon whether
crises have recently occurred in similar political environments. This possibility has not been
previously explored in the literature, in part because it is a finding which is not possible to
obtain from traditional non-spatial models.
Furthermore, the multiparametric model casts doubt on the role of direct economic
interdependence in the spread of crises. Specifically, after accounting for other elements of
spatial proximity, the effect of trade washes out and it is no longer found to be a significant
channel for the contagion of crises. That is, the results suggest that the previous findings
on the influence of trade on contagion may have been spurious. While potentially surprising
for empirical researchers of contagion, this finding is actually more consistent with a num-
ber of case-study analyses which have frequently challenged the purported importance of the
trade mechanism. Examining all crises since 1980, Kaminsky et al. (2003) identifies repeated
episodes in which the impact of trade as a contagion mechanism was negligible. Addition-
ally, Athukorala & Warr (2002) and Dungey et al. (2006) find little evidence of trade flows
significantly contributing to the spread of the Asian financial crisis or the Mexican peso
crisis. Furthermore, trade may have counter-veiling effects depending on the degree of con-
centration, with high levels making states more exposed to shocks, but export diversification
making states better able to recover from them. A possibility which needs to be explored
more deeply in future research.
To highlight the difference between the estimation strategy utilized here and prior work,
Table 4.1) includes the results from commonly used alternatives (e.g., non-spatial probit and
‘na¨ıve’ spatial probit).23 The results evidence the importance of both: 1) including spatial
lags and 2) properly accounting for their possible endogeneity. In particular, several of the
country-level characteristics which are significant in the non-spatial probit model (Model
23As a reminder, the ‘na¨ıve’ estimator is one in which the spatial lages are simply included as exogenous
right-hand side regressors and then estimated as in standard probit. In both the non-spatial and ‘na¨ıve’
case temporal dependence is capture through the inclusion of the observed-lag of y (as opposed to latent-
y∗), that is, a regime-switching model. I prefer this to other standard approaches – e.g., event-history
based approaches such as counter and splines – because the regime switching model more directly captures
the auto-dependence in y and therefore provides a more reasonable alternative to my preferred estimation
strategy.
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6) “lose” their significance when the spatial lages are included, as inflation and political
constraints are no longer significant. More specifically, the effect of these regressors is now
decomposed into an immediate non-spatial effect and the (long-run) spatial (and temporal)
effect.24 This casts further doubt on contemporary understandings of the role of political
institutions in financial crises, and suggests that those theories advocating of their direct
effect need to be reconsidered and evaluated using estimation strategies which account for
spatial dependence.
While the ‘na¨ıve’ spatial model offers some improvements over the non-spatial model
in this respect, it is shown to drastically overestimate the impact of the spatial effects.25
Significantly, it generates false positives for both trade and economic proximity, which find
no support with the consistent estimator. Moreover, the estimated impact of contiguity
and political proximity, while rightly signed and significant, are noticeably reduced when
the appropriate estimator is employed. In all, the results suggest that previous research in
economics which has treated the spatial lag as exogenous is likely to have overestimated the
extent to which (some) ties matter.
As always, parameter estimates of non-linear models cannot be directly interpreted as
substantive effects. As I noted in chapter 2 and chapter 3 these complications are even greater
with the spatial models employed here given the interdependence in the outcomes. Therefore,
using the approach identified in chapter 2 I estimate conditional counter-factual effects via
simulation. Using this strategy, I explore the extent to which the so-called “Tequilla crisis”
in Mexico increased the risk of a banking crisis in neighboring Guatemala. In 1994, Mexico
experienced a sudden devaluation of the peso, which triggered an economic crisis during
which the stock market and banking system collapsed. These effects were far reaching, as
additional crises soon followed in Argentina and Chile. This invites the question, what
would the risk of crises in surrounding countries have been if not for the Mexican crisis? The
answer to this question depends, in part, on the nature of the spatial relationship between
Mexico and any other state. In Figure 4.4, I depict the connections (the edges) between
24This is analogous to the well-known impact of including a time-lagged dependent variable in one’s
analysis
25This confirms prior work which has found an upward bias in ‘na¨ıve’ spatial probit models via monte
carlo analysis (Franzese et al. 2014).
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Table 4.2: Variation in Estimation Approaches
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
MSL-by-RIS Standard Probit Na¨ıve S-Probit




(0.0391) (0.0570) (0.0592) )
GDP Growth (%)



































- 0.9006*** - 0.1033 - 0.5246
(0.4239) (0.5828) (0.5090)
N (states) 2459 (115) 2459 (115) 2459 (115)
***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
Mexico in 1994 and all other countries in the sample (the nodes) for that year. Wider edges
(e.g., connections) represent greater political similarity to Mexico, while ‘black’ colored edges
indicate geographic contiguity.
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We see that Guatemala is a country with both geographic proximity and a relatively
similar degree of political constraints to Mexico. Therefore, how much greater was the risk
of a financial crisis in Guatemala given the crisis in Mexico? With respect to the model, this
question becomes: given that Mexico’s reduced-form disturbance is above/below its reduced-
form cutpoint, what is the probability that the Guatemalas reduced-form disturbance is
above/below its cutpoint? I draw 10,000 times from a N(0, 1) for each of the observations
in the sample and then multiply them through the spatiotemporal filter to estimate to the
reduced-form disturbances. The reduced-form cutpoints are generated by multiplying Xβ for
the selected units (in this case the Guatemala and Mexico) by the spatiotemporal filter, which
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are -0.843 and -1.157 respectively. Therefore, a financial crisis occurs if the reduced-form
disturbances are greater than 0.843 or 1.157. The distribution of the 10,000 disturbances in
relation to the (adjusted) cutpoints is presented in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Scatter Plot of Reduced Form Disturbances (Guatemala & Mexico 1994))
 
In these simulations Guatemala experiences a financial crisis 21.8% of the time when
Mexico does not (1803/8268), yet 28.6% of the time when Mexico is undergoing a financial
crisis (495/1732). Thus, the Mexican peso crisis increased the risk that the Guatemala would
experience a similar crisis by 6.8%. To calculate our uncertainty about these estimates e.g.,
uncertainty over the estimates of the coefficient values we can resample the model parameters
(β, ρ, φ) from a multivariate normal using the estimate means and variance-covariance from
the preceding estimation. Doing so (100 times) indicates that with 95% confidence the
immediate effect estimate lies between 5.67% and 7.07% (with a mean of 6.37%).
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Figure 4.6: Short and Long Run Effect of Shock’ (Guatemala and Mexico, 1994 2000)
 
However, given the time-series nature of the data, we are also interested in calculating
the long-run counter-factual effects. That is, what effect did the 1994 Mexican peso crisis
have on the risk of a financial crisis in the Guatemala in the years which followed? To
calculate this we draw 10,000 i.i.d standard normal disturbances, as before, and compare
them to their reduced-form cutpoints. After calculating the instantaneous effect, we group
those 10,000 realizations of the data into two groups, one in which Mexico experienced a
financial crisis (state of the world A) and the other in which they did not (state of the world
B). Next, we calculate whether the Guatemala was above or below its cutpoint in subsequent
years, that is, whether the Guatemala experienced a financial crisis in t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , t+ n.
Finally, we calculate the difference in the estimated frequencies across groups A & B. This
difference represents the long-run effect of that initial shock (e.g., the Mexican peso crisis).
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Figure 4.7: Short and Long Run Effect of ‘Shock’ (US and Mexico, 1994 1997)
 
The distribution for the estimated effects of all 100 trials is given in Figure 4.6 cal-
culated up to t + 3 with 95% confidence intervals. As expected the immediate effect is
strongest, 6.37%, with diminishing, but still significant, effects in subsequent years: 4.71%,
3.57%, 2.66%, 2.09%, 1.57%, 1.25%, and 1.19%. Thus, the Mexican peso crisis significantly
increased the risk of a crisis in the Guatemala not simply in 1994, but also in several years to
follow. Moreover, these effects appear highly persistent as we fail to return to a steady-state
(no difference) by 2001.
This contagious impact is not exclusive to small markets, but afflicts large markets
as well. For example, the risk of the Unite States experiencing a financial crisis was 2.85%
[95% between 2.54 % and 3.61%] greater when Mexico underwent a financial crisis in these
simulations.26 Furthermore, the effects persisted for several years following the initial cri-
sis. Though the immediate effect is the strongest (likely via contiguity which proxies for
a number of different kinds of connections), significant effects remain in subsequent years:
26Relative to Guatemala, the risk of the US undergoing a banking crisis at all is significantly lower as
one might expect occurring on average in around 5% of the simulations. Thus, the percent increased risk is
quite a substantial effect (more substantial than the Guatemalan case).
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2.07%, 1.44%, and 0.88% (see Figure 4.7). Ultimately, the difference between the two groups
converges to zero as their respective likelihoods of experiencing a crisis return to a common
steady-state probability. These effects may explain President Clinton’s rationale behind ex-
tending Mexico a highly unpopular $20 billion assistance package to Mexico following the
initial crisis. The rationale for and impact of such interventions is a topic I intend to explore
in future work.
4.4 DISCUSSION
Increased global integration – political and economic – offers considerable benefits, but
also carries substantial risk. In so many words, this sentiment reflects the two stylized facts
which underpin much of the contemporary thoughts on the consequences of interdependence.
One of the major downside risk of such integration is the possible contagion of financial
instability between states, as evidenced most dramatically by the recent ‘Great Recession.’
Such events highlight and need to improve our understanding of the process by which crises
spread internationally and what, if anything, states can do to minimize these risks?
In this chapter, I focus on the first half of this question, examining the factors which
increase the risk of financial crisis contagion. My analysis suggests that the presumed impor-
tance of direct spillovers (such as trade) on contagion may be overstated, as it lacks support
when other spatial factors are accounted for. However, these results also suggests that po-
litical factors may play a more important, and different, role than previously thought. In
particular, I find that states with similar domestic political institutions are likely to correlate
highly in their realization of crises, that is, countries with ‘closer’ institutions have a greater
risk of financial contagion. This departs from traditional political economy theory which has
exclusively focused on the direct role of political institutions in the onset of crises. Instead,
I argue for an additional indirect role of political institutions wherein countries with similar
political fundamentals are more likely to experience crises concurrently. That is, we observe
contagion amongst similar types of political regimes.
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I argue that this spread occurs as investors update their beliefs on the risk posed by
particular political environments following a crisis. From these updated beliefs, they with-
draw capital from risky environments, therein generating self-fulfilling crises. This highlights
the importance in understanding now just how states are connected explicitly (or directly),
but how they are perceived to be connected which constructs a tie between states. As the old
saying goes, perception becomes reality. Though in this version of the project I do not test
the actions of investors directly, such analysis is planned in the future to provide additional
support for the mechanism suggested here. Specifically, by using higher frequency financial
data – such as portfoilo investments – we can model the short-term behavior of investors
in response to a crisis directly. If in this alternative analysis we also observe the effect of
political proximity, it would provide strong evidence for the mechanism advanced here.
As alluded to previously, an additional avenue for future research concerns the policy
prescriptions available to states which may minimize or mitigate the risk of contagion. In
particular, whether financial interventions – such as the example of the United States in
Mexico – help to stymie the spread of economic instability. Current research offers tentative
support for this effect, yet this work has consistently underestimated the role of contagion
in spurring such support. That is, the relationship between financial contagion and inter-
vention runs in two direction, with two related questions: does the anticipation of contagion
increase the likelihood of intervention and does intervention reduce the risk of contagion?
The existing scholarship on these issues does not consider them jointly and, as such, risk a
biased understanding of these effects. Therefore, in planned work, I attempt to isolate the
individual effect of intervention to improve our understanding of whether states can act to
reduce the downside risk of interdependence.27
27Data constraints currently prevent a full analysis of this type, though new data on bilateral financial
bailouts in Schneider (2013) should facilitate analysis of this type when publicly available.
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5.0 UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY AND RARE EVENTS
As has been noted elsewhere, many of the most important phenomena in international
relations are both discrete and rare events (King 2001, King & Zeng 2001b). That is,
binary outcomes where the number of historical occurrences (i.e., ones) of the event in
question is extremely low, both in absolute terms and relative to the number of historical non-
occurrences.1 Much of the work in peace studies focuses on events that are rare, including
the initiation of and entry into international and civil wars, attempts to overthrow the
government via rebellion and/or military coups, and the use of genocide by state actors
to suppress such efforts. However, work in IPE and IOs also regularly deals with rare
events: the formation of preferential trading agreements and bilateral investment treaties,
the decision to employ economic sanctions, the initiation of processes of adjudication within
international dispute bodies, the onset of banking and currency crises. These are some of
the most significant phenomena within IR scholarship.2 Yet, researchers in these subject
areas continue to neglect the way in which the rarity of these events may be biasing their
analyses.
Therefore, in this chapter, I review some of the more significant problems which arise in
estimating models of rare-event data. In particular, two issues have been raised for models
with sparse data. First, with low event totals maximum likelihood estimates are known
to be biased, as the conditional density of the regressors about the less frequent outcome
1Prior work has defined rarity exclusively as the proportion of events to non-events (King & Zeng 2001b).
However, the inferential problems presented from rare events is a consequence of a small sample of occurrences
- in effect, a small sample bias - and not as directly a consequence of the percentage of the occurrences within
the sample.
2Of course, such events are not unique to IR and examples abound in American and Comparative Politics
as well.
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is poorly defined. Second, with sparse data complete or quasi-separation is more likely to
arise, producing infinite-valued estimates for these parameters. It is this second concern
which, in part, has led some researchers to caution against the use of fixed effects with rare
event data, as they states which never experience the outcome are dropped from the analysis
Beck & Katz (2001). While both problems are familiar to political science, they have been
previously been cast as separate concerns. In the next section, I indicate how they are both
the result of the same underlying issue: small sample bias.
After recognizing and clarifying this, I propose a simple and general solution, Penalized
Maximum Likelihood (PML), which addresses both of these issues. Building on the initial
formulation given by Firth (1993), penalized likelihood has become an increasingly common
strategy for removing the first-order bias present in maximum likelihood. Departing from
previous bias-reduction strategies, Firth (1993) proposed introducing a slight penalty to the
score function – equivalent to Jeffreys invariant prior in the case of logistic models – to
reduce the small sample bias. Importantly, this approach does not rely on first obtaining
estimates of the parameters, as other correction-based approaches do. As a result, PML
is able to provide unbiased estimates for parameters even in instances where ML is unable
to produce stable estimates, such as in cases of quasi- or complete separation. Therefore,
PML provides clear advantages over both conventional rare-events pooled or standard panel
estimators. Specifically, it allows researchers to estimate models which both: i) correct for
the small sample bias induced from rare events and ii) include fixed effects with none of the
attendant sample censoring which results from estimating conventional fixed effects models
of rare events. Cook et al. (2014) have argued that this second benefit, estimates for all the
unit effects, is important in that it allows researchers to estimate substantive quantities of
interest such as marginal effects which are not possible (or badly biased) with conventional
fixed effects approaches.
While it is shown that penalized maximum likelihood fixed effects should often be
preferred over available alternatives, there are two limitations to this approach. First, though
the penalization strategy does reduce the incidental parameter bias, it may still be significant
in samples with very small-t. Second, available programs for estimating these models are
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ill-suited for sampling dimensions common to International Relations, which can include tens
of thousands unit parameters (e.g., dyads). As such, I suggest an additional complementary
group-fixed effects strategy. In short, while assuming a common propensity (i.e., pooled) is
rarely supported, assuming complete heterogeneity (i.e., unit-fixed effects) is often equally
unrealistic (and/or unnecessary). If sub-groups of the sample are sufficiently heterogeneous
we can achieve the benefits of unit-fixed effects, while reducing the incidental parameter bias.
Therefore, I conclude the chapter with a discussion of how we might identify these groups
to allow for such estimation.
5.1 PENALIZED MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD
While maximum likelihood estimation is typically motivated on the basis of its asymp-
totic fitness, it is well known to produce bias in finite samples. As I discuss below, because
this bias is order O(n−1) it does not usually constitute a problem for large samples, however
in moderate to small samples, or those with low total Fisher information these biases can
be potentially severe (Cordeiro & McCullagh 1991). In addition to biased estimates of the
parameters, the asymptotic confidence intervals also often perform poorly (Heinze 2006).
King & Zeng (2001a;b) introduced several of these concerns to political science, noting and
clarifying that the bias of MLE estimates was not simply a function of its absolute size of
the sample, but dependent on the number instances of the event in the data.3 It is for this
reason that Heinze (2006) notes that studies using ML with extremely sparse data are not
to be trusted.
The nature of this bias for the logistic model has received particular attention (Cordeiro
& McCullagh 1991, Firth 1993, Schaefer 1983).4. Recall the now familiar latent variable
representation given in Equation 1.1 and Equation 1.2, the probability that yit = 1 is given
by:
3Or, more generally, the number of instances of the less frequent outcome.
4See Schaefer (1983) for an analytic expression of the bias
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Pr(yit = 1|xit) = piit = (1 + exp{−xitβ})−1 (5.1)











ln(1 + exp{(1− 2Yit)xitβ})
(5.2)
Which produces βˆ, an asymptotically unbiased estimator of β. However, in finite samples
it is biased. The asymptotic value of the maximum likelihood estimator βˆ is given by the
following expansion:










Therefore, as n increases, or as more information is added, the accuracy of our estimate
of β grows. A variety of strategies have been proposed to eliminate the first-term of this
expansion, b1(β)
n
, thereby producing first-order O(n−1) unbiased estimates. King & Zeng
(2001b)’s offer one such strategy for estimating this b1(β)
n
, which derives from Cordeiro &




Where ξi = 0.5Qii[(1 + w1)pii − w1], Qii are the diagonal elements of Q = X(X’WX)-1X’
and W = diag{pii(1− pii)wi}. Estimating and subtracting the bias from βˆ yields β˜, a nearly
unbiased estimate of β. This approach is similar in spirit to a range of similar bias-corrective
strategies presented in the broader literature on ML-estimation. King & Zeng (2001a;b)
show the benefits from bias-correction over conventional ’pooled’ logit, particularly for small
samples and rare events.
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However, additional problems arise from sparse data – e.g., rare events – when we
shift focus to panel estimation. As discussed in chapter 1, the most reasonable assumption
for re-BTSCS International Relations data is often that there are unobserved unit effects
which are correlated with the included regressors (e.g., αi and xit are correlated), implying
the need for fixed effects. One strategy for estimating fixed effects models, ‘unconditional
logit,’ is to include additional dummy variables for each unit (but 1) into our model and
maximize the standard logit log-likelihood. However, this suffers from the well-known inci-
dental parameters bias and is inconsistent in N when T is fixed.5 In short, for any panel
with fixed-T estimators including individual fixed effects (i.e., nuisance parameters) provide
inconsistent estimates of the structural parameters of interest (Neyman and Scott 1948).6
As such, Chamberlain (1980) proposes an alternative estimator, ‘conditional logit,’ using
a conditional likelihood function, conditioning on a set of sufficient statistics (Σtyit) for
the incidental parameters (αi).
7 That is, concentrating out the fixed effects. As opposed
to unconditional logit, conditional logit does produce estimates which are consistent in N.
However, either strategy – conditional or unconditional – is problematic in the presence of
rare event data as those units which do not change state – e.g. Σtyit = 0 or T – contribute
nothing to the likelihood (returning estimates of ±∞) and are consequently dropped from
the analysis.8 This issue has been widely noted and debated within political science, with
researchers arguing that it induces a form of sample selection bias and therefore cautioning
against the use of fixed effects Beck & Katz (2001).
Therefore, two issues have been raised in political science as concerns when estimat-
ing binary and rare event data. First, with increasingly rare events maximum likelihood
estimates will likely be biased and asymptotic standard errors problematic (King & Zeng
2001a;b). Second, with rare events it becomes increasingly likely that some units will fail to
5Lancaster (2000) provides a useful summary of (and the history behind) the incidental parameters
problem.
6More specifically, the estimates of the incidental parameters themselves are inconsistent because we
have only a limited number of observations from which to estimate αi (i.e., T ). In turn, this inconsistency
transmitted to the estimates of the structural parameters if we can not derive estimators which do not
depend on the incidental parameters (Heckman 1981).
7Chamberlain (1980) builds on the work of Anderson (1973) to allow for multiple regressors.
8Whether they are literally ‘dropped’ from the estimation varies based on the statistical package one uses.
Yet, in all the point remains that they are contributing nothing to the likelihood and, therefore, coefficient
estimates of the regressors of interest.
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experience the outcome within the sample period. Meaning researchers are force to either
improperly handle unit heterogeneity (e.g., estimate a ’pooled’ or random effects model) or
face sizable sample losses from estimating fixed effects models (Beck & Katz 2001). While
these have traditionally been cast as separate concerns, the problems actually arise from the
same fundamental issue: small samples. In the former there are too few events in the total
sample, while in the latter there are too few events in the particular unit-sample (up to, and
including, none). To be precise, the fundamental problem in each case is the lack of a suffi-
cient balance of the two outcomes (0 and 1) over the distribution of some X. Consider, King
& Zeng (2001b)’s intuitive illustration of the ‘rare event’ bias using a simple two variable
model, showing that with two few realizations of Y = 1 the density for Pr(X|Y = 1) will
be calculated poorly and, in turn, the boundary condition incorrectly located. It is easy to
see separation as a special case of this problem, where the number of observations of Y = 1
is zero and, as such, X – in this case the unit dummy – perfectly perfectly predicts the
outcome.
While separation is rightly considered an extreme version of the small sample problem,
we cannot use the strategy proposed by King & Zeng (2001b) in such situations. While King
& Zeng (2001b)’s strategy could (possibly) suffice to remove the incidental parameter bias
in unconditional fixed effects models for those units which experience at least one failure, it
offers no assistance in obtaining estimates for those units which never experience the outcome.
King & Zeng (2001b)’s approach, and other bias corrective strategies, relies on first obtaining
finite estimates of the parameters in order to subsequently ‘correct’ the bias. However, as
noted by Albert & Anderson (1984) and Santner & Duffy (1986) there are conditions under
which such estimates will not exist, namely, quasi and complete separation. Therefore,
bias-correction approaches offer us little recourse when facing such data. However, another
bias reduction strategy has been proposed by Firth (1993) which instead modifies the score
function to remove the bias during the maximization process itself. As such, it does not
rely on on the maximum likelihood estimates, making it instead what Firth (1993) calls a
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bias ‘preventive’ approach.9 Accordingly, it is able to produce finite parameter estimates of
parameters event in the presence of separation (Heinze & Schemper 2002, Zorn 2005).10
As noted above, this is achieved by a modification to the score function (which, as we
will see, is equivalent to penalizing the likelihood by Jeffreys invariant prior):
U∗r (θ) = Ur(θ) + Ar(θ) (5.3)
Where Ur(θ) is the ordinary score and Ar(θ) is modification to the score derived from the




















With the solution of U∗r (θ) = 0 locating a stationary point of:





L(θ) = L(θ)|I(θ)| 12 (5.6)
That is, the ordinary likelihood L penalized by the square root of the determinant of the












9Other bias-preventive approaches have been suggested (see Kosmidis (2007) for a review) which make
similar adjustments. However, these are (i) non-iterative, (ii) shrink toward the mean (rather than zero),
and (iii) do not fully remove the first-order bias. Moreover, simulation studies provide evidence for the
superiority of the modified score function approach over these possible alternatives (Heinze & Schemper
(2002)). As such, I do not discuss these further.
10A point also made by King & Zeng (2001b) in their footnote discussing Firth (1993).
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the determinant of the information matrix is maximized when β = 0, so the penalty function
shrinks the estimates – including unit effect estimates that would otherwise be infinite –
toward zero. Furthermore, penalized maximum likelihood should help ameliorate the small
sample bias given that the attendant bias from the incidental parameters is (always) one of
overestimation, the shrinkage imposed by penalization should provide superior estimates of
the incidental and, in turn, structural parameters even in small samples.11 In more general
terms, it reduces the bias inherent to small samples in ML-estimation and, additionally, it
reduces the incidental parameter bias in conditional fixed effects models, up to and including
those units which never experience the outcome. As such, penalized maximum likelihood
directly addresses both of the primary concerns voiced in International Relations regarding
rare events estimation.
An additional benefit of the penalized maximum likelihood strategy is the flexibility
of the estimator itself. Kosmidis & Firth (2009) develop or discuss bias-reduction adjust-
ments for a broad class of generalized linear and nonlinear models (both with and without
known dispersion parameters). Including a strategy for penalized maximum likelihood probit
– using modified iterative reweighed least squares with data adjustments through pseudo-
responses12 – which presents an interesting possibility for panel binary-outcome data. Previ-
ously, researchers with panel binary-outcome data have been presented with two estimators:
random effects and conditional fixed effects logit (Maddala 1987). Fixed effects probit (with
dummies) is inconsistent in small samples and therefore cautioned against, and there is no
sufficient statistic to condition on – as in the logit case – and therefore no conditional fixed
effects probit estimator is available. Penalized maximum likelihood fixed effects presents an
alternative which produces more accurate estimates using either link function, and therefore
expands the set of options available to researchers with panel binary-outcome data. Given
11Additionally, it will, with certainty, remove the first-order bias inherent to maximum likelihood estima-
tion (especially salient for small samples), which is the chief utility of penalized maximum likelihood. Given
this benefit, we would argue that penalized maximum likelihood (with or without fixed effects) should often
be preferred to standard ML estimation.
12In the probit case the pseudo-responses are:
y∗ = y − hpi(1− pi)η{2φ(η)}
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that ultimately we want a model of dynamics and unit heterogeneity this is important as
many of the developments for dependent binary-outcome models have been made in probit
(see chapter 2). I discuss possible strategies for integrating these two approaches in chapter 7.
5.2 RESULTS
Therefore, I explore the small-sample properties of the three non-panel estimators (i.e.,
pooled, rare-events logit, and penalized maximum likelihood) and four panel estimators (i.e.,
random effects, unconditional fixed effects, conditional fixed effects, and penalized maximum
likelihood fixed effects) via Monte Carlo simulation.13 These experiments draw from and
build upon the work in Cook et al. (2014), with many of the findings appearing in that
text as well. The specification of the data-generation process is similar to that found in
Greene (2004), with the basic framework for binary-TSCS data given in chapter 1.14 In
addition to the unit effect (αi), the DGP includes a time-varying exogenous regressor (X
1
it),
a time-varying endogenous regressor (X2it), a time-invariant exogenous regressor (X
3
i ), and







i + β4dit + αi + it > 0] (5.8)
Where i = 1, ..., N , t = 1, ..., T and...
X1it ∼ N(0, 1)
X2it = X˜
2
it + φαi, where X˜
2
it ∼ N(0, 1)
X3i ∼ N(0, 1)
dit = 1[X˜
4
it + φαi > 0], where X˜
4
it ∼ N(0, 1)
13I should note that attempts were also made to estimate rare-events logit with fixed effects, but the
parameter estimates which results were badly biased (much worse than even uncoditional fixed effects). As
I currently have little intuition for their disproportionately poor performance, I choose to not include them
here.
14I have also ran a series of experiments replicating the DGP utilized by King & Zeng (2001b) in their
analysis of rare events. The results show, as expected, that the PML performs almost identically to re-logit
under a variety conditions (when separation is not a concern). In the next iteration I plan to begin the
results section with this discussion/results but simply did not have time at present.
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while the fixed-effect (αi) is varied across experiments, drawn from from one of three following
distributions:




f(αi) = p(g1(α)) + (1− p)(g2(α))
where g1(αi) ∼ N(0, 1), g2(αi) ∼ N(−6, 1), and p = 0.5
That is, the performance of estimators are evaluated when the unit effects are distributed
normally, χ2, and bimodal (with each peak being normally distributed).15 The random
effects model assumes a parametric distribution for the unit effects. If this distributional as-
sumption is false, it should negatively affect the estimators performance and non-parametric
estimators (e.g., fixed effects) should perform better. To simulate rare events, the mean
of the unit effects (for each distribution) is approximately -3, which sufficed to ensure that
some censoring occurs in each of the experiments. The covariance parameter φ determines
the degree to which the variables X2it and dit are endogenous – the extent to which they
covary with the unobserved unit effects – which is also varied across experiments {0, 0.25,
0.5}.16 Throughout both N and T are also varied, resulting in a large number of experimen-
tal conditions, though for the sake of concision I primarily confine attention here to the N
= 50, and T = 20 case.
In the first set of experiments, αi is drawn from a normal distribution, with all β = 1,
and varying φ between 0, 0.25, and 0.5. Table 5.1 presents the results from the estimators
which assume a common intercept: logit, rare-events logit, and penalized-logit. In experi-
ment #1 – the top row set – φ is set to 0 and we see that, as expected, the results from
each of the estimators is biased. This is consistent with Wooldridge (2010)’s finding that for
probit models the omission of exogenous variables results in attenuation in the estimates of
15Figures of the representative probability density of each distribution are provided in the Appendix I.
16This also, of course, determines the degree of censoring in the data, with higher levels of endogeneity
resulting in greater sample losses.
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the included regressors.17 Cramer (2005) has argued that a similar bias exists for logit, and
these results seem to offer further support for such claims. On average, we observe that the
pooled estimators underestimate by about 10-12% of their true values. More surprisingly,
among the set of pooled estimators, conventional logit appears to do relatively well, consis-
tently outperforming the two bias-reductive approaches. This relative performance generally
holds even as we add endogenous regressors in experiments #2 and #3, yet the nature of
the bias switches as all three estimators now produce inflated estimates of the endgoenous
parameters degrades rapidly. In sum, these findings suggest that neglecting unit hetero-
geneity always biases the parameter estimates in logit models (with the direction of the bias
dependent upon the covariance between the included regressors, the excluded regressors, and
the outcome).
While one would not expect rare-events logit or penalized maximum likelihood to offer
much improvement over conventional logit with respect to this model misspecification – as
they too offer no accounting of the unit heterogeniety – it seems odd that they offer no
improvement to the small sample bias which should also be present in the data. Believing
that this was likely a consequence of the relatively moderate N -toT ratio in the sampling
dimensions, I reran experiment #3 with an expansion to N (to 100) and a reduction in T (to
2), to see whether the the bias-reductive approaches would offer greater improvements under
these conditions. While they do offer some benefits over the conventional logit estimator
– most dramatically in the estimation of time-varying endogenous regressors – these gains
are not on the order that we would expect to observe given the short T specification. As
such, further work is necessary to determine the conditions under which bias-corrective
approaches should be preferred. For now, I confine attention to standard-ML logit in any of
the remaining discussion on pooled estimators.18
17However, Wooldridge (2010) shows that this does not affect the marginal effect estimates
18These are an admittedly constrained set of experiments to draw any definitive conclusions from. However,
given the strength of the claims made by advocates of penalized maximum likelihood – e.g., Paul Allison has
stated that “a case could be made for always using penalized likelihood” – it is important to understand the
conditions under which this strategy may not result in improvements over traditional ML.
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Table 5.1: Coef. Est. Pooled Models (N =50,T =20, αi ∼ N , 1000 trials)
ML-Logit RE-Logit PML-Logit
















































Note: Standard deviations across trials given in parentheses. True β’s all equal
to 1. X2it is included in both the pooled and random effects models, but β2 is not
reported here.
As we have seen, when there is any unit heterogeneity in the data pooled estimators will
be biased and inconsistent. How do the explicitly panel based estimators fare under these
same conditions? The performance of these is given in Table 5.2. As before, in experiment #1
φ is set to 0 and on average, across the simulations, observe eight units with no variation in
the dependent variable (meaning several of the estimators will be based on different sample
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sizes). Under these conditions the estimators perform roughly as expected. The random
effects model reflects the true DGP – there is no correlation between φ and the regressors
and distributional assumption is correct– and as such it performs quite well, producing the
efficiency gains one would expect.
Table 5.2: Coef. Est Panel Models (N =50,T =20, αi ∼ N , 1000 trials)
(Random) (Unc-FE) (Con-FE) (PML-FE)
#1: φ = 0 TV EXO (β1)
1.011 1.095 1.012 0.997
(0.128) (0.145) (0.130) (0.128)
TV END (β2)
1.005 1.089 1.006 0.991
(0.122) (0.139) (0.125) (0.123)
END DUM (β4)
1.011 1.09 1.009 0.994
(0.227) (0.252) (0.232) (0.228)
#2: φ = 0.25 TV EXO (β1)
1.011 1.106 1.013 0.992
(0.156) (0.182) (0.162) (0.141)
TV END (β2)
1.116 1.109 1.016 0.970
(0.148) (0.171) (0.152) (0.140)
END DUM (β4)
1.179 1.109 1.010 0.911
(0.291) (0.171) (0.298) (0.266)
#3: φ = 0.5 TV EXO (β1)
1.125 1.014 1.024 0.964
(0.223) (0.185) (0.195) (0.179)
TV END (β2)
1.120 1.232 1.019 0.959
(0.209) (0.179) (0.183) (0.168)
END DUM (β4)
1.094 1.371 0.993 0.966
(0.482) (0.424) (0.433) (0.403)
Note: Standard deviations across trials given in parentheses. True β’s all equal
to 1. X2it is included in both the pooled and random effects models, but β2 is
not reported here.
Unconditional fixed effects is biased as well – suffering from the well known incidental
parameter bias in samples of this size – producing estimates around 8-9% greater than the
true values, which is roughly consistent with the results reported by Katz (2001) and Coupe´
(2005). However, the conditional fixed effects estimator performs quite well, exhibiting only
a very slight drop in efficiency as compared to the random effects estimators. Finally, the
penalized maximum likelihood estimator performs very well, clearly outperforming uncon-
ditional effects – suggesting that the penalized estimator is less affected by the incidental
parameters bias – and performs as well or better than the random effects and conditional-FE
estimators in mean-square errors terms. That is, even when the random effects assumptions
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are known to hold with certainty both penalized maximum likelihood and conditional fixed
effects perform comparably well to random effects despite the respective incidental parame-
ters problem or sample losses.
What happens when we relax the random effects assumption? In experiment’s #2 and
#3 – the mid and bottom row sets (Table 1) – some of the explanatory variables (X2 and d)
are made endogenous, setting φ to 0.25 and 0.5. In these simulations the dependent variable is
invariant (e.g., always zero) for around seventeen and twenty-five units respectively, meaning
with φ at 0.5 a full half of the sample is lost. As expected the endogeneity introduces bias
into the random effects estimator, with φ at 0.25 already biasing the estimates of (β2) and
(β4) by approximately 12% and 18% respectively.
Despite the sample truncation, the efficiency losses in the fixed effects estimators do
not seems as considerable as prior work has suggested, instead the four-fold increase in the
number of lost observations only causes the standard deviations of the sampling distribution
to increase by about half for β1 and β2 (0.13 to 0.195 and 0.125 to 0.183)S˙urprisingly, the
random effects estimator actually experiences a greater depreciation in its efficiency than
conditional fixed effects. However, as the endogeneity (and sample truncation) increases,
penalized maximum likelihood strictly dominates conditional fixed effects in mean square
error terms, stemming largely from efficiency gains (presented in Figure 5.1). In all, the
results suggest that in the presence of any non-trivial amount of endogeneity – i.e., non-
orthogonality – between the unit effect and the regressors, those models which explicitly
estimate unit effects are far more effective at recovering accurate parameter estimates.
We also wanted to test the extent to which the performance of these estimators is
dependent on the unit effects being normally distributed. Though normality seems like a
reasonable assumption to make about the distribution of unit effects, there are a number
of alternative assumptions that are equally plausible. For instance, it may be the case that
our data includes two or more distinct (normal) distributions which produce a non-normal
mixture distribution. In the canonical example, the heights of men and women are both
normally distributed within sex, but the height of humans is non-normal. Many political
science examples are also distributed in this manner: developed vs. developing countries,
100
consolidated vs. emerging democracies, and, one might argue, states which experience con-
flict and those that do not. Therefore, we performed additional experiments where αi was
drawn from a −χ2(3) (Figure 5.2) or bimodal (µ = 0,−6, p = 0.5) distribution (Figure 5.3).



































The results are consistent with, if not more pronounced evidence of (note the differ-
ence in scale between Figure 5.1, and Figure 5.3), the conclusions presented with the normal
distribution. Though the pooled estimator performed poorly before, when we relax the as-
sumptions of normality it performs considerably worse. For example, when the units are
drawn from a mixture of two normals (e.g. bimodal), the pooled estimator underestimates
the results of all β by near 60% when there is no correlation between the α and the regres-
sors.19 When endogeneity is introduced the pooled estimator improves on the exogenous
19Not reported, tables made available in Appendix 1.
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regressors, but the bias swings wildly in the other direction for the endogenous regressors
producing estimates approximately 1.5 to 2 times(!) the truth for (β2) and (β4). Random
effects performs only slightly better under these conditions, overestimating the same regres-
sors by approximately 51% and 62% respectively. The fixed effects estimators continue to
do well, strictly dominating the random effects estimators in mean-square error terms even
when the random effects assumptions hold (e.g. φ = 0). Penalized maximum likelihood
continues to do the best of all the alternatives, just bettering conditional logit due to its in-
creased efficiency. However, the greater value of PML-FE over conditional fixed effects is not
in terms of parameter estimates, but in that it allows us to calculate substantive marginal
effects.
As has been noted throughout this text, we are ultimately interested in estimating
meaningful substantive (ideally causal) effects. With binary outcomes this requires additional
calculations, as coefficients do not directly equal effects as in the continuous-outcome linear
regression model. While estimating these effects is always more onerous than with linear
models, several of the estimators analyzed here are fundamentally incapable of providing
these quantities of interest. Specifically, conditional fixed effects provides no estimate of for
the average unit effect, meaning we are unable to estimate marginal effects of the regressors
of interest and instead must instead rely on risk ratios (as discussed by King (2001)). This
presents a problem for empirical researchers, the only consistent estimator available – when
α is correlated with the regressors – is also the one which prevents them from calculating the
quantities of interest we desire. Given the near parallel performance of penalized maximum
likelihood with conditional fixed effects in parameters, we consider whether PML-FE may
provide a solution to this problem.
Therefore, we estimate the marginal effects at the means for the ’truth’ – e.g. with
the parameters set to their actual values – and the estimates from each of the (available)
estimators: pooled, random effects, unconditional fixed effects, and penalized maximum

































































































































































































































= βf(ΣβkXk + β4d+ α)
∆E[yit|X, d4it, αi] = F (ΣβkXk + β4 + α)− F (ΣβkXk + α)
(5.9)
The results are presented in mean-square error terms in Figure 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. The
most prominent finding is the relatively strong performance of the random effects estimator
in calculating accurate marginal effects, not only when the regressors are exogenous but
often when they are endogenous as well. It consistently dominates the pooled estimates
and frequently outperforms penalized maximum likelihood as well. The notable exception
being dummy variables when endogeneity is high (0.5) and the distribution of the fixed
effects is not normal, where penalized maximum likelihood provides a better option.20 For
all of the estimators we observe an upward bias on the effects estimates as endogeneity
increases, suggesting the need for researchers to be cautious in the interpretation of these
results regardless of the estimator they select.
How does random effects do so well in spite of its poor performance in estimating pa-
rameters? The result is largely a function of the accuracy of its estimate of the average unit
effect, which is simply the constant for pooled and random effects and the sum of the individ-
ual unit effects for unconditional and penalized maximum likelihood fixed effects. The results
are presented in ??. Random effects consistently outperforms the other estimators, produc-
ing estimates closer to the true average unit effect (-3 in our simulations). Unconditional
effects easily does the worst (not reported) producing estimates of the average unit effect
that are wildly biased and in the wrong direction (frequently returning results of positive
2 and 3). The reason for its poor performance is the sample truncation which results from
rare-events, resulting in a sample with atypically high unit effects. This is a crucial distinc-
tion as previous work (Greene 2004) suggests the accuracy of conditional fixed effects, yet we
show here that when the data are rare-events this is no longer the case. Penalized-maximum
20This is exactly the type of regressor in dispute in the ‘Dirty Pool’ debates; the effect of a joint democracy
dummy on peace. Furthermore, we suspect that part of the reason for this finding is that the endogenous
dummy is ‘slowly changing’ and therefore may represent a broader class of covariates (not simply binary







































































































































































































































































likelihood does reasonably well, but consistently seems to underestimate the average unit
effect.
Importantly, the pooled and random effects estimators only provide a single unit effect
estimate. In the former case, it is a common intercept, and in the latter, it is the mean
of the distribution of random effects. By contrast, the PML estimator provides unit effect
estimates for each unit in the sample, making it possible to calculate counterfactual effects
for specific cases. This is a major potential advantage of the PML estimator that is simply
not viable with any other estimator.
Table 5.3: Average Unit Effect Estimates
Normal Chi-sq Bimodal
φ = 0 Pooled Avg. Unit Effect Est. -2.65 -1.892 -1.204
STD (0.245) (0.213) (0.250)
Random Effects Avg. Unit Effect Est. -3.039 -2.728 -3.204
STD (0.276) (0.382) (0.753)
PML Avg. Unit Effect Est. -2.891 -2.532 -2.344
STD 0.274 0.322 0.417
φ = 0.25 Pooled Avg. Unit Effect Est. -2.619 -1.858 -1.181
STD (0.233) (0.213) (0.225)
Random Effects Avg. Unit Effect Est. -2.962 -2.328 -2.323
STD (0.287) (0.296) (0.565)
PML Avg. Unit Effect Est. -2.605 -2.054 -1.555
STD (0.219) (0.234) (0.280)
φ = 0.5 Pooled Avg. Unit Effect Est. -2.313 -1.487 -0.625
STD (0.283) (0.201) (0.207)
Random Effects Avg. Unit Effect Est. -2.623 -1.79 -0.871
STD (0.332) (0.264) (0.307)
PML Avg. Unit Effect Est. -2.181 -1.548 -0.829
STD (0.224) (0.235) (0.265)
Note: True value for Avg. Unit Effects is -3.
5.3 DISCUSSION
Rare events are central to the study of International Relations, and political science
more generally. Wars, revolts, coups, depressions, are all low probability-high impact events,
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making them concurrently the most interesting but also the most difficult to explain, model,
and predict. After discussing some of the problems raised in estimating these models, I
proposed a novel strategy for estimating rare event-BTSCS data – penalized maximum like-
lihood fixed effects – which has attractive properties that should lead empirical researchers
to privilege it over current ‘rare event’ and/or panel methods. While strategies currently
exist to correct the small sample bias in maximum likelihood when estimating models of rare
events (e.g., King & Zeng (2001b)), these do not naturally extend to cases where we believe
unobserved unit heterogeneity is present. Penalized Maximum Likelihood, however, achieves
comparable performance in reducing the small sample bias of ML and can easily model unit
level heterogeneity through the inclusion of unit dummy variables.21 With the fixed effects
specification, the penalization both reduces the incidental parameter bias and produces finite
estimates event in instances of separation. Thereby enabling us to estimate individual unit
effects (e.g., constants) for all units in the analysis regardless of whether they have switched
state (e.g., experienced the event) during the temporal domain. Not only should assuage
concerns about sample-selection, but also produce more efficient estimates of the regressors.
The results from the preceding simulation suggest that this is indeed the case, as penalized
maximum likelihood frequently performs as well or better than conditional fixed effects (a
consistent estimator) despite the inclusion of incidental parameters.
Furthermore, the fact that penalized maximum likelihood produces unit effect estimates
for each of the units in the sample has two potential additional benefits. First, it allows us to
calculate unit-specific marginal effects for theoretically interesting cases rather than simply
the arbitrary and ill-defined ‘average’ unit. It is the only panel estimator which can produce
these values, which are often the most important for empirical researchers and policy makers.
Second, using the unit effect estimates we can assess whether there is spatial autocorrelation
in unobservables. This is a significant advancement, as current work in spatial econometrics
offers no means of determining whether spatial clustering in the regressands reflects true
contagion or clustering on time-invariant unobservable confounders, and is a fruitful area for
21In this respect, the penalized-pooled and penalized-panel estimators are nested, PML is the reduced
model of PML-FE, facilitating straight-forward model discrimination (e.g., Likelihood Ratio test)
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future research.22 However, both of these proposed extensions depend upon the accuracy of
the estimates of the incidental parameters, which, to this point, remains an open question.
As such, it will be important to analyze this explicitly in the future.23
Lastly, given that both of the literature streams I respond to here were motivated by
‘democratic peace’ scholarship – e.g., rare events with dyad-year as the unit and resultantly
large sampling dimensions – it seems natural to re-analyze that question using the penalized
maximum likelihood strategies presented here. However, two limitations constrain my ability
to do so at present, one computational and one econometric. First, available programs to
estimate these models cannot currently estimate models with as many parameters as would
be required for such an analysis, which can include upwards of 10,000 unit dummies alone.24
Second, while the evidence here suggests that penalized likelihood helps to ameliorate some
of the ills of the incidental parameter bias, it can still present problems in small t samples.
These problems may be more salient in the sample dimensions common to dyadic analysis,
where the N to T ratio is much more pronounced than the sampling dimensions analyzed
here. This later issue is less a concern than an open question, and one that should be
explored when available technologies permit. However, an easy evasion that solves addresses
both concerns by simply reducing the number of incidental parameters to be estimated:
group fixed-effects.
When estimating (B)TSCS models researchers have traditionally been forced to defend
one of two rather extreme positions regarding unit effects: i) complete homogeneity (e.g.,
pooled) ii)complete heterogeneity (e.g., fixed effects).25 Is this always reasonable? As I
have noted throughout, ultimately the decision of which approach to prefer is ultimately a
theoretical choice motivated by ones understanding of the data. It seems likely that for a
22This is similar to how spatial-Durbin models currently allow us to discriminate between spatial correlation
in the outcomes and in the regressors.
23All the data to do so exist now, I just need to come up with an efficient means of comparing the estimates
for the each of the parameters to the true fixed effects specified in the data generating process.
24I have been discussion with the creator of the R package “brglm” – the package used to estimate penalized
maximum likelihood – about modifying the estimator to facilitate such procedures and he has stated that he
plans to incorporate sparse-matrix capabilities into the package soon which would facilitate the estimation
of such models.
25There are notable ad-hoc exceptions to this in applied work, such as estimating regional fixed effects,
however to my knowledge it has not been systematically explored as a general practice in political science.
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number of applications, neither complete homogeneity or heterogeneity is entirely accurate,
but instead that the units can be divided sub-groups which are comparable to one another
but distinct from the remaining groups (units, etc...). We can represent this as a generalized
version of Equation 1.1, given by:
y∗i = αg + Xiβ + i (5.10)
where subscript-g identifies a group from the complete set of groups G. Note the generality of
this set up, G = 1 groups produces the pooled model, while G = N produces the fixed effect
model. When 1 < G < N there are group-specific patterns of heterogeneity (e.g., common
preferences, utilities, risk propensities) which we capture with a common-group intercept.26
As such, this represents a compromise approach between the more traditional extremes.
As noted analytically by Bester & Hansen (2013), group-fixed effects represents a trade-
off between two types of bias. With too many groups (at the limit unit-fixed effects) our
model suffers from the incidental parameter bias, with too few (at the limit pooled) there
is omitted variable bias from the unmodeled unit heterogeneity. Intuitively then, we want
to minimize total bias by selecting a group scheme requiring as few parameters as necessary
to adequately capture the heterogeneity across units. While researchers could identify these
groups in an ad hoc manner (e.g., regional dummies), ideally we would prefer a strategy which
helps locate group clusters amongst the data. Bonhomme & Manresa (2012) have recently
suggested a strategy to estimate group membership that minimizes a least-squares criterion
with respect to all possible groupings of the units. However, at present, such strategies
have only been elaborate for linear models. As such, extending an approach such as theirs
to allow for the estimation of non-linear models – or employing some other technique to
identify latent group-clusters in the data such as Lasso – may be worthwhile.
26In some ways the theoretical motivation for such an approach is quite similar to the previous discussion
of spatial interdependence, generally, that cross-sectional units have underlying patterns of dependence.
However, here our assumption is that units cluster on unobservables (e.g., common shocks) which can be
captured in full with the inclusion of a group dummy.
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6.0 THE KNOWN UNKNOWNS OF CIVIL WAR
The failure to dissect the cause of war leaves us open for the next installment.
— Chris Hedges, 1970
There are known knowns, there are the things we know we know, and we also know
there are known unknowns, that is to say, we know there are some things we do not
know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t
know.
— United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, 2002
The centrality of income in the literature on the causes of civil war is clear. Income
per capita is widely seen as the key factor in determining where conflict is likely to occur,
with scholars arguing that it is the “most important variable” from a theoretical perspective
and empirically the most robust (Hegre & Sambanis 2006). In both Fearon & Laitin (2003)
and Collier & Hoeffler (2004) – the most widely cited empirical work on civil war – income
per capita is argued to play a central, if different, role in the production of conflict. In short,
civil war is widely regarded as a “problem of the poor” (Sambanis 2002, 216). From this,
researchers and policy makers alike have concluded that “the key root cause of conflict is
the failure of economic development” (Collier et al. 2003, 53). Yet, how much support do
we have for a causal theory of development and civil war? I argue that in many respects
this relationship has gone presumed rather than proven. While to some the link between
development and conflict may “seem obvious,” because “if you read the newspapers, you will
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see that the countries where there is conflict are far more likely to be poor,” the importance
of this relationship calls for closer scrutiny (Collier 2008, 18)
That the preponderance of civil wars occur in poverty-stricken countries is undeniably
true. Civil war occurs almost 10 times as frequently in the worlds poorest countries as it does
in its richest (Fearon 2008).1 Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, the
Ivory Coast, Liberia, and far too many more countries have known both crippling poverty
and destructive internal war. However, the mere observation that those countries which are
low in development are high in civil war does not necessarily suggest a direct relationship
between the two, quite simply, correlation does not imply causation. In what follows, I
review the literature on income and civil war and find surprisingly little support for a direct
relationship in canoncial bargaining or contest models of rebellion (Chassang & Padro-i
Miquel 2009, Fearon 2008). Rather, I argue that the observed relationship between the two
is spurious, with other latent conflict-resolution technologies determining both the level of
development and the propensity of conflict. As such, in most current analyses, income per
capita simply proxies for unobservable (and therefore unmodeled) determinants of conflict
– e.g., malfunctioning social institutions, inter-ethnic tensions, historical animosity – which
are distributed in a similar pattern.
While most civil war scholars widely admit to the likely presence of such unobservables
– with some theories directly suggesting their influence – substantially less attention is paid
to handling these unobservable factors in our empirical analyses. This is despite the fact
that a common strategy exists to control for these unobservables and thereby mitigate their
ill-effects, namely, country fixed effects. The use of such approaches has become increasingly
widespread in other fields (see notably Acemoglu et al. 2008), yet civil war scholars have,
by and large, failed to similarly embrace these methods.2 In part, the hesitancy of conflict
researchers stems from important concerns raised about the permissiveness of fixed effects
when dealing with rare-event binary data (Beck & Katz 2001, Green et al. 2001, King
1As determined by comparing the frequency of conflict in the one-fifth poorest country-years to the
one-firth richest country-years.
2There are, to be sure, notable exceptions to this. However, the point remains that as a general practice
fixed effects models are still not the norm despite the advantages they should offer given the widely-held
assumption of unobservable determinants of civil war.
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2001, Oneal & Russett 2001) and rarely-changing regressors (Beck & Katz 2001, Plu¨mper
& Troeger 2007), both of which are present here. If correct, these arguments would suggest
that the inability of researchers to find a relationship after including country fixed effects in
these models is not meaningful theoretically, but simply a statistical artifact of the data and
approach. As such, it is unclear what researchers should make of the finding that the effect
of GDP on civil war goes away when fixed effects models are specified Djankov & Reynal-
Querol (2010). By itself this finding means little, as civil war scholars have long been aware
that this is the result from fixed effects modeling. The more central question, in light of the
previous methodological work mentioned above, is what to make of this finding: does it say
something theoretically meaningful or is it an artifact of an unsuitable modeling strategy?
As such, I elaborate and extend on the main issues raised in estimating fixed effects
models of rare-events binary time-series-cross-sectional (re-BTSCS) data with nearly time-
invariant regressors. After which, I directly engage the more serious of these concerns. First,
utilizing the strategy discussed in chapter 5, I discuss how a penalized maximum likeli-
hood fixed effects model i) obtains first-order unbiased estimates in small samples (e.g.,
rare events), ii) allows for the identification and estimation of unit-specific intercepts for
even those units which are time-invariant in the outcome, and iii) permits the estimation
of case-specific counter-factual substantive effects. Second, I explore the behavior of com-
mon BTSCS estimators when dealing with endogenous and slowly-changing variables; those
with significantly greater between variation than within variation. In the presence of such
variables, it has been argued that fixed effects estimation may perform poorly Plu¨mper &
Troeger (2007). However, as noted by Beck (2011), these issues are still new and require
further attention. Therefore, I offer some practical guidelines on the conditions under which
such variables are likely to complicate inference with non-linear models. Subsequently, I
bring these insights to bear on the question of the relationship between income and civil
war, replicating the analyses of Fearon & Laitin (2003) and interpreting the results in light
of the prior discussion. Anticipating my findings, I conclude that any direct relationship
previously found between development and conflict is likely spurious.
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This has important policy implications as the promotion of development has been seen
as the linchpin in reducing civil war. In part, this has been the result of recommendations
from scholars who have repeatedly and strongly attested to this connection. As noted above,
Collier et al. (2003) in a report to the World Bank states that the causal relationship between
the development and civil war is their key argument. Similarly, in their paper “What Policy
Makers Need to Know,” Rice et al. (2006) argue that the debate on the principal causes of
civil conflict has been resolved: poverty matters. Furthermore, in their policy implications
they go on to suggest that there is “little doubt that policies that increase per capita income
in the poorest countries will reduce their conflict risk” (13). This despite the fact that we
have no evidence suggesting the efficacy of such an intervention, as there is no effect of
within country variation in GDP on civil war. That being said, this should not be taken as
advice to scale back efforts at economic development. In addition to the many other benefits
that a country is known to derive from greater development, there may also be an indirect
relationship with civil war. To that end, I conclude by sketching a possible conditional theory
of income and civil war.
6.1 CUM HOC ERGO PROPTER HOC: LOW INCOME AND CIVIL WAR?
That civil wars frequently occur in poor countries is itself an indisputable fact. The
poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are also those disproportionately more
likely to experience civil war. Figure 6.1 indicates the strong association between GDP per
capita and the probability of civil war onset.3 Moreover, this pattern has been supported
by a range of cross-national empirical studies which has concluded broad support for the
positive (negative) relationship between poverty (wealth) and civil war (Collier & Hoeffler
2004, Elbadawi & Sambanis 2002, Fearon & Laitin 2003, Hegre & Sambanis 2006, Hegre 2001,
Thies 2010). That is, controlling for other observable factors believed to produce conflict, the
relationship between development and civil war remains. Hegre & Sambanis (2006) conclude
3The data in the figure are the same used in the subsequent estimation.
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that GDP per capita as the most robust indicator of civil war.4 Collier et al. (2003) go even
further suggesting that “all studies agree that a link exists between poverty and civil war”
(58). Yet, even among this seemingly complementary work, there remains uncertainty and
disagreement on the principal mechanism underlying this relationship.























































































Broadly, two main explanations have been advanced linking development to civil war.5
First, Collier & Hoeffler (2004) advocate an economic explanation, wherein conflicts are
argued to be more likely in low income countries as a result of lower opportunity costs for
would-be combatants. That is, it is easier for rebel organizations to recruit new members in
low income countries because their is less benefit to remaining in the labor market (or forgone
by leaving it).6 Alternatively, Fearon & Laitin (2003) have suggested that the relationship
between GDP and civil war more likely reflects variation in state capacity. Better developed
4Hegre & Sambanis (2006) find population to be nearly as robust but less substantively meaningful.
5Holtermann (2012) offers a recent summary of these different perspectives.
6While this should make it easier for both sides – rebels and government – to recruit, (Collier 2000)
argue that asymmetries in initial capacity mean that cheap recruits are more significant for rebels than
governments Holtermann (2012).
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states have greater organization, reach, and technologies with which to locate and disrupt
potential rebel organization. Thus, in states lacking these capabilities, rebels should be
better able to mobilize resources and support to help fuel the insurgency effort. In sum,
the two major works in civil war have produced a similar finding but have taken from it
fundamentally different conclusions.7 Despite the centrality of this issue for understanding
civil war, efforts to resolve this debate and illuminate the relationship between development
and conflict have been surprisingly rare (Fjelde & De Soysa 2009, Holtermann 2012, Thies
2010). As such, we are left with an apparent empirical reality searching for an explanation.
The inability of researchers to pin down a clear explanation linking development to war
may suggest the need to exercise greater caution in asserting the strength of relationship.
Justino (2006) argues that this research “offer(s) only limited systematic accounts of the
mechanism through which low incomes amongst a large fraction of society affect the outbreak
of war” and are based on assumptions which are “largely untested” (25). Moreover, formal
analysis into civil war, including that by Fearon himself, should give researchers even greater
pause, as both bargaining and contest models of rebellion have rejected the idea of a direct
link between per capita income and conflict. Building on the canonical bargaining model of
war (Fearon 1995, Powell 2006), Chassang & Padro-i Miquel (2009) conclude that conflict is
not a function of the productive capacity of the state. In short, while the opportunity cost
of rebellion is diminished in poor states so too are the benefits of success. In this respect the
“costs and benefits from fighting move proportionately to the size of the economy, yielding
no natural link” (Chassang & Padro-i Miquel 2009, 220). To better understand this intuition
consider their simple static model of conflict bargaining.8
Assume two groups i ∈ {1, 2} each sharing a territory of size 2, where group 1 controls
1 +λ parcels of land and group 2 the remaining 1 −λ (with λ ∈ {0, 1}). The land is used
to produce crops (though any substitute could suffice), which are generated according to
the production function C(θ, L, l) = θ Ll where L is the amount of land, l is the amount
7Even this neglects the possibility of a ‘grievance’ motive for potential rebellion, wherein individuals in
low-income countries are more likely to rebel because of more salient political, social, and economic hardships
(?). It is this line of research which Collier & Hoeffler (2004) were originally responding to, arguing that as
grievances are ubiquitous they are poor explantors for war.
8Chassang & Padro-i Miquel (2009) extend this to the fully dynamic case, but the static model is sufficient
to show the intuition for why conflict is unrelated to income.
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of labor, and θ is the fertility of the land (more generally, the size of the economy). Each
group controls 1 unit of labor s.t. if all labor is used in production 2θ is realized. However,
either group may choose to forgo production and instead divert some c ∈ {0, 1] amount of
their labor toward an effort to seize land from the other group with a P > 0.5 probability
of success (assumes a first mover advantage). Therefore, the opportunity cost of fighting is
2Cθ (e.g., the forgone production). As such, opting for war yields a payoff of 2θ (1− c) with
probability P and 0 with a probability 1− P .
As in Fearon (1995) conflict can be avoided through bargaining wherein one group
makes a transfer of land T to the other such that both groups are made better off in expec-
tation than they would be from going to war. If no such transfer exists, then conflict occurs.
Therefore, for peace to be maintained the following two conditions must hold:
Group 1: (1 + λ)θ − Tθ > P2θ(1− c) (6.1)
Group 2: (1 + λ)θ + Tθ > P2θ(1− c) (6.2)
That is, the transfer T must be large enough to dissuade group 2 from preferring war, but
small enough to preclude group 1 from doing the same. Both conditions are true if and only
if:
θ > P2θ(1− c) (6.3)
The implication is immediately evident, θ (e.g., the size of the economy) does not
influence the likelihood of fighting as the opportunity cost of fighting and the spoils from
victory are linearly related to one another. As noted by Chassang & Padro-i Miquel (2009),
both the spoils (2θ) and cost (2cθ) are increasing functions in the size of the economy,
meaning no change in the size of the economy alters in the inequality given in condition
(6.3).9 As such, cross-national variation – that is, between variation – in states conflict
9Instead, Chassang & Padro-i Miquel (2009) continue that fighting obtains when the following condition
holds:
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propensities cannot be explained directly by the level of development. Instead, Chassang &
Padro-i Miquel (2009) conclude greater support for within country theory of income, namely,
economic shocks. Analogous to Powell (2006)’s more general model on shifts in power,
large short-term fluctuations in productivity (and sufficiently discounted future returns) can
induce actors to opt for conflict. This may suggest researchers should prefer strategies which
discount between variation in favor of better isolating within variation when attempting to
identify the determinants of conflict.
Fearon (2008) reaches a similar conclusion when model conflict as a contest model
(Grossman 1991, Hirshleifer 1995, Skaperdas 1992). As with Chassang & Padro-i Miquel
(2009), he finds that given that the realized gains from fighting increase in proportion to the
wealth of the state, there is no reason to suspect reduced violence (e.g., the bigger the pie the
greater incentive to fight). Furthermore, he shows that even incorporating marginal utility
of income understandings into our risk probabilities doesn’t completely solve this issue.10
As a result, Fearon (2008) argues that this result undermines support for poverty based
explanations of war commonly given in the empirical literature. Instead he offers possible
second-order explanations, that is, the pacific effects of characteristics associated with high
levels of GDP but which do not directly result from it.
In sum, neither the canonical bargaining nor contest model of civil war can provide
support for a direct relationship between income and civil war. As such, it seems more likely
that the observed empirical relationship between the two is not causal, as is frequently argued,
but emerges because the same underlying factors which give rise to conflict also impeded
development. As argued by Acemoglu et al. (2008) when discussing the relation between
democracy and income, historical country-specific factors which make some countries more
likely to experience both positive (or negative) outcomes often go unmodeled as they are
P > PS ≡ 1
2(1− c)
That is, conflict is determined by the relationship between the first-mover advantage and the opportunity
cost.
10Though ultimately, if we make the assumption that poor people are relatively more risk averse it would
introduce a non-linearit into the utility function and GDP would re-emerge as a predictor. Fearon (2008),
however, considers such an approach and finds there to be little consistent justification for it.
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difficult to observe and typically extend well beyond conventional sample dimensions. In
the case of civil war and development, I argue that some states, over the course of history,
developed better conflict-management processes.11 The ability to resolve low level disputes
without resorting to violence aided development and reduced the risk of future fighting.
That is, to the extent that there is a relationship between development and fighting it is
one borne out of hundreds of years. Conversely, those states which were unable to resolved
such disputes peaceably were set back in their development – forced to devote resources to
security, dispute resolution, fighting, etc... – and had a greater probability of future conflict.
As such, I argue the empirical relationship between GDP and civil war noted by conflict
scholars is spurious. Once the unobserved country-specific factors likely to influence are
controlled for (via fixed effects), I expect there to be no direct relationship between the
two.12
6.2 RARE EVENTS AND RARELY CHANGING REGRESSORS
Despite the apparent importance of unobservables in driving conflict processes, their
has yet to emerge a consistent strategy for addressing them. Numerous papers make no
attempt to model unit effects at all – preferring pooled logit or probit estimation – while
those that do adopt quite different approaches. For example, Fearon and Laitin (2003) re-
estimate their main model(s) using conditional fixed effects logit and indicate that their
results are ‘virtually identical’ to the pooled estimates.13 Instead, Sambanis (2001) re-
estimates his models using random effects probit, ultimately preferring the simple probit
estimator – despite rejecting the null of independence – because of the similarity in the
results. Finally, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that fixed effects estimation is ‘very severe’
in their interpretation of these results. Thus, even the canonical works in the civil war
11These processes ultimately took the form of institutions, which also explains Acemoglu et al. (2008)’s
finding on democracy
12While frequently tests of ‘no significance’ would be odd, as there are lots of reasons on may fail to find
a relationship, in this instance the strength of the finding in the conventional literature makes a non-finding
interesting in its own right.
13However, they do not report these findings in text.
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literature – with each of these articles having been cited more than 500 times – disagree
over the role of unobservables in the determination of civil war and how they should be
addressed in empirical research. Furthermore, researchers frequently seem to confuse the
issues underlying the decision over which modeling strategy to prefer.
In part this confusion stems from a lack of consensus among methodologists on how
to handle these issues. In the ‘Dirty Pool’ symposium more than a decade ago, the topic of
fixed effects models for re-BTSCS data was debated (Beck & Katz 2001, Green et al. 2001,
King 2001, Oneal & Russett 2001). Through the course of these discussions a number of
potential issues for fixed effects estimation were raised, with Beck & Katz (2001) concluding
that it is never a good idea to estimate fixed-effects models with rare-event binary time-series
cross-sectional data. It is easy to see why such strong claims would have lasting effects on
civil war scholars. In particular, two of the problems discuss seem to have resonated widely
and are still voiced as concerns against estimate fixed effects models.
First, those units which do not experience a civil war are dropped from the analysis,
possessing no within-variation in the outcome.14. While some suggested at the time this was
not a problem Green et al. (2001), others argued that dummy variables are atheoretical and
removed all the between-unit variation from the model.15 Many in the civil war literature
to raise this issue as their reason for avoid fixed effects, including Collier & Hoeffler (2004).
Others refer back to the critique of Beck & Katz (2001) explicitly, such as Nel & Righarts
(2008) who argue “we do not run fixed effects models. Following Beck & Katz (2001), we
consider the use of fixed effects models to control for the influences of unit idiosyncrasies in
binary-outcome time-series cross-sectional data as pernicious. There are many units with
no other outcome than zero, and to control for their presumed effects on the parameter
estimates does not make any sense.” Similarly, Buhaug & Gleditsch (2008), citing Beck &
14While Heckman (1981) notes this ceases to be a problem as T →∞, given that we are always estimating
models with finite-T it may be important for empirical research
15Specifically, in response to Green et al. (2001), Beck & Katz (2001) defended the democratic peace
writing, ”Green, Kim and Yoon...argue that if we discovered new democratic dyads that were always pacific,
it would give us no information, because ‘we do not know the base probability (the intercept) of war for
each of these new dyads.’ We freely admit that it is logically possible that these new dyads might be pacific
because of the name of the dyad (the fixed effects) or because both partners grow green beans. But it seems
odd to throw out the only theoretical explanation we have, that the dyad is pacific because it is democratic”
(490).
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Katz (2001) note that they are “generally skeptical of such methods,” as it “requires us to
treat as non-informative all countries where we do not observed variation in the response”
(227).16
The second limitation of fixed effects which is consistently raised is the inability to
include time-invariant or nearly time-invariant regressors (Beck & Katz 2001, Plu¨mper &
Troeger 2007). While the former is certainly true, the latter is potentially more interesting, as
FE estimators do provide estimates for rarely changing regressors. However, as noted by Beck
(2001) “Although we can estimate a model with slowly changing independent variables, the
fixed effect will soak up most of the explanatory power...[and] make it hard for such variables
to appear either substantively or statistically significant”(285). That is, by eliminating the
between variation and retaining only the less substantial within variation, fixed effects “masks
the impact of slowly changing independent variables” (Beck 2001). Given that a number
of the most significant determinants of civil war change slowly over time (e.g., institutions,
development, population...), this is a salient issue for conflict studies. As with the issue of
sample selection, researchers use these concerns not just to justify alternative estimation
strategies, but even where fixed effects models are run they voice them in an apparent effort
to explain away aberrant findings.17
As noted, civil war data are both rare and models of conflict typically include rarely
changing variables. Thus, to the extent that either of these issues truly renders fixed effects
problematic, the hesitancy on the part of researchers is well placed. Having said that, how
important are these issues for fixed-effects models? The issue of sample selection is largely
taken up in chapter 5, so I only briefly tough on it here. First, to the extent that sample
selection is producing the incongruous results, there should be another way to prove this.
Namely, estimating a pooled model including only those units which experience a conflict
during the sample (e.g., the same selection step which occurs when we estimate a fixed-effects
model). If the findings remain with this conflict-only sub-sample then it simply cannot be
16I should not that following this discussion Buhaug & Gleditsch (2008) does indeed estimate a fixed effects
model, despite their misgivings.
17Collier et al. (2009) seems to be an example of this, following their fixed effects model they note that
“none of the variables which change slowly over time are significant,” but do appear to take this inability to
produce results as meaningful.
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the case that selection alone is distinguishing the two results. Second, even with severe
sample selection, (conditional) fixed-effects estimators produce unbiased results. There is
some loss in efficiency, as it does not use the entire sample, but they are still substantially
better off in mean square error terms when unobserved heteorgeneity is present. Second, if
we consider the absence of conflict in particular states an artifact of the temporal domain –
e.g., on a long enough time horizon all units would experience failure – then strategies exist
to model this belief and estimate fixed effects while retain the entire sample. This penalized
maximum likelihood fixed effects (PML-FE) is discussed in detail in chapter 5 so I do not
discuss it further here.
The issue of rarely-changing variables has been less widely discussed in the literature.
While this should not be cause for determining which model to estimate, it is important for
understanding how to interpret the results we obtain. If, for example, it is the case that
fixed effects masks rarely changing variables, then we would want to discount the impor-
tance of particular variables losing significance. Plu¨mper & Troeger (2007) provide the most
substantial – and possibly only – systematic analysis into the consequences of fixed effects
estimation for rarely changing variables. Their analysis focused primarily on comparing fixed
effects to their fixed-effects variance decomposition estimator for continuous-outcome data.18
In general, Plu¨mper & Troeger (2007) find that the performance of fixed effects diminishes
as a variable becomes increasingly “slow” but improves as it becomes increasingly endoge-
nous. While I fully expect these same themes will generally hold, a number of outstanding
issues require further inquiry. First, what impact, if any, does sample selection (e.g., rare
events) have on the performance of these estimators? Second, and more importantly, what is
the false-positive rate for the non-FE estimators when unit heterogeneity goes unmodeled?
That is, how frequently will we wrongly conclude significance for a irrelevant (endogenous)
variable when we fail to account for unobserved heterogeneity?19
18The estimates for pooled and random-effects estimation are included in the online appendix, yet presented
in such a highly aggregated form that it is difficult to infer much beyond the general themes I note in text.
19An additional concern, but one that is not addressed here, is the accuracy of these estimators in calcu-
lating the substantive effects of slowly changing regressors. In future work, I explore this question in greater
detail.
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To answer these questions and provide some general guidelines for researchers when
dealing with rarely changing regressors and non-linear outcomes, I estimate a variety of
monte carlo simulations. The basic framework for these experiments is given in chapter 5,
with a slightly different specification here to explicitly assess the effect of rarely changing
regressors. The DGP includes a time-varying exogenous regressor (X1it), a time-varying
endogenous regressor (X2it), a nearly time-invariant exogenous regressor (X
3
it), a nearly time-
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it ∼ N(0, 1) and X˜4it ∼ N(0, σ)
as indicated X3it and X
4
it are the ‘rarely’ changing measures. In all experiments the between
variation is held fixed at 1, while the within variation σ is modified {1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2}
to capture different levels of near invariance, with lower values indicating a more slowly-
changing measure.20 As before, the fixed-effect (αi) is varied across the experiments, drawn
from from one of two following distributions:
αi ∼ N(−3, 1)
or...
f(αi) = p(g1(α)) + (1− p)(g2(α))
where g1(αi) ∼ N(0, 1), g2(αi) ∼ N(−6, 1), and p = 0.5
That is, the performance of the estimators is evaluated when the unit effects are distributed
normal or bimodal (with each peak being normally distributed). As noted in chapter 5, the
20This is similar in nature to the approach taken by Plu¨mper & Troeger (2007), that is, modifying the
ratio of between to within variation.
122
random effects estimator assumes a distribution of the unit heterogeneity (e.g., normality),
when this is wrong it will negatively affect these estimates. In applied work, of course, we
never know the distribution of these effects. As such, it is useful to test these models under
a range of possibilities to examine their performance. For civil war a bimodal distribution
seems just as, if not more, reasonable theoretically than assuming normality, with some states
being ‘high risk’ and other states at effectively no risk at all.21 Unless otherwise noted, in
the reported experiments the level of endogeneity φ is 0.25 and the sampling dimensions are
N = 100 and T = 20.
Table 6.1 reports the estimates of the nearly time-invariant regressors (β3 and β4) for
the 1st set of these experiments, which assume the unit effects are distributed normally. We
see that all of the estimators perform worse when the within-to-between variation is low
(e.g., more slowly moving), as presented in the leftmost column.22 While the pooled and
random effects estimators perform the best in mean-square error terms, both evidence a
significant upward bias in the estimate of the endogenous regressor. Note the implication of
this, in the conditions where the current literature would most strongly advise researchers
prefer pooled or random effects (to fixed effects) these estimators are at the greatest risk of
committing type-I errors (i.e., false positives). Both the pooled and random effects estimates
improve as the within-to-between variation levels (columns further right). In particular, the
improvements of the pooled estimator are interesting. For the exogenous regressor β3 it
continues suffers from the expected attenuation bias at all levels of ‘slow,’ with its improved
performance resulting from efficiency gains alone.23 However, the estimates of the endgo-
neous regressor β4 improve considerably (become less biased) as the within variation rises in
proportion to the between variation. This may seem odd, but what it is actually capturing
is that the relative strength of the endogeneity is diminishing as the within variation rises
and, as a result, the pooled estimator performs better.24 As a test of this I hold the within-
21As noted in chapter 3 this is exactly what is argued by Collier et al. (2003)
22Occasionally, I may invert this and note the between-to-within variation as being high for slowly-changing
regressors, meaning the same thing of course.
23As discussed in chapter 5 this the downward bias induced from omitting exogenous incidental parameters
as discussed by Wooldridge (2010) and others.
24In the future different specifications for the slow-moving variables will need to be explored. In particular,
evaluating the performance of the estimator when a variable is slowly changing do to persistent dynamics in
the regressor.
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to-between variation fixed and increase the correlation φ between the fixed effect αi and the
endogenous X4. These results indicate that this is indeed the case, as the performance of
the pooled estimator degrades noticeably, evidencing the expected inflationary bias.25
Table 6.1: Panel Estimators with Rarely Changing Regressors (αi ∼ Normal)
φ= 0.25 σwithin/σbetween: 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Pooled
β3
Coeff. Est 0.910 0.915 0.897 0.908 0.908
Standard Deviation 0.168 0.151 0.128 0.116 0.099
RMSE 0.191 0.174 0.164 0.148 0.136
SE 0.115 0.109 0.100 0.091 0.084
β4
Coeff. Est 1.114 1.089 1.055 1.023 1.003
Standard Deviation 0.167 0.152 0.130 0.118 0.099
RMSE 0.202 0.176 0.141 0.120 0.099
SE 0.118 0.111 0.102 0.094 0.086
Random Effects
β3
Coeff. Est 0.985 0.994 0.988 1.001 1.002
Standard Deviation 0.173 0.156 0.133 0.126 0.105
RMSE 0.174 0.156 0.133 0.126 0.105
SE 0.170 0.152 0.134 0.118 0.105
β4
Coeff. Est 1.201 1.164 1.124 1.089 1.075
Standard Deviation 0.176 0.159 0.136 0.122 0.106
RMSE 0.267 0.228 0.184 0.151 0.130
SE 0.173 0.154 0.135 0.118 0.106
Con-FE
β3
Coeff. Est 1.007 1.004 1.024 1.013 1.007
Standard Deviation 0.604 0.294 0.201 0.161 0.125
RMSE 0.604 0.294 0.161 0.126 0.202
SE 0.577 0.292 0.198 0.153 0.126
β4
Coeff. Est 1.005 1.029 1.019 1.005 1.013
Standard Deviation 0.555 0.303 0.199 0.153 0.130
RMSE 0.555 0.304 0.200 0.153 0.131
SE 0.574 0.292 0.198 0.152 0.127
PML-FE
β3
Coeff. Est 0.980 0.947 0.981 0.985 0.977
Standard Deviation 0.509 0.293 0.183 0.148 0.131
RMSE 0.508 0.288 0.182 0.147 0.129
SE 0.501 0.255 0.174 0.137 0.112
β4
Coeff. Est 0.949 1.001 0.976 0.966 0.978
Standard Deviation 0.518 0.324 0.184 0.136 0.134
RMSE 0.515 0.324 0.182 0.132 0.133
SE 0.497 0.256 0.174 0.135 0.112
Turning attention to the fixed effects estimators, each performs roughly as expected,
providing nearly unbiased estimates of both nearly time-invariant regressors at all levels. At
25Results not reported in text, but available upon request.
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the lowest level of within-to-between variation reported, each estimator is quite inefficient.
This lends some support to those who have suggested that estimating fixed-effects models
on nearly time-invariant risks erroneously rejecting a true relationship (i.e., Type-II error).
However, both improve considerably with only minimal increases in the within-to-between
variance. Conditional fixed-effects continues to dominate PML-FE with respect to bias,
however, the efficiency gains from maintaining the full sample are considerable enough that
it is consistently preferred in mean-square error term.
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Table 6.2: Panel Estimators with Rarely Changing Regressors (αi ∼ Bimodal)
φ= 0.25 σwithin/σbetween: 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Pooled
β3
Coeff. Est 0.764 0.751 0.731 0.719 0.692
Standard Deviation 0.166 0.148 0.129 0.111 0.095
RMSE 0.289 0.290 0.298 0.302 0.322
SE 0.084 0.079 0.073 0.068 0.062
β4
Coeff. Est 1.368 1.31 1.23 1.145 1.065
Standard Deviation 0.160 0.144 0.131 0.110 0.095
RMSE 0.402 0.342 0.265 0.182 0.115
SE 0.088 0.084 0.079 0.073 0.067
Random Effects
β3
Coeff. Est 0.889 0.911 0.947 0.976 0.985
Standard Deviation 0.216 0.172 0.142 0.119 0.108
RMSE 0.243 0.194 0.152 0.122 0.109
SE 0.215 0.169 0.139 0.119 0.105
β4
Coeff. Est 1.881 1.588 1.382 1.258 1.183
Standard Deviation 0.210 0.165 0.141 0.124 0.110
RMSE 0.905 0.611 0.407 0.286 0.213
SE 0.212 0.166 0.139 0.120 0.106
Con-FE
β3
Coeff. Est 1.023 0.998 1.012 1.015 1.014
Standard Deviation 0.457 0.223 0.165 0.134 0.114
RMSE 0.457 0.223 0.165 0.134 0.115
SE 0.462 0.235 0.164 0.131 0.112
β4
Coeff. Est 1.033 1.002 1.006 1.011 1.014
Standard Deviation 0.456 0.232 0.159 0.136 0.114
RMSE 0.457 0.232 0.159 0.136 0.115
SE 0.462 0.235 0.164 0.131 0.112
PML-FE
β3
Coeff. Est 0.989 0.989 0.976 0.995 0.967
Standard Deviation 0.422 0.422 0.224 0.170 0.111
RMSE 0.422 0.422 0.223 0.170 0.106
SE 0.592 0.425 0.218 0.151 0.120
β4
Coeff. Est 1.002 1.002 0.954 0.974 0.976
Standard Deviation 0.486 0.486 0.220 0.150 0.137
RMSE 0.486 0.486 0.215 0.148 0.135
SE 0.595 0.426 0.218 0.151 0.120
The same general patterns hold in Table 6.2 when we alter the distribution of the
unit effect (e.g., bimodal). The fixed effects estimators perform comparably, if not better
than, they did under the ‘normal’ set of experiments. However, the pooled and random
effects estimators perform much worse, more severely underestimating the exogenous regres-
sor and overestimating the endogenous one. In particular, the random effects estimator is
significantly worse when its distributional assumptions are violated. For the endogenous
126
regressor and low within-to-between variation (the leftmost column) its estimate is nearly
2 times(!) greater than the true value. As such, while slowly-changing regressors seem to
indeed complicate analysis, these issues are not unique to fixed effects specifications alone.
Indeed, it seems that in many cases failing to properly estimate the unit heterogeneity will
often have worse even consequences for our ability to draw accurate inferences about nearly
time-invariant regressors.
To consider these risks more systematically, I undertake additional analysis to explore
the likelihood of making inferential errors when employing these models. In effect, we are
interested in two questions: i) what is the risk of a false negative when fixed effects models
are estimated? ii) what is the risk of a false positive when unit heterogeneity is neglected
or mishandled? The former relates to Beck (2001)’s concern that when a variable “changes
over time, but slowly, the fixed effects will make it hard for such variables to appear either
substantively or statistically significant,” while the later is concerned with the possibility
of omitted variable bias. To assess the risk of false negatives, I calculate z-statistics from
the results presented in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 and sum the total number of times we
would fail to reject the null at the 90% confidence level. For false positives, I run additional
experiments where the endogenous slowly-changing variable is omitted from the true data-
generating process. That is, X4 is only related to y through their joint correlation to the
fixed effect, with any relationship found between the two representing an entirely spurious
association. The results for the frequency with which pooled, random effects, and conditional
fixed effects produce false negatives and false negatives over 1,000 simulations is presented
in Table 6.3.
The findings do indicate that fixed-effects estimators have a relatively high risk of false
negatives when the within-to-between ratio is very low. Specifically, when within variation
is 5 times greater than between variation the null will be incorrectly rejected by fixed-effects
estimators 45.5% of the time when the effects are distributed normally and 26.8% of the
time when they are distributed bimodaly. However, the power of these estimators quickly
improves as false-negative rates drop to negligible levels with slight increases in the between-
to-within variation, occurring less than 3% of the time when the within variation is 2.5
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times greater than the between variation, indicative of a very slow-changing variable. As
such, it appears that false negatives, while a concern, occur regularly only when the ratio
of between-to-within variation is extremely high. Given that this is an statistical question
researchers can answer with their data, it seems advisable to calculate the between-to-within
variation for all time-varying variables before undertaking any analysis. That is, rather than
just assuming particular variables are generally ‘slow moving,’ and forgoing fixed effects, one
should actually calculate these descriptive statistics to help inform their model selection as
some ‘slow moving’ variables are not negatively impacted by such specifications.
Table 6.3: Type 1 & Type 2 Errors with Slowly-Changing Regressors
φ= 0.25 σwithin/σbetween: 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Pooled
Normal
False Negatives 0 0 0 0 0
False Positives 623 604 589 537 476
Bimodal
False Negatives 0 0 0 0 0
False Positives 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Random Effects
Normal
False Negatives 0 0 0 0 0
False Positives 446 387 330 292 221
Bimodal
False Negatives 0 0 0 0 0
False Positives 999 994 928 765 627
Con - FE
Normal
False Negatives 455 26 0 0 0
False Positives 58 50 44 53 43
Bimodal
False Negatives 268 2 0 0 0
False Positives 48 58 61 32 60
Simulations run 1000 times. All findings for β4 using 90 percent confidence level. False
negatives are calculated when X4 is included in the DGP and false positives when it is
not.
The pooled and random-effects models always find a relationship where one is present
– no false negatives – however, they also regularly conclude support for a relationship where
none is present. The pooled estimator erroneously concludes significance nearly 50% of the
time for all of the normal experiments, and a full 100% (!!!) of the time in the bimodal
experiments. That is, even with a relatively low level of endogeneity specified (φ = 0.25) the
pooled estimator consistently – and under some conditions, always – finds significance when
we know there to be no direct relationship between the variables. Random effects only offers
slight improvements over this, evidencing high false positive rates for all of the specifications
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examined. Moreover, the rate at which these estimators incorrectly conclude significance
increases with lower within-to-between variation. That is, under the very conditions when
they are frequently advocated as the preferred alternative.
Whether these type-I or type-II errors are ‘worse’ is not a question I take up here and,
moreover, to do so would largely miss the point. Both threaten our ability to make sound
inferences and this analysis suggests that the risk of either is significant when our variables
are slowly-moving. While, as researchers have noted, there is a threat of false negatives
for these regressors when one estimates fixed effects models, the analysis given here has
suggested two important addendums. First, the risk of false negatives is only meaningful at
very high levels of between-to-within variation – that is, for very slow moving variables – as
such researchers should analyze how ‘sluggish’ there variable is rather than treating this as a
binary condition. Second, slow-moving variables also pose problems for pooled and random
effects estimators. As always when unit effects are present, both estimators consistently
overestimate the strength of endogenous regressors (and pooled underestimates the strength
of exogenous ones), yet these biases are even more severe for slowly-changing regressors.
As a consequence the threat of false positives is greatest under the same conditions that
researchers fear fixed effects may induce a false negative. While researchers will vary in their
preferences for which risk is more acceptable (e.g., how conservative an estimation strategy to
adopt), they should not eschew fixed effects under the belief that the estimates obtained by
pooled or random effects are sound. To the contrary, these estimators will frequently cause
us to erroneously conclude support for relationships where none exist. As such, whichever
strategy one ultimately prefers, analysts should be measured in their interpretation of these
variables, taking care to note the possibility that their results will be biased – in one direction
or the other – for the reasons presented here.
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6.3 DEVELOPMENTAL PEACE
In light of these findings, I reanalyze Fearon & Laitin (2003) classic and oft-cited
insurgency model which examines the determinants of civil war onset globally from 1945 to
1999. Civil War is coded as ‘1’ if there is a civil war – fighting between agents of the state and
non-state actors seeking government control, regional autonomy, or changes in government
policy in which 1000 deaths occurred over the entire spell with an average of 100 per year
and at least 100 on both sides – and ‘0’ otherwise. The covariates are identical to the main
model in Fearon & Laitin (2003) and therefore I refer readers there for a more thorough
discussion, but these include time-varying regressors (Population(ln), GDP growth, Polity,
Oil, Instability, Non-Contig), several of which are also rarely changing, and time-invariant
measures (logMtn, Ethnic Fractionalization, Religious Fractionalization). In addition War
Lag is included to capture possible temporal dependence.26 Finally, as in Fearon & Laitin
(2003), I include GDP per capita (constant in 1985 $USD), which is logged, logGDP. Above
I argued that GDP and civil war are jointly determined by an unobserved and unmodeled
long-standing dispute resolution capacity, which varies across states. As such, any direct
relationship between the two is spurious. To account for this unobserved heterogeneity, I
estimate several fixed effects specifications to eliminate these time constant unobservables.
If my argument is correct, GDP(ln) should no longer be significantly related to conflict once
these unosbervables are introduced into our model.
In Table 6.4, I estimate models of civil war using pooled logit, random effects, and
conditional fixed effects. The results are largely in line with my expectations. As in Fearon
& Laitin (2003) the pooled results suggest a negative and significant effect of GDP on
civil war. Furthermore, population, mountainous terrain, non-contiguity, oil, and instability
are all found to be positively and significantly related to civil war. Concerned with the
possibility of unit effects, but wary of the ‘severity’ of fixed effects, I then specify a random
effects model. The results are identical to those given in the pooled model, suggesting this
26Again, this is just in keeping with Fearon & Laitin (2003)’s specification, see chapter 2 for a discussion
on other approaches to capture temporal dependence in binary data.
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specification offers no additional leverage on this question.27 Finally, I estimate a conditional
fixed effects model of civil war onset. These results differ markedly from the pooled and
random effects estimates, most notably GDP(ln). In model 3, we see that the relationship
between GDP and civil war is no longer significant, indicating that there is no significant
within unit effect of development on civil war. These results support my expectations and
the formal analysis offered by Chassang & Padro-i Miquel (2009), suggesting that the direct
and casual relationship attributed to development and civil war in the existing literature has
been overstated.
Table 6.4: Unit Effects and Civil War
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3





































N (states) 6310(143) 6310(143) 2756(56)
SEs in parentheses. ***sig at 1%; **sig at 5%; *sig at 10%.
27This is also confirmed by the non-significant Likelihood Ratio test, p = 0.497
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However, given the prominence of this finding, it is important to explore the other
factors which might explain this non-finding before discarding development as a determinant
of conflict. Therefore, I consider the two possible problems regularly associated with fixed
effects (as discussed in the previous section). First, scholars have suggested fixed effects is
inappropriate in models of conflict because of attendant sample censoring due to the rarity
of these events. The argument suggests that our results will be at best inefficient, and at
worse biased, by failing to account for those units which ever experience conflict. For GDP
in particular, omitting all the units which are high on GDP and low (i.e., zero) on conflict
may bias us away from finding a relationship between the two, as we are left to estimate on
a sub-set of countries that are all (relatively) impoverished.
I test whether this is indeed the case in Table 6.5. In Model 5, I estimate a pooled logit
on the sub-sample of states which have experience civil war at any point during the obser-
vational period. If researchers are correct that fixed effects results are biased from “treating
as non-informative all countries where we do not observed variation in the response,” this
should also present itself in this analysis. However, we see that while the coefficient es-
timate is attenuated (and the standard error marginally increased), this sample selection
does not induce any changes to the sign or significance of GDP. While other variables are
affected by this choice – mountain est and non-contig – the estimate of GDP remains pos-
itive and significant. Given that this is estimated on the same sample used in fixed effects
models, it simply cannot be the case that sample selection alone is inducing the findings we
observe. Approaching this same issue from a different direction, in Model 6 I estimate a
penalized maximum likelihood fixed effects (PML-FE) model which accounts for individual
unit heterogeneity but allows researchers to maintain the entire sample (see chapter 5 for an
explanation of this estimator). Here we see that despite maintaining the entire sample in our
analysis, the effect of GDP on civil war is no longer significant once unobserved unit effects
are accounted for. In sum, the differences in the results given by pooled and fixed effects
estimators are not dependent on the sample under analysis, here I have modified the sample
for both (censoring pooled and expanding fixed effects) and produced familiar results.
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Table 6.5: Unit Effects and Civil War: Sample Size
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6





































N (states) 6310(143) 2772(66) 6310(143)
SEs in parentheses. ***sig at 1%; **sig at 5%; *sig at 10%.
The other possibility presented in the literature is that the slow-changing nature of
GDP itself might pose problems for fixed effects estimation. As discussed at length in the
last section, when variables change slowly over time removing all the between variation, as in
fixed effects, may ‘mask’ the true effect of the regressor. GDP is regularly argued to possess
these features, yet no where have I actually seen this analyzed, that is, how slowly does
GDP change? This can be easily calculated by computing the mean and standard deviation
for GDP within each unit. We can then divide the mean of the standard deviation of GDP
within units (0.385) over the standard deviation of the means of GDP across units (0.963)
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to produce the within-to-between ratio (0.396). This is actually quite similar to one of the
experimental conditions tested earlier σwithin/σbetween = 0.4, there we saw that under the
least favorable conditions reported, fixed effects produces false negatives only 2.6% of the
time.28 As such, it is highly unlikely that the fixed effects specification is producing incorrect
conclusions.
In sum, the evidence seems to suggest that the fixed effects estimates differ from pooled
estimates not because the dependent variable is binary and rare or because GDP changes
slowly over time, but because there are unobservables related to both development and civil
war. Once these are properly accounted for, using fixed effects, the relationship between
GDP and civil war is no longer significant.
6.4 DISCUSSION
Per capita income is widely considered to be the most robust and significant determi-
nant of civil war. In large part, this stems from the undeniable reality that civil wars occur
more frequently in low-income countries. However, a strong empirical association does not
indicate a casual relationship. Yet, frequently civil war scholars have seemed to conflate
the two in the case of development and civil war. Here I have suggested that we need to
be cautious in our both our empirical approach and in our claims about this relationship.
Specifically, I have advocated the use of fixed effects to study this relationship. Though the
language of this chapter has been necessarily methodological, this issue is not simply one
of taste or a methodological nuisance. Rather, it represents a significant theoretical belief,
namely, whether we believe there are latent unobserved factors which cause some states to
experience (avoid) civil conflict. More specifically, are there unobservables which may de-
termine both conflict propensity and the included regressors? I have argued here that there
are strong reasons to suspect this is the case from development and civil war.
28We could even take this further and calculate the probability of observing the z-statistic produced in
our empirical results here (rather than using traditional levels of significance), doing so would just further
support the argument that these findings are unlikely to have arisen from error.
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When fixed effects models are estimated development and civil war are no longer signif-
icantly related. I have gone to some lengths to show that this is a consequence of theoretical
differences underlying the models, namely, the presence of unobserved unit heterogeneity.
Similar findings have traditionally been dismissed or discounted with appeals made to the
shortcomings of fixed effects for such models. While these concerns should be strongly con-
sidered and are likely to corrupt some relationships, I have shown that they are unlikely to
be doing so here. Specifically, neither complications arising from slowly changing regressors
nor sample selection are likely to have produced the findings discussed here. Instead, the
findings support my argument that unobservable factors contribute to both development and
civil war. Once these factors are directly introduced to the systematic part of the model the
‘most robust’ finding in the civil war literature appears to be no more.
In chapter 3 we saw that when the dynamics of civil war are properly accounted for
GDP is also no longer significance. As such, we have three possible explanations for what I
have called the ‘developmental peace.’ First, that GDP per capita is genuinely a contributing
factor to the emergence of civil war, as has been argued consistently in the conflict literature.
Second, that conflicts cluster in time and space in a pattern similar to low development, once
this temporal and spatial dependence is accounted for there is no longer a direct relationship
of GDP on conflict. Finally, that unobservable factors contribute both to the emergence
of low GDP and frequent conflict, with no direct relationship between the two. While I
have provided evidence for the latter two theories here, we ultimately want to discriminate
between the two. As such, I discuss how this might be achieved in the future in chapter 7.
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7.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
While the study of binary rare-events has long been central to the field of International
Relations, we have only begun to fully appreciate the unique challenges confronted with
these data. Though the problems are often analogous to those confronted with continuous-
outcome data, the solutions rarely are. Given the prevalence of these data within a range of
important issue areas in political science, it is important to improve our ability to surmount
these econometric challenges. Therefore, in the preceding text, I summarized and offered
possible solutions for two of these more significant challenges: (i) spatiotemporal auto-
dependence and (ii) unit-level heterogeneity. In short, I have engaged issues surrounding
the presumed independence of our data. While the problems posed from violating this core
tenet of statistical analysis is widely known – see any introductory econometrics book —
most applied works remain largely silent on the issues as I have raised them here, with few
noting these possible complications and fewer still seeking to redress them.
Spatial, temporal, and spatiotemporal dependence is likely to exist in most any data.
While the presence of possible temporal dependence has been appreciated for some time,
recent history should also motivate us to focus more closely on the means by which crises
propagate globally (i.e., spatially). There can be little question as to whether such events are
independently determined – they are not – these events are a consequence of both country-
level and systemic factors. Failing to incorporate the latter into our analysis risks our ability
to draw accurate conclusions, period. That is, failing to account for the (inter-)dependence
of these outcomes risks inefficiency at best, and often bias as well. Given these consequences,
it will always be good practice to test whether spatial dependence is present, even in those
(rare) instances where we expect it to be absent. These concerns are not simply academic, but
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have real policy implications for the understanding the occurrence of, and optimal response
to, a host of significant political phenomena (e.g., financial crises, civil conflict).
In chapter 2 of my dissertation, I attempted to further our ability to understand such
dynamics. I presented a BANC estimator (MSL-by-RIS) for dealing with endogenous spatial
lags for binary outcomes. Furthermore, I outline two ways (cumulative multivariate normal
probabilities and brute-force simulation) by which we can calculate substantive counterfac-
tual effects, thereby capturing the effect of the occurrence of some event in one unit-time on
the probability of an event in another unit-time. Both parameter and, more importantly,
effects estimation represent sizable advances over the extant IR ‘spatial’ literature which,
with rare exception, fails to address the endogeneity of the spatial lag – treating it as ex-
ogenous – and offers no estimate of the substantive effects, which are the quantities we are
actually interested in. As such, it is difficult to know what one should conclude from these
existing studies, what inference does one draw from a significant coefficient estimate on an
endogeneous regressor in a non-linear model? In future research, we should take greater care
to ensure our empirical strategies are able to offer meaningful results.
Given that for most of the issues IR scholars are interested in we will almost never
have experimental control, we must instead focus on making the most of the the historical
data we are presented. This is an incredibly difficult task, rife with complication. Even
in the proposed solutions suggested here, I have limited my focus to a particular aspect
of interconnectedness; simply looking at whether the level of exposure to the outcomes of
others increases the probability of a similar occurrence. In the future this can, and should,
be expanded to incorporate (at least) the three legs of the Epidemiologic Triad for disease
transmission: (i) the virulence of an external agent, (ii) the susceptibility of host, (iii) and
the conditions of the environment. This will give us a much clearer picture on the risk
of spatial spillovers than simply looking at the degree of exposure. In future work I plan
to extend to attempt to incorporate this theoretic model more completely in our empirical
analysis.
Even with the less developed model of interconnectedness presented here, we have
seen the clear theoretical importance of understanding these dynamics. In chapter 3, I
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showed how the conflict trap is actually a regional phenomena, with spatial and temporal
dependence augmenting one another. Specifically, I argue that contagion is a mechanism that
increases the persistence of conflict, and more persistent conflicts increase the likelihood of
contagion. These mutually-reinforcing positive-feedback loops help explain why we observe
conflict-prone regions and offer a more complete understanding of the ‘conflict trap.’ This
underlines the importance of a regional approach when peacekeepers are enacting conflict
management strategies. In the future it will also be important to understand how the
possibility of external intervention influences these dynamics.
My research has also shown the importance of spatial dynamics in understanding finan-
cial crises. Specifically, in chapter 4 I find that states with common political fundamentals
are more likely to experience simultaneous financial crises. While I argue that this is driven
by investor updating, more work is needed to prove that this mechanism should be preferred
to possible alternatives. At minimum, however, it suggests that political institutions do
matter in the contagion of financial crises. Therefore, explaining the exact process by which
they matter remains a fruitful area for future research. The results also illustrate the impor-
tance of estimating models with a better specified spatial structure. We observed that when
included in a model with other possible sources of contagion, the effect of trade is drastically
reduced. This lies is stark contrast to much of the existing contagion literature in economics
which has largely utilized single spatial-lag models and find strong effects of trade.
In the final two chapters, chapter 5 and chapter 6, I addressed another possible source
of dependence in our data: constant unit-effects. While the ‘Dirty Pool’ symposium greatly
advanced our understand of how best to model unit-level heterogeneity with binary-outcome
data in International Relations, the time had come to revisit that debate. Many of the
conclusions rendered there are reconsidered and shown to not be as dire as once thought.
Above all, I propose a strategy to avoid the sample losses which generated much of the debate
in ‘Dirty Pool’: penalized-maximum-likelihood fixed-effects (PML-FE). I show how PML can
provide finite estimates for parameters even in instances of perfect separation, allowing us
to estimate a fixed-effects model where all units are retained, minimizing the risk of bias
and improving efficiency. As such, I argue, should be the preferred approach for modeling
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rare-event binary data. Using this estimator, I (re-)visit the relationship between GDP and
civil conflict. I show that despite strong claims to the contrary, we should be suspicious of
research arguing for a direct relationship between development and war. Once we account
for potential unobservables, driving both development and conflict, there is no longer any
relationship. While researchers have called upon the ‘Dirty Pool’ conclusions to explain
away this non-finding, I show that many of these justifications are specious (e.g., sample
selection, nearly time-invariant regressors) and that fixed effects should be the preferred
approach. As such, I we need to reconsider the debate linking development and poverty and
offer alternative explanations for what remains an interesting empirical regularity.
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